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Chapter 1: Institutions, Incentives and Urban Development
As a focus for local politics, urban development dominates the political landscape
of contemporary St. Louis. The drive to foster the revitalization of the city has
preoccupied the activities of the current mayor and his staff, and has been a dominant
theme of each mayor since the 1950s. In St. Louis’ post-World War II period,
development activities have included large urban renewal projects, public housing and
other housing oriented to low-income residents, downtown commercial development of
hotels and sports stadiums, and neighborhood revitalization efforts aimed at encouraging
private investment to boost the number of middle income residents. These activities have
involved civic leaders from a variety of different perspectives—from neighborhood
residents seeking to foster residential stability, to regional business leaders seeking to
identify how the city fits into the area’s economy.
St. Louis’s preoccupation with development politics may reflect the seriousness
of its economic situation, facing its sixth consecutive decade of demographic decline and
in a secondary position regionally in most economic sectors. However, it is by no means
unique, both across contemporary cities and historically, reflecting the key role that
development has played for the formation, maturation and continued viability of
American cities. Additionally, development has been a central focus of those scholars
who have studied urban affairs and governance. Unlike their European counterparts,
American cities emerged as places for commerce instead of places of culture or symbols
of national sovereignty. Urban governance has largely comprised the activities of local
leaders to promote growth and, more recently, manage the consequences of decline. The
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history of most American cities is a history of how local leaders have sought to promote
their city’s natural advantages and market it for trade, industry, and new residents.
The work of St. Louis’ contemporary leadership to foster economic rejuvenation
is a successor to these earlier efforts, although now expanded in scope and intensity.
Current development policy-making encompasses a diverse set of activities—local public
financing, eminent domain, ownership and sale of public assets. The planning and
implementation of projects involves a wide range of actors—from community groups to
the local chamber of commerce—and participants from both the public and private
sector. The development decision-making process ranges from the rather technical
decisions made by city bureaucrats, to large and politically complicated projects that
involve multiple approvals from local agencies, to the policy decisions that structures
how limited public financial support for development initiatives is distributed.
This study uses the example of St. Louis to identify how local leaders make
decisions about development and what factors influence the type of projects that come to
fruition. The thesis of the study is that St. Louis economic conditions and decentralized
political structure creates a system of development decision-making that is substantially
privatized. At the center of local development activity are place-based entrepreneurs who
understand the local market—the constraints and opportunities provided by local
neighborhood landscapes—and work to change the incentive structure for economic
reinvestment. Included in this is the creation of development images for particular
projects and particular markets whose implementation are both economically and
politically viable. While these entrepreneurs can include local political leaders as well as
members of the civic organizations, most importance is the enunciation of strategies and
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vision for redevelopment that attracts private sector investors and local development
entrepreneurs. The leadership of the private sector in planning and implementing
development policy is the flipside of local public development institutions that are
fragmented and reactive. Over time, local political leaders, particularly in the mayor’s
office, have worked both to clarify the supportive role of the public sector and how it
responds to private sector initiative.
This analysis starts from the perspective that St. Louis’ system of development is
a function of both the diminution of the economic role of center cities due to increased
regional, economic competition, particularly for residents and the businesses that attract
them, and the reduction of federal aid for urban redevelopment. Intra-metropolitan
competition has left St. Louis as the inner city diminished as both the region’s central
focus of population and economic activity; the decline of the city’s traditional economic
base has scattered the economic elite whose personal and corporate future depended upon
the city. Federal aid once provided local political leaders substantial resources to plan
and implement redevelopment projects; its loss, and the gradual shift of aid to incentives
has made local projects even more dependent on private sector resources. At the same
time, however, this form of development decision-making is significantly shaped by the
city’s decentralized political structure, one that gives great incentives for local aldermen
to support the private developers that work in their wards. Political decentralization
meets the strategic need of developers and development investors seeking to strategic
opportunities to investment in stable housing markets such as loft development, new
housing projects and historic neighborhoods.
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To demonstrate these claims, this analysis will look at development as a form of
local policy-making and will particularly look at local decision-making around
development projects shapes development outcomes. While the concept of urban
regimes is a starting place for the analysis, the study looks toward neo-institutional theory
as a grounding part for the analysis. The concept of institutional settings are used to
convey the fact that development decision-making is contained within specific
institutional contexts that define participants, the roles they play and the frameworks that
they bring into their participation. In this manner, institutional settings provides a series
of incentives for the participation of local actors—dictating a set of formal and routines
that guides who participates in the development process, how development initiatives are
prioritized, and what initiatives emerge. These institutional settings are specific to both
particular markets in the city, was well as particular type of development projects. They
develop historically—past initiatives shape the types of projects participants are likely to
pursue in the future. Additionally, they can shift as new types of development initiatives
emerge.
The use of the term “development” within this study requires some explanation.
Urban development is at the same time a profession, a process and an outcome. In
conventional terms, it can be defined as any set of activities taken by local people to
enhance the long-term social, economic, and environmental conditions of their
community. While increasingly development initiatives, particularly at the residential
neighborhood level, combine both physical development and the development of the
social capacity of a community, this analysis will mostly look at the physical
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development initiatives and analyze the development of social capacity as it impacts the
planning and implementation of development projects.
The study focused on two sets of development initiatives that occurred in the City
of St. Louis beginning in the mid-1990s. First, the study analyzes redevelopment
initiatives within the city’s central business district (CBD). Once the center of the
region’s commercial, retail and white-collar economy, the dominance of St. Louis’ CBD
has been declining since the 1950s. Even with a series of high profile projects in the
1970s and 1980s—shifting the CBD’s role to a tourist and entertainment destination—
vacancy and obsolescence in the area’s building stock has continued. More recently, St.
Louis’ downtown has seen increased investment in the form of hotels, sport stadiums and
entertainment venues and, increasingly, loft dwellings for young professionals and other
middle class residents. The redevelopment of certain prime buildings downtown has
come with the increased attention of local political and civic leaders, including a highly
publicized downtown planning process and the initiation of a new public/private
partnership, called Downtown Now!, to oversee implementation of the plan.
Secondly, the study analyzes neighborhood development initiatives occurring in
JeffVanderLou and the 5th Ward area of St. Louis, an area collectively known as the near
north side. JeffVanderLou is an African American, low-income community adjacent to
the city’s midtown arts district area. A historic area of African-American homeownership in the first part of the 20th century, JeffVanderLou was designated a model city
area in the 1960s as population loss and housing abandonment increased. However, these
interventions did not halt the social and economic decline of the community in the 1980s
and 1990s. More recently, the area has been the focus of a comprehensive community

7

William, Winter, 2006, UMSL, p.

8

development initiative in 1999 sponsored by local political leaders and funded by local
foundations and corporations, leading to a number of planned activities to improve the
area’s housing market and social services. The 5th Ward similarly is a majority African
American community north of downtown that has seen significant economic and
demographic decline over the past twenty years. Like JVL, the 5th Ward underwent a
planning process in 2000, and extensive physical rebuilding before and since then,
including a number of public housing reconversion projects and development of new
housing subdivisions.
Towards An Institutional Approach to Development Decision-Making
In analyzing these projects, this study will deviate from the primary methods by
which urban scholars have addressed local the topic of urban development. First has
been the practitioner literature associated with the planning and initiation of development
projects. This literature includes studies on trends in neighborhood development
(Keating, Krumholtz and Star, 1996), collections focusing on current development policy
issues (van Liet, 1997), stories on the successes in urban revitalization (Grogan and
Proscio, 2000), evaluations of best practices in the field (Garvin, 1996) and
recommendations from experts and practitioners (Suchman, 1994). These types of
studies vary in their treatment of broader political considerations, but generally treat the
politics and policies impacting development priorities as outside their emphasis. The
technocratic bias in some of this literature reflects the fact that the development has
become increasingly professionalized—both in the public and private sector—and that
scholarship must inform the capacity and best practices of those who work in this sector.
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More generally, however, urban scholars have used the issue of urban
development as way to explore the place of cities within the broader system of American
politics. For these scholars, local case studies provide the opportunity to theorize about
the effects of the American political economy and the nation’s federal system on the
ability of local leaders to pursue development policies. The debate has been over the
“limitations of locality”—to what extent the choices of local leaders have been
constrained by the local economic and political milieu (Clarke and Gaile, 1997; Judd,
2000). Within a political economy perspective, scholars have noted how the nation’s
federal political system and private market economic system might constrain the abilities
of local leaders to pursue distributive policies (Peterson, 1981), and how the limitations
of the power of local political officials to pursue economic development is overcome
through collaborations with the local business elite (Molotch, 1976; Mollenkopf, 1983).
Clarence Stone (1989: 6) has called these collaborations as “urban regimes” and has
defined them “the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests
function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions.”
Regimes represent one way for public leaders to overcome the limitations imposed by the
broader political and economic environment and to create an institutional device to
“produce the capacity to govern and to bring about publicly significant results” (Stone,
1989: 9).
This analysis of development decision-making in St. Louis starts with the
contribution of past scholarship—particularly regime theory—as an important building
block, but will attempt to shift the grounding of the study by incorporating
institutionalism as its primary frame. The broader political and economic environment
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provides a base for local government activities, one that local leaders are largely unable
to change. An increasingly international economy places local cities in direct
competition with regions across the world, with seemingly no increase in their capacity to
bargain with economic decision-makers. Additionally, for the last 30 years, local leaders
have largely responded—rather than initiated—the drastic changes in the relationship
between their cities and America’s federal government. On the other hand, how local
cities have responded to these challenges is in part a function of factors intrinsic to the
local political sphere, relating to the capacity of local governments as it developed within
a specific local context. That many cities have entered a period of aggressive
entrepreneurialism cannot be denied. American cities, as well as their counterparts in
Europe, enter into the 21st century less as passive reflectors of national and international
trends and more as “independent political actors,” engaging “in aggressive placemarketing and competition for investment” (Judd, 2000: 956).
It seems obvious that any investigation of development in major American cities
would utilize a theoretical approach that combines the contributions of the broader
political economy as well as the local interactions that comprise the local political
ecology (Jones and Bachelor, 1993). It seems equally clear that in their activities the
capacities of local actors vary and that the characteristics of local institutional
arrangements depend not only on the specific interactions of elected officials and local
business elite only, but other aspects of a local political culture. The starting point to
understanding variation in local institutional arrangements is by the direct investigation
of development decision-making and how participants view the constraints and
opportunities impacting their roles.
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In order to theorize about the latter in the context of St. Louis, this study will
borrow from the renewed importance of institutionalism in political science and urban
studies more specifically. This sort of institutional approach is implicit in the regime
framework—since the 1980s the most prominent scholarship of urban development—but
the application of the regime framework is ultimately limited. The concept of regime
denotes the existence of deep, persistent and sustaining patterns of collaboration between
local elected political leaders and local businesses in planning and implementing local
development. The hierarchical model of the classical regime—a strong mayor and an
organized business elite—matched the model of local political organization preferred by
Progressive reformers and made popular by notable American mayors in the post war
urban renewal period. Urban regime theory has created an archetype of local institutional
relationships that has become progressively less applicable as a range of case studies
have applied the concept to other cities. These case studies have noted the importance of
other actors besides politicians and business elite (Ferman, 1996), as well as questioning
the assumption that businesses have sustained interests in the affairs of local cities (Jones
and Bachelor, 1993). More fundamentally, scholars have questioned the assumption that
local economic interests dominate policy-making (Reese and Rosenfield, 2002) and that
the development choices of local political leaders reflect less the logic of economic
constraints and more the choices imposed by the political logic of representation
(Swanstrom, 1989).
These studies and others have added to the typology of regimes, incorporating
such factors as the role of neighborhood organizations (Ferman, 1996), the impact of
progressive ideology (DeLeon, 1992) and symbolic activity generally (Henry and
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Paramio-Salcines, 1999), and the role of non-local actors (Burns and Thomas, 2003). In
doing so, a more nuanced picture of local regimes emerges and improves the concept as a
framework as a tool for comparative analysis. However, methodologically it takes
scholarship further away from the task required—a deductive, theory-building approach
that starts from individual decisions within the context of specific policy processes.
Regime theory is a useful starting point because it correctly relates the form of
policy-making to the participants of policy-making, and in turn to the operation of policy
processes to the outputs of public policy. Its limitation is methodological and ultimately
theoretical. In an application of it that over-relies on structural approaches, regime theory
treats the behavior of individual actors as a function of a set of generalized community
characteristics. Additionally, comparative studies have suggested that even where factors
are similar, cities differ in their policy outcomes according to their local political
institutions (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999). In application to a successive series of
case studies, regime theory becomes less theory and more a generalized framework
saying increasingly little about outcomes in specific policy processes. To make
meaningful conclusions about development decision-making means moving beyond the
“limitations of locality” debate and, in exchange, developing a framework for
understanding how the different components of the urban structure—political and
economic forces, local political interest and pressure groups and the formal and informal
structures of local governance—provide a context for local behavior.
In neo-institutional approaches to political science lies the intent of scholarship to
place institutions—formal organizations, legislative bodies and the rules and regulations
by which policy is made—as independent variables in the policy-making process. In this

12

William, Winter, 2006, UMSL, p. 13

view, neither the preferences of participants nor social and economic constraints can
alone explain policy outcomes (March and Olsen, 1984). The term “institution” should
be thought of broadly. It includes formal organizations and interest groups, political
structures and institutions, bureaucratic and organization rules, and local political norms
and culture. Institutions shape political behavior by defining a system for political debate
and conflict and influencing what political actors view as both possible and preferable
(Steinmo, 2001).
While neo-institutional approaches vary, two primary schools stand out, differing
in their frame of analysis and methodological interests. “Historical” or “organizational
institutionalism” incorporates those scholars who emphasize the impact of the rules and
regulations of formal association and policy-making procedures and how they shape
politics and policy (March and Olson, 1989; Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985;
Thelen, 1999). These scholars generally see political institutions as a primary, but not
solitary factor in policy and political debates. In terms of how institutions structure
individual behavior, their frame of reference includes political culture, organizational
rules and formal institutions and organizations. In the urban field, scholars have looked
at the influences of the formal organizations of local politics—reformed political systems
versus unreformed systems, for example—on the outcomes of local policy (Clingermayer
and Feiock, 1990; Reese, 1997). On the other hand, “individual institutionalism”
incorporates a strong behavioral assumption in its emphasis on individual actions as
responding to and generating specific institutional contexts (Moe, 1987; Ostrom, 1991).
Some scholars working from this perspective are also labeled as part of “new economic
institutional” approaches that explain the importance of institutional contexts on the
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incentives of actors to make rational decisions in light of uncertainty and imperfect
information (North, 1990).
While a deep chasm philosophically and politically can exist between these
schools, there are complementarities between them, a fact recognized by both scholars of
urban governance (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003) as well as those concerned with neoinstitutional theory (Kato, 1996). Organizational analysis sets the framework for the
analysis of individual actors. On the most simplistic level, changes in the structure of
development decision-making demonstrate how local entrepreneurs not only work within
existing frameworks but also act strategically to change them. One of the critical tasks of
local leaders generally is to help build the capacity of local government and development
partners (Judd, 2000).
Urban Development as Local Policy Processes
One method to synthesize the different levels of analysis—that of the policy
entrepreneur on the one hand and local political culture on the other—is to analyze local
decision-making as a form of a policy-making process. The context of policy process
links characteristics of the local political culture, the informal and informal rules defining
local action, with the characteristics of the “institutional milieu” of local organizations
(DiGaetano and Strom, 2003), and the actions of policy entrepreneurs and other local
participants. In one sense, development deals seem somewhat narrower than what
conventionally is encompassed within a definition of public policy-making (Jenkins,
1978). Development activities comprise a narrowly technical set of processes undertaken
by professionals within the context of a specific deal. These technical processes occur
with the involvement of local developers, non-profit organizations, city planners, elected
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officials and other civic leaders and can be related to the specifics of the deal—for
example, blighting bills, community development commission hearings, or planning
studies (The Development Training Institute, 1995). Other processes important to urban
development, however, serve as a background to the specific deals and relate to the
broader balance of power within community development politics. One example in St.
Louis has been the varying weight of the mayor’s office or the Board of Aldermen in
distribution of CDBG funds, a balance that has shifted over time in the struggles between
the two branches of local government. The distinction between the two is, on the one
hand, the formal creation and initiation of a framework for prioritizing of issues and
interests in development and, on the other hand, the lower level decisions over specific
policy-deals that occur in discrete organizational settings. Both involve political debate,
sometimes on the micro-level of jurisdictional debates, and are related to each other in an
iterative fashion.
The study will borrow from the policy process literature the concept that policymaking occurs within specific institutional contexts that reflect the participation of a
distinct group of actors and a particular institutional milieu that informs their behavior
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; DiGaetano and Strom, 2003). This study
will use the somewhat broader term of “institutional setting” to designate the specific
context of development decision-making. Locally, these institutional settings vary in
terms of their capacity, cohesion and integration of activities, and range from highly
organized, professionalized and coherent structures with clear rules and norms, to highly
chaotic, fragmented processes with little consistency in the type of participants and the
type of decisions made.
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Within them, however, are individuals located at specific points in decisionmaking processes. Local participants in the decision-making process—both the
individuals who pitch particular initiatives and the representatives of organized interests
that support or facilitate community development strategies—are akin to the policy
entrepreneurs influential in defining and formulating policy in national policy processes
(Kingdon, 1995). Individual actors will behave strategically to maximize approval and
implementation of development initiatives, with the characteristics of local policy
processes informing and shaping their behavior.
Another useful facet of the policy process perspective is the notion of how policy
communities change (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Institutionalism generally has
renewed the interest in historical studies of policy processes and how past processes
impact contemporary decisions (Robertson, 1993). However, despite the underlining
structural conditions that inform policy-making, both routinization and instability are
evident in local development decision-making. The institutional structure of local policymaking both reflects and sustains stability by subscribing a set of practices and rules for
participation in the decision-making. The fate of past initiatives provides clues for
successful strategies in the future, as well as increases the legitimacy of a particular
decision-making process. However, the status quo can be punctuated by changes as
participants use the opportunities in the political environment—the political-economic
environment, the emergence of new problems or solutions, or the initiation of new
institutions—to change how decisions are made. Local mayors, for example, may be
most able to influence this process, including creating new mechanisms for policymaking when existing processes stymie their proposals.
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Policy Processes and Political Entrepreneurs
Urban development decision-making within the focus of a set of related processes
adds a third level of analysis to the twin tracks of institutional analysis. The three levels
link theoretical concerns with the critical questions addressed by scholarship and the
methods of analysis that will be used in this study to address them. The first level is that
focusing on the local political culture that informs development decision-making. In
organizational terms, this includes local political institutions, local and regional economic
development authorities, and community-level organizations and pressures groups. In St.
Louis, these include both private sector groups, public agencies and, increasingly, publicprivate organizations. These organizations operate at all ends of the development
process—from conceiving of projects, acting as gatekeepers for approval, and
implementing the projects.
Also significant on this level are the constraints of local political culture.
Individual actions often conform to a sense of how the system works—an illusive factor
to capture, but critical in analysis. In St. Louis, development decisions are informed by
the constitutionally mandated structure of St. Louis politics—the 28 member Board of
Aldermen, for example, and the segregation of elected “county” offices outside the direct
control of the mayor—as well as the informal practices that guide decision-making—the
notion of aldermanic courtesy, for example, and the routines of public and private
participation in decision-making. Overtime, these aspects have created a set of local
practices that routinize local activity and inform how local leaders at various places
within decision-making processes will respond to emerging challenges and opportunities.
Rules and routines create networks of activities that are mutually beneficial for
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participants in terms of sharing information, linking parts of the process, and creating an
institutional structure for shared work. One the one hand, this work comprises the formal
organizations and institutions that comprise development decision-making. Of key
importance is the difference between organizations and networks, each with rules
establishing the basic operating principles of the organization and the roles and
responsibilities of its members (Portz, Stein and Jones, 1999). On the other hand,
decision-making is sustained through networks of collaborative activity taking place at
various points in the decision-making process. The existence of networks is critical for
the work of public entrepreneurs “because they create efficiencies in assembling the
resources necessary in production process” (Schneider and Teske, 1995: 174).
Informing the level of organizations and networks is a methodological approach
that investigates the activities of local actors, their values and motivations. The bulk of
the work in completing this study has been interviews with policy-makers—broadly
defined—involved in community development work. The interviews have been
conducted to uncover the complimentary and competing roles of these actors within the
three sets of projects that have been chosen and demonstrate how they conceptualize their
role in the local development.
The second level of institutional analysis focuses upon the individual actors and
how they respond to restraints placed upon them. In the field of community
development, participants include elected officials, local political appointees or staff
members, professionals in development agencies, private sector actors, paid and
volunteer members of civic associations and other civic organizations, and neighborhood
activists and residents. In this sense, institutional analysis calls on a reappraisal of the
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role of public entrepreneurs in the development decision-making process. A traditional
view of the role of entrepreneurs emerged in the discussions of mayors in the urban
renewal period, emphasizing their role in organizing and initiating public housing and
slum clearance projects (Salisbury, 1964). With increased competition and federal
retrenchment from urban policies, scholars point to the increased entrepreneurial activity
on the part of local actors to “identify, evaluate, anticipate and even help to develop and
create the markets for private producers to explore, aided by necessary by government as
subsidizer or co-investor” (Eisinger, 1988: 9).
Within recent urban scholarship is a field of study that has approached local
actors as public entrepreneurs and examined local contexts to the degree that they offer
incentives for local actors to pursue projects and policy-making (Schneider and Teske,
1995). This literature borrows from the discussion of private sector entrepreneurs in their
definition of entrepreneurs as individuals who discover market opportunities and take
advantage of newly created possibilities to create profit (Casson, 1982; Schumpeter,
1934). While the nature of politics makes the concept of profits slightly more complex,
in politics
“entrepreneurs exploit market opportunities and seek profits by adapting
products, policies, or programs evident in one policy sphere or political
jurisdiction to the domain in which they are operating or by proposing
newer or more experimental programs” (Schneider and Teske, 1993: 321).
In this view, policy entrepreneurs are “embedded” in local social networks that help
reduce uncertainty and create an opportunity for sustained and productive relationships
within specific policy fields (Schneider and Teske, 1995). Within the development field,
policy entrepreneurs promote linkages within the policy-making process and provide new
solutions to development dilemmas (Goetz, 1990); in doing so, policy entrepreneurs play
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a critical role in the decision-making process, particularly when decision-making is
fragmented. This view of policy entrepreneurship is broader, more inclusive, and more
accurate than the conception of the strong mayor in that entrepreneurs can be found at
many points of the policy process (Kingdon, 1995). The defining characteristics of
policy entrepreneurs, “much as in the case of a business entrepreneur, is their willingness
to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in the hopes
of a future return” (Kingdon, 1995: 122).
To these two, the level of institutional settings adds a third level of analysis,
particularly in the evaluation of their ability for capacity, cohesion, and collective action.
Capacity refers to both the strength of relationships between local actors as well as their
programmatic ability to achieve key goals (Portz, Stein and Jones, 1999; Stone, 2001).
Urban scholars have increasingly turned to this notion in their discussions of urban
governance, and have especially used the term to highlight the presence of long-lasting
and effective interaction between corporate leaders and elected political leaders in
advancing and implementing urban initiatives (Stone, 1989). For a city like St. Louis—a
city, as it will be shown, whose institutions promotes the diffusion of political power—
this view of structural capacity may be less important that the political capacity of
specific political leaders. Over time, incoherence within local policy processes creates a
feedback look that makes the consolidation of decision-making increasingly unlikely;
policy-making incoherence becomes a component of deal making rather than a political
obstacle to be overcome. Thus, while most of St. Louis’ recent mayors have advocated
structural changes increasing their control over policy-making, their success has more
likely depended upon their ability to work within the confines of the existing political
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system to maximize their political leverage over development decision-making (Stein,
2002).
Another factor in the analysis of the institutional setting of local decision-making
relates to the internal dynamics between the various decision-points involved in any
community development decision. Capacity is intimately related to these sets of
interrelationships, not simply their number—which is likely to multiple in complicated
development deals—but whether they are cohesive and cooperative on the one hand or
fragmented and competitive on the other. How well differing decision-points in the
policy-making process reflects some of the institutional issues raised previously—the
structure of local politics, the rules and norms guiding decision-making, and personal and
formal power of local actors to bring them together.
One macro-level consideration for policy entrepreneurs is the observation that
over time local policy processes within cities have become more fragmented. In the
policy process literature, policy fragmentation has been noted as a part of the more
general trend away from independent subsystems, as greater complexity and a greater
number of interest groups increase interdependence in politics and open up political
debate to greater influence (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Policy communities are less
likely to monopolize issue areas, with the consequence that participants are less likely to
communicate regularly with each other, understand the broader implications of their
decisions or share common attitudes and outlooks (Kingdon, 1995). On the local level,
policy fragmentation within cities has been the consequence of functional specialization
of formal roles (Stone, 2001), the devolution of federal policy (Koschinsky and
Swanstrom, 2001), and the formal organizing structure of local politics (Stein, 2002), as
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well as the complexity of problems facing city leadership. In the face of this, the task of
political entrepreneurship is as much initiating new institutional frameworks as it is to
development new networks to link local policy processes together. In the language of
local development, participants in the development process work to create new models of
project activity and assist in their implementation to create some sort of capacity.
Collectively over time, these activities shift the incentive structure of development
politics, shifting how participants view development opportunities and constraints and
achieve a plateau of stability and routinization in the local development process.
The Importance of Development Images in Development Decision-Making
Another feature of the policy process literature is the notion of a specific policy
image informs local behavior, specifically the strong connection between specific policy
images and the institutional arrangements that support their implementation
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). In a similar form, development often occurs within the
context of a development image, either referring to the specifics of the initiative or a
broader vision of neighborhood identity. At the same time, these development images
play a methodological role in the analysis of development decision-making. One
question to be ascertained from development participants is how they understand their
role in development, whether they share a sense of collaboration and consensus over the
goals of development policy, and how their activities come to exhibit a degree of
regularity or routinization over time. In this sense, the primary input for this study is the
language of development participants—gathered through interviews, review of primary
project documents and secondary sources such as local reports and press.
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While the constellation of local actors provides a significant context for
development activities, development images are by no means uniform across any one
city. Specific urban places matter in terms of how these forces interact and the impact of
their activities. This significance is often unrecognized by urban scholars but
immediately clear to local development practitioners; the relative costs and benefits of
particular place underlie much of local conversations about development. While the
overall characteristics of the city, county and region set constraints in terms of resources,
markets and local capacities, there is wide variance in development opportunities and
outcomes within a city like St. Louis and with other municipalities in the St. Louis
region.
In the language of real estate promotion, the factor of specific place is often in a
short hand way described as “location, location, location.” Location is an intangible but
real notion within the real estate industry of the power of specific places in terms of
attracting, retaining and growing investments. Interviews with local practitioners
demonstrate that the notion of place are widely understood and recognized, and that the
characteristics of specific places as they are invested with meaning by practitioners
enormously impacts development processes. In methodological terms, the language of
participants can treated as a set of beliefs about development opportunities and
constraints. As will be demonstrated in the specific treatment of development activities,
development participants can have very clear perceptions about the framework for
development, and their responses to questions demonstrate unambiguous conceptions
about the roles of participants in the development process and the critical decision-points
within these processes. In addition, participants have a localized understanding about
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development, reflecting their sense of how development opportunities shift from block to
block and from neighborhood to neighborhood.
Such understandings of local conditions can be identified in a wide variety of
manners—from informal and subtle messages in marketing materials to more technical
and professional analyses of marketing studies and project financial statements. As an
example of the first, in everyday conversations, neighborhood names can be loaded
descriptors, evaluating and providing quick judgments of the economic performance of a
local housing market and the quality of life of its residents. Urban marketers have joined
the practices of those marketing the newer suburban subdivisions in place branding,
utilizing neighborhood marketing to communicate historic housing, neighborhood
amenities and other local features. Cutting across neighborhood boundaries are other
features of urban markets—the current focus on loft living as one—that signify desirable
aspects of contemporary living. This sort of language functions as more than just
marketing slogans; they also serve as conceptual shortcuts for describing specific places,
and within them specific types of development activities, and for signifying their
importance and impact.
Given the importance of private market investment in contemporary community
development, it is often the language of the local market that has the most value for
participants in development politics. Included in this grouping are the reports created by
property appraisers and marketing analysts, financial projections, and other quantitative
analyses of local housing and development markets by bankers and financiers. This sort
of language attempts to describe the objective economic reality involving the value of
proposed projects within a particular community. The fact that third party actors under a
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professional standing compile some of this information strengthens the notion that this
information is privileged over other forms of informal valuation. In many urban
neighborhoods, these estimates of local market strengthen frankly act as constraints on
development initiatives. However, both the less formal descriptors of local markets and
formal economic language for any one market can shift; indeed, overseeing the shift of
these considerations is a key activity of place-based entrepreneurs.
While competing messages abound in any local context, the coherence of a
particular set of descriptors within one place suggests that language can represent a
shared set of assumptions about the ability of development initiatives to be successful
over the long term. Put in another way, the behavior of actors responds to and reinforces
a particular development image. Actors look to the presence of particular descriptors as
an indication of confidence and a signal for their participation in development activities.
On a formal level, the language of planning, predevelopment activities and project
implementation likewise can demonstrate a shared sense of confidence. Planning
documents—a common feature to the community development activities in many
communities, including the three to be analyzed here—can be read both as blueprints for
future projects; the maps that often accompany them visually attempt to order the
physical terrain into a series of understandable component parts.
In the context of this study, these development images are an important
component to the institutional setting around development decision-making for specific
communities and specific types of projects. For emerging development initiatives or
markets, the creation of a new development image can be a necessary condition of a new
round of development activity. While competing development images abound in any
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local context, the coherence of a particular set of descriptors within one place suggests
that language can represent a shared set of assumptions about development initiative.
Conversely, the lack of consistency signifies the lack of consensus over development
goals and how individual actors participate in development politics.
Private Sector Leadership in Development Decision-making
The three levels of analysis suggest a set of hypotheses and key questions based
upon how they relate to each other in community development decision-making.
Previous research provides both a standard view as well as unanswered concerns that are
crucial in this analysis. The standard view is that American federalism and political
economic structure constrain the choices available to local elected leaders. Institutional
devices such as urban regimes provide the local capacity for a strong mayor and
organized business leadership to plan and implement development projects. Local
capacity emerges in institutional settings that emphasize local executive leadership, both
in the political and in the private sector. Political entrepreneurs work at the top level of
these processes with local institutional structures that are both routine and established but
at the same time open and flexible.
Such a view underlies the regime concept, although the level of local institutions
is underspecified. The standard view also emphasizes a particular relationship between
form of local political structure and local development capacity that has been
substantiated in a number of studies of economic development decision-making. Local
leadership capacity has been linked to the presence of strong political coalitions and
strong public-private collaborations (Judd and Parkinson, 1990). The emergence of
public entrepreneurs advocating pro-growth politics is associated with cities that have
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full-time mayors and strong local business groups (Schneider and Teske, 1993). In
general, unreformed political systems, with a strong mayor’s office and smaller city
council, appear best suited to aggressively carry out development policy (Reese, 1997).
Other aspects of local organization—including a professionalized and highly trained
economic development bureaucracy—also facilitate initiation of development projects
(Jones and Bachelor, 1993).
In the case of St. Louis, economic and political conditions fail to structure local
politics to provide the mayor’s office with this level of local control. The activities of
mayors in the past seem to indicate the limits of mayoral prerogative in planning and
implementing local development projects. The implication is that St. Louis’ capacity will
be low and policy entrepreneurship difficult to sustain and the emergence of local
capacity presupposes structural political change that recasts political organization in the
city and creates the incentives for the mayor to consolidate the policy-making process
into an effective community development regime.
The study will attempt to show how St. Louis’ case both conforms to and
provides valuable additions to the standard view. On the one hand, comparative studies
have generally misconstrued the field of local development by overemphasizing
structural constraints and de-emphasizing how local contexts provide incentives to policy
entrepreneurs to pursue projects. More importantly, from the view of practitioners in
development decision-making, development is a series of processes across a number of
institutional settings involving both “peak bargaining” between political and economic
elite (Jones and Bachelor, 1993) as well as routinized decisions and day to day actions by
professionals and other professional actors (Reese, 1993). In this sense, regimes are both
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an ideal rarely found as well as a process only marginally applicable to development
activities. For cities like St. Louis, policy entrepreneurship is less an outcome of the
well-oiled machine of a consolidated regime and more a necessity for any meaning-level
of development. The case of development projects in St. Louis indicates how the
substantial devolution and economic competition of local development economies creates
local institutional structures that reinforce the substantial privatization of development
decision-making, with public leadership playing a supporting and limited role.
Power and Limitations of the Case Study Approach
The use of the City of St. Louis as a single case study as opposed to a comparative
approach means that the analysis might require some additional justification. The
method has been widely used in business and public management (Taylor, 1994) and are
common for a series of studies germane to this analysis—Stone’s study of Atlanta (Stone,
1989), Jones and Bachelor’s analysis of Detroit (Jones and Bachelor, 1993) and DeLeon
on San Francisco’s urban regime (DeLeon, 1992). Critics of the approach pointed to
three issues with the methodology. First is the suggestion that it inherently destroys the
“scientific distance” implicit in more quantitative techniques. Additionally, critics have
suggested that case studies lack rigor and, because they do not measure independent and
dependent variables, they lead to arbitrary interpretations (Runyon, 1982; Yin, 1984).
Secondly, critics have charged that case studies lack representation with respect to a
larger sample of their study frame and so lack the ability to generalize findings (Smith
and Robbins, 1982). Most significantly, proponents of the case study risk the danger of
selecting for analysis only cases that confirm their hypothesis, imperiling the validity of
their research.
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While recognizing these limitations, this analysis proceeds from the point that the
case study method remains a valuable tool for exploring new interpretations and
suggesting new lines of inquiry. In this sense, one of the purposes of this analysis is not
to create a predictive model or determining cause and effect relationships but suggest
new additional factors to consider, particularly around what local factors account for the
emergence of policy entrepreneurs in development decision-making. Other aspects of the
research undertaken for this analysis have been included in order to improve the method
and overcome its limitations. First is the use of triangulation in the collection and
analysis of qualitative data (Bromley, 1986). In terms of this research, it has meant
multiple sourcing of conclusions and interpretations about events and conditions—either
through interviews, secondary documents or collected data. Additionally, in response to
the single observation issue, scholars using case study methodology have advocated using
the single case to compare the chosen hypothesis to a series of alternative theories
(Campbell, 1975). In this study the selection of multiple project sites—with an analysis
of a series of activities within each project area—is one attempt to test theories over a
greater range of cases. While the selection of the project settings necessarily limit the
application of the theoretical approach taken here, they have been selected to demonstrate
the applicability—or lack of applicability—of the approach to a range of institutional
settings in St. Louis.
The threat to external validity in the case study method is a more serious issue to
confront. Incorporating into the research design concepts and frameworks from the
general literature is one attempt to overcome this limitation. Beyond this, Stoecker
suggests that modeling into case studies the methodological requirements of survey
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research “leaves us worse off than when we started” (Stoecker, 1991: 93). Case study
methodology is appropriate in the situations where it can best answer research
questions—in the case of applied research, particularly those dealing with process.
Stoecker writes that
“process is both historical and idiosyncratic, and statistical analysis is
unable to capture either one of those. In fact it is the case study’s ability
to capture the idiosyncrasies which make up the ‘unexplained variance’
which is the source of its strength… In fact, the non-typical case can
assist us as an example of an exception to a generalization, therefore
transforming and making more accurate general theories” (Stoecker, 1991:
94).”
The study will utilize interviews, public and private publications, and secondary
data from local papers and publications. The interviews conducted for the analysis of
local development decision-making form a particularly critical base of knowledge. While
in terms of sources cited local primary and secondary sources dominate the analysis, the
interviews provided a much richer base of information to analyzed development
decisions. (See Appendix B for the list of subjects interviewed.) The interviews targeted
key stakeholders in a variety of fields—including public officials, private developers and
other development professionals in the civic sector—in a variety of institutional settings
in the city, including in downtown and in the two neighborhoods studied. The interviews
also provided complete timelines of development activities in each of the areas and an
assessment of the relative importance of particular factors and activities in creating and
sustaining development activity.
In terms of other documentation, the project relied upon local primary information
on developments—including financial pro-formas and other development applications
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where available. Additionally, the project utilized on-line access to the St. Louis PostDispatch to assemble complete citations on key individuals, organizations and projects.
Review of the Chapters
Along with this introductory chapter, the first four chapters provide background to
the analysis of the two project sites. Chapter 2 presents the broader political, economic
and social context of St. Louis, including how it has changed in the post-war period. The
chapter will summarize the constraints put upon local leaders based upon the city’s
continuing economic and demographic decline, its relatively unchanging formal political
structure and the intergovernmental context of both federal-city and state-city
relationships. Together, these add up to a city with relatively fewer economic resources,
organized around a formally weak mayor system, at a time of federal policy devolution
and in a state that has not aggressively incorporated local or regional policy into its
modus operandi. These forces have heightened the importance of private market forces
in both the financing of development projects and in leadership roles of planning and
initiating projects.
Chapter 3 uses these constraints to reflect upon two past periods of development
activity in St. Louis in an attempt to demonstrate how past initiatives inform current
practices. The periods chosen include St. Louis’ 1950s urban renewal period—when
Mayor Raymond Tucker aggressively confronted the city’s mounting economic and
physical obsolescence—and redevelopment activities in the 1970s and 1980s, when
federal policy provided new opportunities for local mayors under the New Federalism
initiative. Both of these periods show how the power of the mayor’s office was
constrained by other local political actors and by the city’s political culture and how the
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local business elite was less active and organized in redevelopment efforts than other
American cities. The chapter demonstrates a basic inadequacy of the regime archetypal
to St. Louis’ development activities and also provides an understanding of some of the
past institutions and organizations that impacted development initiatives in the 1990s.
Chapter 4 more directly investigates the institutional setting of development
decision-making in St. Louis, focusing upon the organizations and individuals that
participate in development activities. They are discussed both in terms of their formal
aspects and the roles and responsibilities of participants as well as the informal rules and
routines that shape individual behavior. In looking at specific types of participants,
contrasts are made between the existing urban literature and the practice of local
participants, particularly in terms of the interaction between structural constraints and the
incentives provided for participants to act as policy entrepreneurs in the process.
The next three chapters analyze development activities within the two project
areas. Chapter 5 and 6 focus on development activities in the downtown area,
demonstrating how the collective work of development participants created stability in
the area’s development activities. Chapter 5 presents a historical perspective of
downtown development and how economic decline and institutional changes in local
organizations blunted the effectiveness of a post-war vision of downtown as the region’s
central business district. This decline, in turn, set up the basis for a new round of
downtown planning and a new vision for downtown as a residential neighborhood; the
aspects of how this emerged will be discussed in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 focuses upon
neighborhood development activities in the 5th Ward area and 19th Ward area, an area
generally known as the near north side. The chapter demonstrates how neighborhood
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development initiatives fit within a similar framework of analysis used in the analysis of
downtown development, emphasizing how participants in development decision-making
creating new development images and new institutional settings to foster reinvestment.
Development activities in the two neighborhoods provide contrasting views on the sorts
of participants necessary for sustained development activities and how the institutional
terrain of local neighborhood development impacts the type and goals of development
initiatives. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the key findings from each of the chapters and
suggests how institutional analysis of this sort contributes to the study of local
development.
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Chapter 2: St. Louis in Decline
This study’s perspective on development as a process of activity suggests that any
analysis of local development decision-making require an investigation of the work of
individual policy entrepreneurs. Such a perspective assumes an independence of local
action that has been missing from some of the previous scholarship on urban
development decision-making. Policy decisions occur within the context of a specific
group of individuals, organizations and networks; the rules of the community and the
organization help shape individual behavior. Development decisions include both peak
bargaining over critical initiatives as well as routine, day-to-day decisions on more
mundane matters. The institutional settings of development decision-making exhibit both
stability as well as change as entrepreneurs utilize opportunities to reshape decision
systems.
Additionally, as will be investigated in Chapter 3, previous attempts at local
revitalization may hold important clues for analysis of contemporary strategies. Past
initiatives and campaigns do more than just provide models for what type of projects are
likely to be successfully implemented; they help create a local political culture that
shapes present activities by identifying and routinizing specific decision-making
processes. Through repeated activities, past processes represent social learning on the
part of local institutions and actors. Over time, the actions of policy entrepreneurs will be
funneled into specific strategies, and, in some general way, the choices of local actors
will be constrained by the characteristics of the local decision-making environment.
However, a broader perspective is useful, because, both for the case of St. Louis
and for the case of American cities generally, local choices occur within the context of
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broader economic and political forces. In this sense, the thesis of this chapter is that
broader political, economic and social forces have shaped the overall policy process in
which development occurs in a manner that constrains the choices that local elite face.
These forces have reinforced a substantially private system of planning and implementing
development projects and prioritizing projects that have significant market support.
This chapter will review two sets of broader forces. First is the economic position
of the city of St. Louis and the city’s significant demographic and economic
transformation after the World Ward II. Demographic and economic trends have meant
that the city enters into the 21st century after 50 years of rapid population loss and a
substantial decline in the city’s economic base. Intra-metropolitan fragmentation and
competition has generally heightened competition for regional resources; the decline of
St. Louis as the center city of the regional has complicated the task of economic
rejuvenation. In terms of specific sectors important for development, economic shifts
have transformed the local banking community, consolidated local banks into national
networks; as resulted, local offices have responded to national headquarters as much as
the local priorities of St. Louis leaders. Additionally, regional competition has shifted the
locus of the St. Louis development community far past the city borders. While much of
the region’s residential developers are local, their work is increasingly found not just in
St. Louis County—the region’s urban county—but in former exurban counties like St.
Charles and Jefferson Counties. The preference of most regionally based housing
developers has been towards the development of suburban housing subdivisions on
former green-field sites, and suburban and exurban political leaders have actively courted
new development, propelling the growth of these areas. Most local developers have left
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the task of urban in-fill and rehabilitation to a set of smaller developers, who have
generally lacked the capacity to respond to urban redevelopment or the ability to
substantially invest in a manner that has been transformative for inner city communities.
Second has been the effect of federal policy over the post-war period, with the
federal government initiating a series of policy initiatives that local leaders have used to
transform the face of their cities. Since World War II, federal policy has shifted from a
period of more active direct intervention in the urban renewal period (1946-1963),
through a period of New Federalism in the 1970s, to a period of retrenchment and
withdrawal of federal policy instruments in the 1980s and 1990s. Also significant for the
intergovernmental system is the impact of Missouri politics in shaping the types of
powers that local leaders have in order to confront economic decline. Decline in federal
resources has shifted responsibility to local resources, which are generally not available
at the same level. State political trends, particularly a pervasive ant-urban trend, has
made the state-level resources a poor substitute. Additionally, there has been a generally
shift from grant-based funds to incentives and other tax subsidies, including TIF
financing and state and federal housing-related tax credits. In political terms, both of the
decrease in public funds and the shift to incentives has increased the importance of the
private sector in financing development projects.
Economic and Demographic Shifts and Development
As noted in Chapter 1, the factor relating to the economic status of local areas has
been a prominent part of the “political economy” literature of urban scholars (Petersen,
1981). These scholars note that the political structure of American government largely
leaves to private hands control over decisions regarding economic matters and local
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leaders thus lack the political authority to control economic enterprise. Much of the
activity of local elite, then, is in the encouragement of economic development, as
opposed to regulatory activity to curb it or to tie development to redistributive concerns.
The fact that St. Louis has faced a dramatic economic and demographic shift over
the last fifty years has a number of consequences. First, the demographic and social
shifts in the composition of the city’s residents impact the types of demands made upon
local leaders, impacting the political equation made by local leadership (DiGaetano and
Klemanski, 1999). The political incorporation of immigrants is a historic role of urban
governments. One of the consequences of St. Louis’ emergence as a majority African
American city is that the city has increasingly had to incorporate the political needs of
this population into its governing policy. At the same time, this incorporation occurs at a
time, unlike in the past, when the city is increasingly constrained to provide real
resources to facilitate this transition.
Economic and demographic shifts also impact the city in terms of the resources
that its private sector can offer in governance. Corporate leadership can be a key
component of a city’s civic structure, not only representing the interests of the city in
civic deliberations but also mobilizing private capital for civic improvements. The
regional and national shift of corporate front offices from St. Louis impacts the presence
of these sorts of resources; increasingly, business decisions are made by corporate
leadership with none of the traditional allegiance that previous corporate leadership had.
At the same time, the ability of elected leaders to negotiate with local businesses
will fluctuate according to the state of their local economies. While profits can be made
in poor cities, in purely economic terms the rate of return for investments will be
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comparatively less and thus less attractive for investors. Thus, poor and disadvantaged
cities will have relatively fewer resources and will be in a weaker negotiating position,
more likely to accede to the interests of local economic forces. Alternatively, those urban
areas with a stronger economic base will be in a better position to influence economic
development and set development priorities.
Demographic Shifts and Decline in St. Louis
From the perspective of 2004, the degree of population loss and demographic
shifts in the city has been extraordinary.
[Insert Table 1 here.]1
From 1950, the year of St. Louis’ highest population level, to 2000, the city lost 500,000
residents. Population decline occurred in all areas of the city, with some areas on the
near-north side of the city losing over 75% of its population over the last thirty years.
With population decline in the city came also demographic change in racial and ethnic
terms.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
From 1950 to 2000, the city went from a population 82% white to a majority African
American population; the city is also comparatively poorer than it was in the 1950s, with
some areas facing serious economic and social distress. Population loss has had a
profound effect on the physical landscape of the city, with large-scale abandonment and
demolition of the building stock in some parts of the city, mostly around the downtown
area and on the city’s north side. The decline in the city’s population, housing stock and
business activity increased fiscal pressures on the city at a time when it had greater
pressures to respond to human needs and to reverse the city’s economic decline.
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Concurrent with population loss in St. Louis City has been the increasing
population growth outside the city’s boundaries. St. Louis County, an urban county
separated from the City of St. Louis in 1876, surpassed the city’s population in 1970 with
951,000 residents, a 35% increase over 1960. In 2000, the county had just over 1 million
residents, although comparisons to the 1990 census showed that St. Louis County’s
growth rate was slowing. More recent analysis has shown that parts of St. Louis County
are demonstrating the same type of population loss that occurred in the city in the 1970s
(Van Der Werf, 2004: B4), including job loss and a drop in the area’s household income.
The center of regional population gain shifted to further ex-urban counties, including St.
Charles County to the west. St. Charles County’s population increased from 213,000 in
1990 to 284,000 in 2000, a 33% increase. Although still smaller than St. Louis County,
St. Charles’ strong growth rate will challenge both St. Louis City and St. Louis County’s
dominance in local economic and political affairs.
Patterns of Business Activity
Paralleling change in St. Louis demography were changes in the city’s patterns of
business activity. While the dream of St. Louis as the “Fourth City” faded as the 19th
century turned into the 20th, St. Louis remained a strong economic center, with a highly
diversified economic base (First National Bank, 1927: 1). As the scale of economic
activities increased, segregation in types of business activities occurred, with
manufacturing and commercial activities in districts primarily within the city’s
boundaries and downtown St. Louis dominating both in wholesale and retail activities
(Thomas, 1927: 45, 76). As important, the city as a whole dominated the region in terms
of number of business establishments, over 2,600 as compared to less than 100 in St.
1

All tables and figures are found in Appendix B at the back of the paper.
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Louis County and under 500 in counties on the Illinois side (St. Louis Chamber of
Commerce, 1935: 49).
Over time, this city’s dominance in business activity would fade, as significant
numbers of establishments shifted to St. Louis County and St. Charles County.
[Insert Table 3 here.]
Even with boosters heralding the city as a location for business, more sanguine
assessments prior to World Ward II noted that
“the city has not grown as rapidly as was anticipated. The expansion of
commerce and industry has been insufficient to absorb even a small part of
the older residential districts (City Plan Commission, 1935: 4-5).”
One post-war report picked up on this trend, concluding that even with a renewed
postwar expansion of St. Louis’ economic base, “most of the new plants are choosing
suburban and outer suburban locations thus pushing industrial St. Louis so far beyond its
political boundaries that they are now unrecognizable to a casual observer” (St. Louis
Chamber of Commerce, 1951: 3). The same report found business locations in the region
had taken on a new pattern of city, suburban, and even exurban development, as suburban
municipalities recognized the need for housing in closer proximity to new industrial
plants, taking more land for residential uses and forcing newer facilities further out (St.
Louis Chamber of Commerce, 1951: 5).
Urban renewal proposals and studies authored in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s
recognized both the suburbanization occurring in the region’s commercial facilities as
well as the increasing obsolescence of the city’s central business district. According to
one report at the town, the problems of the downtown were
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“self-evident – inadequate thoroughfares, lack of off street parking, blight
and obsolescence, have encourage decentralization and brought about
economic decline” (Russell Mullgardt Schwarz Van Hoefen, 1953: 5).
By the end of the 1950s, the number of business establishments in St. Louis County
increased to almost parallel of those in the city, leading the city in both retail and service
sector establishments. The movement of new businesses and relocated businesses from
St. Louis City to St. Louis County continued through the 1960s, with the county the
“fastest growing” area for expansions, relocations and new plants in 1967 and 1968
(Koepke and Weidemann, 1971: 10). For the city particularly, the trend of business
expansion was “downward” (Koepke and Weidemann, 1971: 16) despite a number of
tools available to encourage business redevelopment. These included federally sponsored
Land Clearance for Redevelopment (LCRA) funds beginning in 1951, Chapter 353
blighting abilities in 1955 and the bonding authority through the Planned Industrial
Expansion Authority (PIEA) authorized in 1969. Also holding back industrial relocation
in the city was the lack of availability of industrial land. Even with the tools of
redevelopment and eminent domain, accumulation of industrial parcels and rezoning of
formerly residential land to commercial and industrial land was difficult “recognizing
both political and economic realities”; by 1970, even with the availability of cleared land
in the new industrial district in the Mill Creek and Kosciusko area, the largest tract of
industrial land was only 100 acres (Landsdorf, 1975: 5). While the city adopted a land
banking policy through its Land Reutilization Authorities (Team Four, 1975a), a more
explicit form of this policy ran up against political opposition following a highly
unpopular 1974 citywide comprehensive plan.
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Manufacturing continued to decline in the city, with the city loosing 55,000
manufacturing jobs in the 1960s and another 27,000 in the 1970s; the percentage loss was
more than double the percentage loss of total jobs in the city. Hurting the city’s ability to
attract and retain businesses was an increasing perception on the part of manufacturers of
the city’s inhospitable business environment. A 1975 study commissioned by the
Regional Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA) found that many manufactures in
the city cited crime, urban decay and the city’s political condition and tax system as
major concerns impacting their business (Taylor, 1975: 24). Such a perception also
impacted the customer base for the downtown’s office and retail district, which
significantly shifted to the suburbs by 1980. Between 1960 and 1976, development of
commercial office space in Clayton rivaled the development of space in downtown St.
Louis (Cretin, 1976: 33); a second boom in the early 1980s continued to draw tenants
from downtown’s older building stock (Prost, 1982a: 3E). By 1982, even as several new
Class A office buildings came on line downtown, city planners were publicly questioning
whether the area could absorb significant amounts of additional office space (Community
Development Agency, 1982: 37). Downtown’s historic role as the region’s retail district
was threatened by the introduction of new shopping malls in the suburbs. An attempt to
draw customers back to downtown with the 1985 St. Louis Centre project had initial
successes, but by the early 1990s, the project was considered a failure
Increasingly the economic future of the downtown area has been seen in tourism
and entertainment. Recognized first by Mayor John Poelker (1973-1977), this emphasis
led to successful redevelopments of Laclede’s Landing in the 1970s, Union Station in
1985 and, more recently, the new football stadium and convention center expansion. In
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the period of downtown development analyzed here, continued expansion of this sector
has included a new convention hotel adjacent to the convention center and a new baseball
stadium. Despite these optimistic signs, in overall economic terms St. Louis city’s junior
economic status is largely set. Business figures for the year 2000 show that the city
continues to decline in all categories, with numbers of businesses stable in St. Louis
County and increasing in St. Charles County.
Shifts in the Development Community: Banking and Residential Developers
A subset of economic changes impacting urban development has been sectoral
change in both the local banking community and in the homebuilding industry.
Consolidation and concentration of the local bank and savings and loan industry occurred
throughout the 1990s, driven by bank crises, particularly in the savings and loan (S&L)
industry in the late 1980s, and federal and state deregulation in the banking industry that
allowed for greater out-of-state ownership. The impact of the former on local institutions
hit a number of ways, from reduced bank profits and cost-costing measures to closure of
some banks by federal regulators (“Junk Bonds to Fuel S&L Bailout Debate,” 1989: 7;
Gallagher, 1989: 14A; Gallagher and Carey, 1990: 1A).
Bank failures, combined with a more general economic depression in the early
1990s, reduced the availability of real estate capital, restricting the opportunities of real
estate investors and developers (“Banking on Banks,” 1991: 4A; Donaldson, 1991: 8A).
All in all, a dozen local S & Ls shut their doors between 1991 and 1993 (Gallagher, 1993:
1E). At the same time, bankers were advocating for deregulation of the industry that
would allow for greater consolidation (Dubinsky, 1993: 47A); deregulation prompted a
wave of consolidations in the industry (Lerner, 1993: 27; Gallagher, 1993: 1E). Federal
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regulation of banks meant that local banks like Boatmen’s Bank and Mercantile Bank,
which had been actively acquiring local banks throughout the first part of the 1990s, were
candidates for purchase by out-of-state competitors (Banstetter, 1994: 1). NationsBank
bought out Boatmen’s in September of 1996, which in turn merged with Bank of
America in May of 1998. Mercantile purchased Mark Twain and Roosevelt, two wellknown local banks, in January of 1997 and was in turn purchased by Firstar in May of
1999.
Bank consolidation dramatically reduced the number of medium banks in the St.
Louis area and dramatically increased the share of business done by the top two banks in
the region, Firstar and Bank of America (Gallagher, 2000: E1). Changes in the
ownership of local banks reduced the long-term presence of some banks in city
neighborhoods (Manning, 1997: 1). As significantly, bank mergers changed the culture
of how the institutions and their officers related to the local community. Anecdotally,
there is the comment that real estate lending lost its personal touch (Desloge, 1992: 45;
Gallagher, 1998: A1); the importance of personal connections between bankers and their
local customers declined as national companies standardized their lending products and
policies. Buyouts also changed the personal relationships between bankers and the notfor-profits that depended upon their support (Tucci, 1996: 1); while the mergers were
generally followed by announcements that the institutions would continue their charitable
reinvestments in the area, over time the region lost a sector of middle tier managers and
corporate leaders who could commit corporate resources to regional initiatives.
Like the banking industry, the local real estate industry had its share of mergers,
mostly in the commercial and industrial building market (Prost, 1998d: 35). In general,
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the industry remained dominated by local companies (Lerner, 1994: 1; McLaughlin,
1997b: 12A), even as some of the older, family-owned businesses were sold. The
location of residential construction activity has mirrored population shifts in the region;
by 1997, St. Charles County led the region with total number of building permits issues
(Lenny, 1997: 12A); the level of construction doubled the population of such areas as
O’Fallon, MO, over 1990 levels (Reel, 1998: 1). Throughout the 1990s, the City of St.
Louis has generally been at the bottom of the list in terms of building permits issued
(Kohler, 1999: 1). While increased redevelopment activity in the city and growth
restrictions enacted in some of the outlying counties have equalized these numbers, much
of the housing redevelopment completed in the City of St. Louis has been done by
smaller developers, including Pyramid Development, a mostly south-side developer
which built a number of new infill houses in the city in the late 1990s. The fact that most
new construction is in-fill construction—with construction limited in scale according to
the availability of vacant lots—has generally discouraged the participation of large
homebuilders, although there have been recent exceptions (Editorial, 2002: B8). Another
exception to this rule has been the local presence of McCormick-Baron-Salazar, a
national builder of affordable housing communities headquartered in St. Louis that has
played a significant role in a number of public housing reconversion projects and other
affordable housing developments.
Federal Policy and the Cities
The economic problems of cities did not happen in a vacuum, but have been
intertwined with the policy initiatives of states and the federal government. Federal
policy since World War II have both benefited and hampered city revitalization efforts.
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The postwar intrusion of the federal government particularly in urban areas represented a
break in the nation’s 150-year history. Never directly addressed by the constitution or
constitutional framers, most American cities were founded and developed in the earlier
traditions of villages and townships. Because the federal government generally ignored
them, state-level government more directly impacted 19th century cities. Additionally,
even though early federal policy included internal improvements, Congress declined to
pursue federal expenditure policies aggressively oriented towards infrastructure
development, seeing it as an improper use of federal power. Both the control of localities
and the pursuit of internal improvement policies were policies better left to the states. As
entities chartered by states, American cities operated within the constraints of their state
legislatures and state constitutions, which affected their ability to expand their political,
taxing, and budgeting power (Sbragia, 1996).
Until the Great Depression, the federal government had little direct impact as
cities, with a couple of exceptions. General relief offered by the Roosevelt
administration during the Great Depression first brought federal aid into urban areas; in
St. Louis, Mayor Bernard Dickmann (1933-1941) used this revenue as new source of
political patronage and municipal services, matching $12 million in local funds with over
$50 million in federal funds (Primm, 1990: 471). In this sense, postwar federal urban
renewal policy represented a shift in federal policy in tenor and level of involvement.
What is generally regarded as federal urban renewal legislation began with the Public
Housing Act of 1937. Among other things, the Act authorized the US Housing
Administration to provide up to $800 million in long-term, low-interest loans to local
public housing agencies to clear so-called “blighted areas” and construct low-income
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housing (United State Congress, 1937). Following World War II, a coalition of mostly
northern Democrats and urban Republicans united politically to pass the 1949 Housing
Act; this landmark bill empowered a new federal agency to assist in slum removal,
authorize write-down subsidies in clearing and assembling urban renewal sites, and set up
a $1.5 billion revolving loan fund for the production of housing units (United States
Congress, 1949).
“Slum clearance and economic redevelopment were good politics” (Judd and
Swanstrom, 1994: 138), and most American mayors in the immediate post-war period
seized upon these new mechanisms to expand revitalization of core areas of their cities.
The control of mayors over these new funds was heightened by the pattern of their
implementation. Under the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act, the Public Works
Administration initially planned to own and operate federally owned housing. However,
court rulings prohibited federal administrators from using eminent domain, and, instead,
the federal government adopted the procedure of granting control of the location and
development of urban renewal projects to local authorities (Robertson and Judd, 1989:
304). This “policy of remote control” meant that
“the federal government provides some powerful tools, and designed them
to achieve political as well as economic change at the local level, but in
the final analysis local actors were the ones who put these tools to use.
Their distinctive concerns and interests had considerable impact on the
shape and effect of these programs” (Mollenkopf, 1983: 139-140).
From Urban Renewal to War on Poverty
Urban renewal instituted a powerful set of local coalitions that planned and
implemented major redevelopment projects. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, this
coalition in St. Louis included Mayor Raymond Tucker (1953-1965) and members of the
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city’s business elite. Tucker and his allies cleared blighted residential districts, built
public housing and made improvements to the infrastructure of the city. Even as mayors
publicly lauded urban renewal, it could also be controversial, as Tucker’s defeat in 1965
illustrates. Through massive displacement and disruption of urban neighborhoods, urban
renewal could create enough enemies to bring the process to a halt and threaten the
political career of its proponents.
By the middle 1960s, urban renewal nationally was buffeted by the criticisms of
scholars and community activists alike, and then modified by a new set of policy
initiatives. This “War on Poverty” approach emphasized social reconstruction and
human services alongside a more humane form of physical revitalization—smaller scale,
more in-fill type projects (Johnson, 1964: n.p.). Prompted by the enormous political
capital available after the assassination of President Kennedy, these initiatives built upon
public dissatisfaction with urban renewal. Democratic officials responsible for fleshing
out the initiatives saw the requirement of “maximum feasible participation” as an
opportunity to initiate a new relationship between the federal government and community
residents and the non-profit organizations that served them (Piven and Cloward, 1993:
271). This control even initially bypassed local mayors and the local organizations that
dominated urban renewal.
In St. Louis, War on Poverty priorities initiated the establishment of the Human
Development Corporation in 1964 to coordinate activities. Even when mayors regained
control of War on Poverty spending in 1967, the newly created agency remained active
and vital in St. Louis politics. HDC and other Model City agencies became an
opportunity for employment of St. Louis’ African American middle class and a political
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base of support for black political leadership (Stein, 2002: 142). Additionally, these new
organizations remained institutionally segregated from the mainstream development
functions within St. Louis’ government (Kerstein and Judd, 1980: 211). In this sense, the
War on Poverty increased the profusion of separate agencies operating in St. Louis.
Nixon and New Federalism
It was in part this multiplicity of institutions—and their implicit challenge to an
executive-driven development policy—that prompted urban mayors to support “New
Federalist” proposals advanced by President Richard Nixon in 1974 (Wong and Petersen,
1986). Nixon’s New Federalism proposals combined greater programmatic authority
over federal funding for city leaders while increasingly the level of federal support. In
doing so, Nixon’s policies split the Democratic Party, with big city mayors in favor of
them and social liberals in the party concerned that the shift to local control would
jeopardize program priorities (Judd and Swanstrom, 1998: 225). In 1972, Nixon
succeeded in implementing revenue-sharing programs for states and local governments,
distributing millions to local areas with few strings attached, with the largest cities using
the funds to cover ordinary city expenses. Two years later, the 1974 Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974 continued the trend towards programmatic
devolution to the local leaders. Among other things, the act consolidated the federal
categorical grants of urban renewal and the War on Poverty that cities could use broadly
to spur urban development. Previous federal urban policy fostered the development of
sub-recipient organizations to carry out programmatic goals; by contrast, under CDBG,
funds were provided directly to city administrators who could contract with other
agencies to carry out redevelopment activities. The level of CDBG funding to specific
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cities depended upon the level of that city’s economic distress; CDBG required each city
to submit an annual plan indicating how funds would be used to benefit low and
moderate residents.
CDBG funding provided new opportunities for local leaders, including an
increased pool to carry out development initiatives. Allocations of CDBG in St. Louis
City increased dramatically throughout the 1970s—from $15 million in the first year of
the program in 1974 to a high of $34 million in 1980.
[Insert Table 4 here.]
With increased funding and program flexibility, the initiation of New Federalism
provided local leaders three key political opportunities. First, the development of this
new system reshuffled the development decision-making process, with a specific goal of
providing local mayors greater control over the disparate federally funded redevelopment
activities (Wong and Peterson, 1986: 304; Dommel and Associates, 1982: 226).
Increased local discretion brought new participants in the development process, and left it
up to local mayors to manage new political pressures. Secondly, CDBG continued the
general shift of redevelopment into a broader set of development activities, not just
physical revitalization but also human services, community planning, and even such
“routine” maintenance issues such as street repair and tree planting—infrastructure needs
usually paid out of general revenue funds (Dommel and Associates, 1982: 235).
Third, although federal regulations mandated that some of the CDBG funds
benefit low and moderate-income residents, this became more of a target that absolute
standard. The new funds became an irresistible pot of money for local leaders across the
city coping with new demands at a time of continuing population loss and economic
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decline. CDBG’s flexible approaches allowed political leaders to shift local priorities to
development projects that enhanced the local tax base and generated additional revenues
for the city (Wong and Peterson, 1986: 307).
Federal Retrenchment under Reagan
As will be detailed in Chapter 3, CDBG brought in a new period of development
politics in St. Louis, with struggles between Mayor James Conway (1977-1981) and the
Board of Aldermen over allocation of the funds. The CDBG allocation to the city
reached a high of $38 million during the first year of Vincent Schoemehl Jr.’s mayoralty
(1981-1993) and that of President Ronald Reagan’s administration, an unfortunate
occurrence for the ambitions of a young, energetic mayor who wanted to carry out
revitalization activities. After over 30 years of increasing federal support to cities,
President Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981 with a determination to cut
discretionary domestic spending. Supporting this was a 1979 commission that suggested
that “it may be in the best interest of the nation to commit itself to the promotion of
locally neutral economic and political policies rather than spatially sensitive urban
policies that either explicitly and inadvertently seek to preserve cities in their historical
roles” (Presidential Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties, 1980: 2).
Reagan saw his policies as a continuation of the federal devolution that began
under Nixon’s New Federalism—with consolidation of urban-focused programs and
reduction in federal expenditures as a principal goal. Urban-oriented block grant
programs were particularly visible targets for administration reformers. This budgetcutting philosophy meant that, by the end of the 1980s, most urban-oriented programs
were either eliminated or reduced. The only existing urban program that survived the
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Reagan Administration was the CDBG program. The amount of CDBG funds was
reduced in half between 1980 and 1990 (Judd and Swanstrom, 1998: 239). Other urbanoriented program, like Aid to Families with Dependent Children and the Food Stamps,
also faced cuts through the 1980s, reflecting Reagan’s view that such programs promoted
government dependency. The Reagan Administration budgets also sharply reduced
public housing funds, both in terms of traditional public housing units and support for the
Section 8 housing voucher program that was implemented in 1974. Reagan’s 1981
budget, adopted by Congress in a budget “coup” for the administration, reduced
expenditures for Section 8 and public housing to almost half that of the previous year
(Hays, 1995:235).
Ultimately, administration changes led cities to replace federal funds with local
revenue sources, worsening budget crises and leading to reductions in programs and
services (Palmer and Sawhill, 1986: 218). Compounding the program cuts were the
impacts of the administration’s tax policies. Tax reforms in 1981 reduced individual and
business tax levels, increased federal budget deficits, and spurred administration officials
to propose additional budget cuts. Further tax changes in 1986 had the impact of
reducing state and local tax rates as most states followed the federal lead and reduced tax
rates as well. Legislation in 1986 also eliminated the federal historic tax credit, which
had allowed investors to claim credits for reinvestment in older, historic properties, many
of which were located in urban areas.
Continuity in Urban Policy Following Reagan
An additional impact of the Reagan Administration extends to a programmatic
initiative that only became implemented in the 1990s—Empowerment Zones and
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Enterprise Communities (EZ/ECs). A policy borrowed from England, EZ/ECs fit the
Administration’s emphasis on the role of the private sector in providing market solutions
to problems of urban poverty and unemployment. The goal of the policy was to provide
target tax credits and relief policies to businesses that located in distressed communities
in an environment of decreased regulatory oversight.
In part because of the predominance of Empowerment Zones in both the first
Bush Administration (1988-1992) and the two Clinton Administrations (1992-2000),
most scholars see these years as a continuation of the Reagan Administration’s emphasis
on federal devolution and program deduction. One enduring legacy of the Reagan years
is how it institutionally and ideologically reoriented the federal government’s role in
urban policy-making.
“A national government that permanently indexes its income tax revenues
will (as indexing proponents predicted) have to struggle to justify each
marginal expansion in federal functions. The restrictiveness of the federal
budget is likely to force state and local governments to retain at least their
present allocation of service and financing responsibilities, and provides a
recurring impetus toward federal devolution” (Palmer and Sawhill, 1986:
258).”
The institutional capacity of the federal government to fund a more aggressive urban
policy was furthered reduced after the 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Act,
revised in 1990, and budget reforms under the 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA). Gramm-Rudman-Hollings placed a time table for stepped reduction in the
federal budget deficit, with a process for sequestration of spending should goals not be
reached, whereas the 1990 OBRA mandated that future increases in expenditures within
one category would have to be met with reductions in another category (Shuman, 1992:
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291; 333-4). Such guidelines made a resumption of federal urban policy, at least in terms
of federal discretionary spending, unlikely even given a Democratic President in 1992.
Despite a certain consistency in the tenor and impact of federal policy throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, some new urban initiatives did emerge. President George H. W.
Bush (1989-1993) largely shared Reagan’s view on urban policy. His Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development, Jack Kemp, championed an overhaul of public
housing, including the 1990 Affordable Housing Act, which allowed local housing
authorities to demolish public housing complexes and replace them with privately owned
units with rent-assistance certificates (Koenig, 1990c: 3A). This program includes the
HOPE VI initiative and has provided St. Louis with the ability to demolish most of its
publicly owned housing scattered to the north and south of downtown and replace it with
privately-managed, market-rate housing projects. The Act also created a new HOME
Program, which provided a new block grant for housing development and rehabilitation
(Hays, 1995: 256). These HOME funds are restricted in their use towards low and verylow income housing; they have not substituted for CDBG, and their levels have gradually
declined.
Bush also oversaw the successful enactment of EZ/EC legislation in the fall of
1992, some nine years after it was first proposed to Congress by Reagan. The bill
designated 25 urban and 25 rural enterprise zones to be chosen on the basis of a
competitive application process and allocated additional funding to finance “weed and
seed” programs. Clinton renewed the enterprise zone legislation in the 1993 budget
reconciliation act, adding to the zone incentives an additional $100 million of grants that
could be the zones for a wide range of development options and services. Congress
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reauthorized the EZ program in 1996 legislation allowing for the designation of second
round of zone communities, but the impact of the designation was muted after a
Republican-controlled Congress failed to appropriate the additional spending for the
winning communities. Included in that second round was the City of St. Louis, in
partnership with East St. Louis and St. Louis County; following the designation, the three
political jurisdictions founded a new organization, the Greater St. Louis Empowerment
Zone, to oversee implementation of the region’s EZ initiative.
Clinton and Empowerment Zones
Contributing to continuity in urban policy after 1992 was the nature of Clinton’s
governing coalition. A southern governor, Clinton won the presidency as a moderate
Democrat, and generally governed the country from the center. Clinton’s major social
policy initiatives emphasized more a traditional states-perspective on social policy,
continuing the trend of downshifting program initiatives to the state level. Clinton’s
economic and social advisors shared a “human resource policy perspective,” advocating
policy improving the ability of Americans, including poor Americans, to compete in an
increasingly global economy (Hays, 1995: 266). In budgetary terms, this meant funds for
workforce development as opposed to the physical development projects of past
approaches. Most significantly, Clinton fulfilled a campaign to “end welfare as we know
it,” ending Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and replacing it with a
state-level block grant with greater programmatic flexibility in designing and
implementing policy.
In this sense, and despite the magnitude of Clinton’s support from urban voters,
traditionally Democratic calls for renewed support for public housing and a return to an
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aggressive urban policy did not fit the policy imperatives of the new Democratic
president. By contrast, Clinton’s urban policy explicitly recognized the importance of
private capital in the rebuilding of inner-city areas and philosophically asserted the
importance of local communities in developing the sort of partnership in order to
encourage private investment (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
1995: 5). The New Markets Initiative, the last major policy initiative undertaken by the
Clinton Administration, typifies this approach, emphasizing tax credits in order to
encourage commerce and retail development in distressed communities (Associated
Press, 2000: A7). Additionally, Clinton’s budgetary approaches emphasized funds for
increased training and workforce development, as well as federal funding for public
safety under a local law enforcement block grant; however, in most cities, CDBG
continued to decline.
State Policy and St. Louis: Home Rule as Limitations and Opportunities
Clinton’s experience as a governor gave him some experience with the traditional
view of American states as important intermediaries in American federalism and as
potential sources for policy experimentation. In historical terms, state governments
outweigh the influence of the federal government in terms of their impact on cities. The
double layer of federal relations—states within the federal union, with powers
specifically sorted between the two in the Constitution—also contributed to an uniquely
American institutional preference against the activism of the state in the economy,
including the economy of the city, that typifies the federal intrusion of the New Deal
period.
“By fragmenting political conflict, the Constitution channeled state
activism away from the regulation of property and toward the promotion
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of private economic development. It did so by creating the world’s largest
‘free trade’ zone. The states could not prevent businesses from entering or
leaving their borders. Nor did states have much latitude to enact
legislation favoring in-state enterprises, in contrast to the national
government’s powers even in small states (Robertson and Judd, 1989:
31).”
In this framework, with states possessing the primary need to promote economic
development, a state’s willingness to promote locally based incentives will vary across
time and across the nation. While state have had historically anti-urban biases, this does
not negate the fact that periodically state governments have provided opportunities as
well as constraints for local leaders to pursue redevelopment.
Historically, the relationship between cities and their state governments is
articulated through Dillon’s Law.
“the power of the state legislature over local governments is plenary or
absolute. The legislature has the power to create and to destroy them and
to specify the powers and functions which they—or even must—exercise
(Heeter and Mandelker, 1967: 1).”
This control emerged gradually in the 19th century as states confronted the oftenmisguided activism of local governments in financial matters (Sbragia, 1996). In
practical terms, Dillon’s Law has meant that the powers of local governments in a whole
host of redevelopment issues—from municipal borrowing to tax-increment financing—
has been preceded by enabling legislation from the state level. Additionally, state
requirements have shaped the political form of local government, specifying the roles and
responsibilities of types of local officials and the organization of municipal government.
Secondly, home rule for local governments began as countervailing force against
state intrusion in local affairs in the late 19th century. Missouri became the first state to
create the opportunity for home rule in 1876 and St. Louis became Missouri’s first home
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rule city that year. The line of separation between the local interest and state interest,
however, has been drawn differently over time and in different states. The language of
the constitution retained to this day places home rule within the context of conformity to
the statue constitution and statutes and means that the state government retains control of
matters of “high government prerogative” (Schmandt, 1953: 411; Westbrook, 1968: 55).
In this sense, cities acting under home rule charter are not considered “sovereignties
within sovereignty (Schmandt, 1948: 47), but in real and practical ways find their
authority checked in significant ways. For St. Louis, this has meant state political control
of significant local matters, including the police and public schools, and, in terms of
development policy, that certain local capacities are subject to state authorization and
control.
State Actors as Collaborative Partners
The complexities of the home rule relationship between the St. Louis and
Missouri state government created both tensions as well as opportunities. Local actors
both rail against the strictures of state oversight as well as use state oversight in matters
of the “general welfare” as an opportunity to expand local abilities, particularly when
local voters have circumscribed their powers (Schmandt, 1948: 97). In this sense,
irrespective of the legal and political debates over the scope of state power, the
interaction of state actors and local actors has been both competitive as well as
collaborative. As a large pool of voters, local areas are an important political
constituency, even if the historical legislative malapportionment of cities relegates urban
priorities to the back burner.
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One way this political calculation has worked out can be seen in vote totals of
Democratic governors of the state, the party label obviously most closely associated with
the political tendencies in St. Louis and other metropolitan areas in the state. While St.
Louis (city or county) has not had a native son as governor since the 1940s, urban
counties have been an important component of the victory of most recent Democratic
governors. Mel Carnahan’s 1996 victory came with St. Louis City and County providing
27% of his total votes; in 2000, the city and county provided his successor Bob Holden
28% of his total vote (Secretary of State, 2004). Even though Democratic voters have
been a necessary, but not sufficient component of these victories—with both candidates
winning some votes out state—St. Louis’ base of Democratic votes provides the city
some measure of access to the governor’s office on urban-centered policy initiatives.
Additionally, the governor himself and key members of his staff can become personally
involved in local development projects. Both of the previous Democratic governors
assigned personnel to work in St. Louis and become important allies of the mayor when
state support was needed.
The activities of Missouri state agencies in local development issues have
increased proportionally with the federal devolution of urban policy and have
transformed the traditional role of state government (Dewhirst, 1995: 285). State
officials help direct the expenditure of state funds for local economic development
activity as well as help direct the governor’s attentions to key projects, influencing the
balance of power in project negotiations. In institutional terms, the relevant state
department impacting local development is the Department of Economic Development,
organized in 1984 as the state’s main entity to assist in job creation and redevelopment
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activities in the state. The department provides grant and tax credit funds that can be
important components of housing redevelopment schemes, including the Distressed
Communities tax credit. The department’s St. Louis office has staff that works with local
political leadership—primarily the mayor and his staff—to pinpoint redevelopment funds
and assist in redevelopment projects. The state’s Department of Natural Resources also
plays a role by virtue of its implementation of the state Historic Tax Credit program. The
Missouri Department of Transportation also plays a significant role in regional
development issues by funding for new roadways or improvements to the existing
infrastructure. Also significant for redevelopment issues in St. Louis are a series of
additional state boards and commissions that have regulatory control over funds, tax
credits, and bonding issues. The Missouri Housing Commission, an independent body
with a governing board appointed by the governor, manages the state’s share of the
Federal Low-Income Tax Credit program, used by local developers to create affordable,
rental housing. The Housing Commission has staff in St. Louis that promotes the
department’s programs and helps applicant agencies in preparing applications and
requests for funds. Additionally, the Missouri Finance Board has the ability to issue
bonds that can be used to finance commercial development projects; an appointed
commission approves projects upon recognition by a professional staff.
State-Sanctioned Development Tools
In some respects, state support for local development mirrors the changing nature
of federal development support—from targeted discretionary spending programs to
investment incentive initiatives. State tax incentives programs promote the economic
considerations of the deal as much as the deal’s political importance, making private
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economic actors even more important in planning and completing projects. At the most
common level, state statute generally describes the basic power of local municipalities to
control local economic growth through planning and zoning (Heeter and Mandelker,
1967: 1). In addition, state statute also mandates powers that have become an influential
part of local control over development initiatives. These include the powers of blighting
and eminent domain, the ability to create development related districts and authorities,
and tax incentive powers under Tax Increment Financing (TIF) legislation and state
historic tax credits. Typically, these tools do little to enhance the state’s ability to shape
growth; rather, they place tools in the hands of local governments to pursue it.
Perhaps the most common development program sanctioned through state law is
the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Law (Missouri Revised Statute Chapter 99.230),
commonly referred to as Chapter 99. First enacted in 1951, the law allowed certain
Missouri communities, including the City of St. Louis, to create Land Clearance for
Authorities (LCRAs) to declare property blighted, take property through eminent domain,
and provide incentives, including bonding, to finance the redevelopment of the property.
More commonly over time, the law allows the authority to enter into a contract with a
redeveloper and pass certain of the incentives on to the developer. Since its introduction,
Chapter 99 redevelopers have become the most common development tool used in local
development matters, although the number of redevelopment plans accelerated in the
1970s and 1980s. The power of the redevelopment law can only be exercised after a
finding by the LCRA body, ratified through the city’s legislative body; additionally, the
law lays out a series of public meetings and procedural sequences prior to the approval of
the redevelopment plan (Heeter and Mandelker, 1967: 61-2). However, increasingly,
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Chapter 99 designation is a matter of procedure rather a substantive process, and
controversy over its use, including eminent domain, is infrequent.
A related tool lies in the Urban Redevelopment Corporations Act (Revised
Missouri Statute Chapter 353.010), available to Missouri home rule cities with a
population greater than 350,000—St. Louis City primarily. Commonly referred to as
Chapter 353, the Act was first authorized in 1943 and 1945, with local authorizing
legislation in 1959 setting up the local administrative requirements to administer the law.
Essentially, the act builds upon Chapter 99 authority by allowing qualified
redevelopers—also known as urban redevelopment corporations—to borrow the power of
eminent domain from the local authority; additionally, the redevelopment corporations
can receive tax abatement of varying levels for up to 25 years as an incentive for
redevelopment of the property (Community Development Agency, 1976: 1). Like
Chapter 99 redevelopment, Chapter 353 comes with a sequence of procedures, including
public notification, study by city planning and approval before the Board of Aldermen.
While some controversy exists over its use (Johnson, 1990: 16), Chapter 353 designations
have become increasingly habitual over time, including the practice of “spot-blighting” to
provide individual homeowners tax abatement for their renovation and redevelopment
activities.
Additional state-level tools include the Planned Industrial Expansion Act
(Revised Missouri Statute 100.300), authorized in 1967 to provide local communities the
authority to offer bonds to finance industrial development, and the associated Industrial
Development Authority Act. State law also directs the ability of local communities to set
up neighborhood improvement districts (Revised Missouri Statute 67.453), community
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improvement districts (Revised Missouri Statute 67.1401) and other special taxing
bodies, including tax increment financing (TIF) districts as enabled through the 1982
Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act (Revised Missouri Statute
99.800). The Act allows local government to set up TIF districts as an incentive for
redevelopment projects in blighted areas. The district allows local government, and by
proxy a private developer, to recapture some portion of future increased tax revenue to
fund redevelopment (Casella, 1985: 1). Typically, the degree of this recapture is
calculated in advance and used to float bonds covering a portion of the redevelopment
costs. Like other incentive projects, TIF projects require an extensive procedure of
public meetings, planning studies, and local government action. While TIFs are common
in commercial retail projects—where increases in property and sales tax receipts can
provide a hefty incentive—their use has become routine in certain urban residential
projects, primarily downtown loft conversions.
While direct development expenditures are rare from the state level—excepting,
of course, expenditures as a part of the annual budget—the state does provide a series of
development-related incentives. Budgetary pressures over the last five years have largely
reduced grant programs; as a consequence, the majority of these are credit programs that
leverage private investment into projects by providing state tax relief. Most significant to
St. Louis has been the creation of the Missouri Historic Tax Program in 1997 (Revised
Missouri Statute 253.545). The credits give for profit developers a 25% state tax credit
on eligible redevelopment costs on historic residential or commercial properties.
Authorization of the credit followed an extensive campaign by historic preservationists
and local development advocates, in part using the example of the renovation boom that
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followed the enactment of a similar federal tax credit in the 1980s; the elimination of the
credit in 1986 was also credited locally for stymieing redevelopment in a number of the
city’s historic neighborhoods (Freeman, 1997: 1B). Another feature of the credit is its
ability to be transferred, thus allowing developers to bring additional equity into the
project on the construction side. While the credit brings an additional requirement,
following historic preservation guidelines in the renovation of the property, its enactment
has been a major boom for development in the downtown area.
The success of the historic tax credit encouraged an additional campaign to create
broader tax credit eligibility to all residential redevelopment work within distressed
communities. That campaign led in 1999 to the creation of the Neighborhood
Preservation Act (Revised Missouri Statute 135.478). The enabling legislation created a
series of levels of tax credits applicable to both renovation of existing structures and
construction of new residential buildings in qualified census tracts and communities. In
contrast to the historic tax credits, the legislation capped the total amount of credit
available, leading state officials to create a lottery system for awarding the credits,
somewhat limiting their predictability and effectiveness in development initiatives.
Summary
Broader political and economic trends have represented both opportunities and
constraints for local leaders as they have pursued redevelopment issues. The federal
policy has evolved from the emphasis on physical reconstruction under the urban renewal
period, human and social programming under the War on Poverty, local flexibility in
community block grants, and the devolution and diminution of federal policy in more
recent years. State policy has not matched the loss of federal funding and furthered an
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emphasis upon market-based incentives, as opposed to open-ended grant funding. The
characteristics of these incentives emphasize the capacity of local leaders and local
institutions to develop partnership with private sector developers at a time when regional
economic pressures place inner-city housing and development markets at a competitive
disadvantage as compared to green-field developments in rapidly growing, ex-urban
communities.
In St. Louis, the general impact of these trends has heightened the reliance upon
private market forces for both the financing of particular projects and for leadership in
planning and implementing projects. At the same time, public leaders operate in the
context of a legacy of past initiatives that continue to impact development options in the
contemporary period. The next chapter in the study reviews the legacy of past
development initiatives, emphasizing the urban renewal period in the 1950s, the period of
New Federalism in the 1970s and the local development initiatives in the period
following Reagan’s retrenchment of federal urban policy in the 1980s and 1990s.
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Chapter 3: St. Louis and Urban Regimes
While the nature of St. Louis’ problems may have deepened in the 1990s, the
city’s economic distress and population loss are not new predicaments for city leadership.
Nor is the current emphasis on revitalization a new phenomenon either. At several
critical points since the 1940s, St. Louis leaders have organized local campaigns for
urban revitalization. These campaigns included massive demolition, construction of
public housing and urban renewal, initiatives to attract and retain new businesses, and
endeavors to stabilize the housing markets in specific neighborhoods. Viewing these
campaigns provides an insight of how political, economic, and social forces have
interacted with the work of local public entrepreneurs and local organizations to
undertake development initiatives.
St. Louis’ revitalization experience matches that of other cities in that the federal
government has been an important component of each revitalization period. In St. Louis’
immediate post-war period, the efforts of Mayor Raymond Tucker (1953-1965) to build a
strong public-private coalition around urban renewal replicate those of other mayors at
that time. More recently, St. Louis’ Vincent Schoemehl (1981-1993) is often included in
a list of “messiah mayors” (Teaford, 1990: 258), attempting revitalization in the era of the
“New Federalism,” a time of greater local discretion over a shrinking pot of federal aid.
However, the characteristics of redevelopment—the projects have been implemented and
the nature of the coalition promoting them—have been the product of local factors. What
is unique about the St. Louis’ experience is how local leaders have responded to these
opportunities and challenges. Over time, these experiences add up to a pattern of
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development politics that shapes how contemporary civic actors pursue revitalization
initiatives.
The thesis of this chapter is that past revitalization initiatives continue to shape
contemporary redevelopment activities, both in the formal in organizations and
institutions formed as a part of the redevelopment process, as well as a general culture of
decision-making that emphasizes the participation of particular actors and the roles that
they play. Additionally, these past experiences also demonstrate the degree of interaction
between the city’s political structure and economic elite, directly addressing the question
of whether St. Louis has a political regime. First developed by Clarence Stone (1989) in
his study of post-war Atlanta, regime theory remains the principal focus through which
scholars, and the lay public in some sense, has treated urban development, describing
how public and private actors cooperate to govern cities and foster economic
development. In this framework, development decision-making rests upon the important
contributions of both elected politicians and the local business elite. Regimes are the
persistent and lasting interactions of these two groups within specific cities. Over time—
as their characteristics become more institutionalized—regimes continue because they
provide a system for incentives for local actors to collaborate and to withstand political
and economic challenges, including changes in the intergovernmental funding
environment, local electoral change and the upturns and downturns in local economies.
Regime theory suggests the importance for a lasting public-private partnership as
a precondition for urban revitalization. In this initial exploration of St. Louis’ past
attempts at revitalization, the presence of a number of key factors should demonstrate the
existence of a St. Louis regime. First is the existence of a strong and consolidated
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organization, like Atlanta’s CAP, founded and supported by local corporations to help
channel corporate support into local initiatives. St. Louis has a seemingly similar
organization to CAP, Civic Progress, founded in 1952 and made up of the presidents and
chief executive officers of the region’s largest corporations. In terms of political
leadership, redevelopment activities promoted the role of the mayor as the chief
executive of the city and as the individual responsible for coordinating interactions
between public leaders and private businessmen. Additionally, a St. Louis regime should
be marked by an active, engaged and lasting collaboration between corporate leadership
through their organization and the political leadership of the city. This should be seen
both in degree of cooperation and interaction between political leadership and the
corporate leaders, as well as the development of specific organizations and initiatives by
which this interaction is institutionalized. Over time, this collaborative should have an
additive effect. In Atlanta, for example, the interaction between CAP and Atlanta’s
political leadership has become increasingly ingrained in the city’s local political culture,
and successive initiatives have built upon, rather than replaced, this essential feature of
Atlanta politics.
To complete this review of St. Louis’ development history, as well as provide an
initial test of some of concepts of how development policy emerges, this chapter will
review two previous periods of local revitalization activity. The first is St. Louis’ urban
renewal period under Mayor Tucker, a period when local officials responded to the
opportunity provided by the federal aid to promote urban revitalization. This period
seemingly represents the clearest example of a St. Louis regime—with Tucker promoting
the participation of a newly formed Civic Progress in a number of development projects
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in the downtown and near downtown. The participation of Civic Progress members and
other civic leaders extended beyond urban development into a series of attempted reforms
of the city’s political structure, as well as support of Tucker’s electoral campaigns.
The second period is the period of New Federalism, from the middle 1970s until
the late 1980s, under Mayor John Poelker (1973-1977) and Mayor James Conway (19771981), as well as the first years of Mayor Vincent C. Schoemehl Jr. (1981-1993). The
period represents a time of challenge for St. Louis—with rapid population loss across
both decades and the political challenges of an increasingly racially diverse and poor
population. Additionally, the period is defined by another radical shift in the federal
relationship towards cities, with the development of the block grant program to provide
greater control to mayors and then a decline in federal aid to cities under Reagan.
Tucker as the Urban Renewal Mayor.
Of all of St. Louis’ post-war mayors, Raymond Tucker was perhaps in the best
position to create what would be recognizable as an urban regime. His personality and
previous experience working with business elite to eliminate the smoke that dominated
the St. Louis skyline contributed to an ability to develop close relationships with local
business people and organizations (Tucker, nd). Tucker’s pre-mayoral career included a
stint as Mayor Dickmann’s chief of staff, the city’s Smoke Commissioner until 1945, and
until 1953 a professor of engineering at Washington University. Even during this
interregnum, Tucker remained connected to St. Louis politics, chairing a committee set
up by Mayor Joseph Darst (1949-1953) to propose reforms in St. Louis’ municipal
charter (Stein, 2002: 103). When Darst declined to run for reelection in 1953, Tucker
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announced his candidacy, and won the first of his three terms in a close race against a
seasoned local politician.
Tucker’s platform in the 1953 election supported the recently formed Civic
Progress group (“Tucker Calls for Aid of Citizens to Improve City,” 1953: 3A) and a 10point plan of urban redevelopment and slum clearance (“Raymond R. Tucker, Candidate,
Offers 10-Point Plan,” 1953: 3A). Civic Progress had formed following the visit by of 8
local businessmen to Pittsburgh in 1952 to investigate the work of a similar
organization—the Allegheny Conference for Community Development. These
organizing members represented the highest level of St. Louis’ corporate and civic
community, including the former Republican mayor of St. Louis Aloys Kaufmann,
Arthur Blumeyer, chairman of the St. Louis Housing Authority, David Calhoun,
president of the St. Louis Union Trust Company and Wesley McAffee, president of
Union Electric. As all new members were recommended by the existing membership, it
became a prestige appointment for those selected. Members were required to actively
participate in the group’s monthly meetings held downtown and to commit their personal
and corporate funds to Civic Progress sponsored campaigns.
Mayor Darst used Civic Progress to staff his Citizen’s Finance Committee—
which in January of 1953 recommended changes in the city’s political and financial
structure—and after his election in 1953, Tucker strengthened the relationship between
Civic Progress and the mayor’s office. Tucker became an ex-officio member of the
organization and attended Civic Progress meetings to promote his civic initiatives. The
meetings were held in the mayor’s office, with Tucker’s staff prepared and managing the
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organization’s agenda2. Civic Progress members quickly organized and assisted Tucker’s
success on two fronts—shepherding successful public passage of the Plaza Bond Funds
in September of 1953 and the Earnings Tax Funds in 1954. The first provided funds for
the Plaza Apartments in downtown St. Louis—a project to be undertaken by the Urban
Redevelopment Corporation (URC), founded by Aloys Kaufmann and 21 other
prominent business leaders in March of 1950 (’21 Men Vs. Slums,” 1950: 44).
The Earnings Tax Campaign in 1954 was initiated in order to give the City of St.
Louis the ability to levy a permanent earnings tax to fund the city’s general revenue and it
proved to be a more complicated campaign. First was the process of overcoming the
state legislature’s opposition to the project, followed by a campaign for public approval.
The effort included Civic Progress members—whose chair Powell McHaney, president
of General American Life, organized the campaign—as well as some of the local unions
and community leaders that had opposed Tucker’s election in 1953 (Tucker, nd).
The Plaza Bond campaign was the first in a long line of projects on which Civic
Progress worked with Mayor Tucker. Others include the 1955 Bond Campaign, which,
when approved by 83% of the city’s voters, authorized $110 million in funds for street
and bridge improvements, parks and playgrounds, expressways, and funds for a new Mill
Creek Urban Renewal Project (Dunlap, 1955: 1A). Civic Progress also worked closely
on the construction of public housing undertaken by the St. Louis Housing Authority and
the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (LCRA). LCRA’s first commissioner
was David Kempland, a downtown real estate agent (“Geo. Kempland is Named to Land

2

Tucker’s mayoral papers held at Washington University in St. Louis, MO, contain minutes of his weekly
meetings as a part of Civic Progress and detail his involvement with the organization.

71

William, Winter, 2006, UMSL, p. 72

Clearance Post,” 1951: 1A); later appointments would continue the pattern of cooperation
and collaboration between the mayor’s office and local civic leadership.
Together, those two agencies planned, applied for funding and implemented St.
Louis’ major public housing from the 1950s, including the Darst-Webbe towers on the
near-south side of downtown and the Cochran and Pruitt-Igoe Towers on the near-north
side of the city. By the time Pruitt-Igoe opened in 1957, St. Louis’ urban renewal
agencies spent over $80 million dollars, creating a total of 6,000 new public housing units
(Primm, 1990: 489). Civic Progress members also worked with Tucker and St. Louis’
urban renewal agencies on the city’s Mill Creek project, a major industrial and residential
project on the western edge of downtown.
Evaluating St. Louis Urban Renewal Experience as a Regime
From the viewpoint of almost 50 years, and with the retrospective knowledge of
some of the long-term, detrimental effects of urban renewal, it is tempting to label the
public-private cooperation fostered by Raymond Tucker as an urban regime. These
activities combined the efforts of an energetic mayor with a newly established business
group to conduct major redevelopment of the city. As an organization of civic leaders,
Civic Progress was essential to the period. Members lobbied for state highway
construction, paid for studies on downtown development, sponsored the formation of
numerous community initiatives, as well as directly leveraging their personal and
corporate wealth into projects. In later years, Civic Progress members discussed race
relations, participated in city/county merger talks, and supported reform slates for the St.
Louis School Board.
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However, closer examination of economic development decision-making suggests
a hazier pattern. The story of the Plaza Apartments, a project designed to infuse the
downtown with new middle class families, is illustrative of the sort of constraints facing
St. Louis’ urban renewal actors. The September of 1953 Plaza Bonds Campaign was the
second attempt to get public approval for the project. Yet, even with those funds and an
additional $4.1 million provided by the federal government (Tucker, 1954), the project
lagged. LCRA’s executive director, Charles Farris, at first a strong supporter of the
project, later switched positions, distancing himself and soliciting additional developers
for the project (Gardner, 1956: np). Failure by the city comptroller—an independently
city-wide elected official—to take up needed expenditure requests also delayed the
project; the comptroller also required LCRA to get detailed bids from each city
department contributing to the project prior to submitting even a preliminary request for
funds (Farris, 1955b: np).
By the fall of 1956, URC’s president Russ Gardner, a downtown real estate
lawyer and member of Civic Progress, brought the mayor in to solve the impasse
(Gardner, 1956: np), and the mayor held meetings between URC, the Federal Housing
Agency and LCRA to speed up the project. However, controversy continued, with the
problems leading one nationally known real estate developer to suggest that he take over
the Plaza project as a part of the larger Mill Creek project (Tucker, 1957a: np). Part of
the difficulty surrounding projects like the Plaza Apartments was the inability of LCRA
to foster a cooperative approach to redevelopment, despite its leadership under Charles
Farris, a nationally known expert. Tucker later stated that he was not satisfied with the
operations of LCRA when he took office (Tucker, nd). After reviewing LCRA files,
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Tucker shut down the organization’s operations; federal authorities assisted by
suspending all projects in the city and placing LCRA office in receivership (Keith, 1953:
np). Farris brought to St. Louis his experience working as a top administrator for the
federal Housing and Home Finance Agency, where he helped author many of the urban
renewal regulations (Tucker, 1953: np). After accepting the job, Farris became a
significant actor in the city’s development strategies, and a key political ally of Tucker.
Tucker assisted Farris by asking all of the LCRA board to resign, and then reappointing
commissioners who were favorable to moving urban renewal forward, including allies on
other civic campaigns and Civic Progress members (Tucker, 1954a: np).
Farris’ difficulties at LCRA demonstrate key factors of St. Louis political system
that make consolidated control of development difficult. As noted in the Plaza
Apartments discussion, other political leaders independent from Tucker inserted
themselves into the project, holding up critical decisions. Bringing all the city agencies
together to get the project rolling—including the Streets Department, the Department of
Public Safety and others—was part of the “red tape” that hampered Farris autonomy
(Farris, 1954b: np). Farris also had to negotiate with the city comptroller to borrow
personnel from other departments of the city to work on urban renewal projects (Farris,
1955a: np).
Even within the subset of civic reformers who should have constituted the core of
an urban renewal machine, dissension blunted the effectiveness of their activities. Tucker
had to address the lack of coordination between the City Plan Commission and LCRA.
His intercession led to a series of policy papers between the two organizations (Coibion,
1956: np; Farris, 1956: np), but the agreement was never officially instituted. The St.
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Louis Housing Authority also became an independent base of political power over which
various political leaders in the city—including Raymond Tucker—struggled for control.
Urban renewal proponents deplored the separation of the housing authority from the City
Plan Commission and the fact that the commission had to authority to review public
housing plans (“What Planning Means,” 1953: 4A). The Housing Authority’s batch of
jobs and low-income apartments constituted an irresistible catch for St. Louis ward
leaders. Tucker was very concerned with the Authority, receiving reports early in his
term of its politicization (Brown, 1956: np) and its inability to work with other city
agencies (Tucker, 1954b: np). Initial plans were for Farris to become the executive
director of both LCRA and the Housing Authority; however, merger of the two
organizations was delayed until later in 1955. Tucker indicated in later years how, after
the transfer of power, some commissioners tried to influence Farris’ operations with
political considerations (Tucker, nd) and Farris attempted to stamp out political activity
among Housing Authority employees.
Tucker and the Politicians
Most significant for the urban renewal period was the activity of the locally
elected city aldermen and ward committeemen. Tucker strongly believed that as mayor
he represented the best interests of all city residents, a theme he stressed during his
campaigns and in his meetings with Civic Progress members. However, as the costs and
casualties of urban renewal emerged—in St. Louis, urban renewal displaced thousands of
families and radically changed the face of significant parts of the city’s core—the
proponents of urban renewal failed to attract the support of political leaders closest to St.
Louis’ neighborhoods. Like most cities at this time, St. Louis had little in the way of
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neighborhood improvements besides urban renewal; a small demonstration project in two
city neighborhoods stressed the identification of code violations and provided no funds
for repairs (Division of Building and Inspection, 1957: np).
Urban renewal proponents also seemed unable to establish vehicles that provided
meaningful participation of actors from other levels of the city’s political structure. A
widely publicized post-mortem of a 1948 Redevelopment Bonds Campaign—a campaign
sponsored by the local business and civic leadership—noted that urban renewal stirred a
“silent unorganized opposition” within most of the city’s wards by raising more questions
than advocates of urban renewal could answer (“Slum, Housing Bond Election Urged
After U.S. Funds are Voted,” 1948: 1A). Farris understood the importance of building
civic support for urban renewal, and early in his administration established citizen
committees to assist in the financing and location of new housing projects. While the
commissions included religious leaders, banking officials, real estate agents, members of
the chamber of commerce and officials from the Urban League, League of Women
Voters and the AFL-CIO, it included no representation from other political leaders in the
city (Farris, 1954a: np).
While the participation of aldermen and ward committees was not sought, they
used entrance points in the city’s political structure to affect economic decision-making.
Indicative of this was the federal highway 70 project planned for the north part of the
city. Not only did aldermen block the project in the middle of the 1953 primary
campaign, they continued to stall the project even after the 1955 Bond Campaign
provided $18 million to speed up condemnation of property and construction (Tucker,
1957b: np). In another example, opponents of the Darst-Webbe public housing project
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not only enlisted support in the Board of Aldermen, but also among some local leaders in
the Chamber of Commerce. Their campaign forced Tucker to respond to a formal
investigation of the project by the federal Public Housing Agency (Blumeyer, 1954: np).
Ward leaders’ opposition to Tucker hardened when he moved beyond urban
renewal activities and worked to change the structure of the St. Louis political system to
check their authority and consolidate his power. In 1956, Tucker succeeded in initiating
a campaign to rewrite the charter of the City of St. Louis. Leading the campaign for him
was a number of prominent businessmen, civic leaders, and some labor officials. Tucker
and his backers erred politically in their confrontations with local aldermen, including
failing to negotiate with the aldermen on the key point of diminishing the size of the
aldermanic board. By the time the charter amendments were finalized, they were
publicly opposed by a number of powerful local leaders, including A. S. Cervantes, a
south-side alderman would later defeat Tucker in 1965 (“New Charter Campaign
Reaches Climax,” 1957: 1A). The Board of Aldermen also hampered the chances for
passage by scheduling the election during the political “off-season” and creating a budget
problem prior to the vote that forced the mayor to make short-term cutbacks in city
services (Tucker, 1957: np). As a consequence of these machinations, the new charter
went down to massive defeat, with low-income voters and black voters strongly opposing
the changes.
Tucker’s failure at charter reform and the enmity that it caused also created
further difficulties on urban renewal projects. A 1962 bond election to fund further
projects went down to defeat after a lackluster campaign. The bond issue had the formal
endorsement of the Democratic and Republican Parties and even key African American
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leaders that were convinced that urban renewal was hostile to their interests. However,
campaign organizers failed to provide any funding for ward organization support (Trask,
1962: 1A). Most significantly, in Tucker’s 1965 reelection attempt, the opposition of
ward leaders and the mounting criticism of urban renewal projects made for a difficult
campaign. Tucker lost the support of wards that had previously supported him and failed
to get the endorsement of the party committee from his own ward (“Tucker Likely to
Lose Backing of Key Ward,” 1965: 8A). Campaigning for his opponent A. S. Cervantes
was a trio of city politicians—including black ward leaders (“The Cervantes Campaign,”
1965: 1B). Unlike some of Tucker’s past opponents, Cervantes ran a credible campaign,
including releasing policy statements on development (“Development Co-Ordinator for
City Urged by Cervantes,” 1965: 1A) and campaigning against the Mill Creek project as
a “wasteland” (“Business Links of Cervantes Cited in Review of His Tax Votes,” 1965:
1A). Even with some predicting that ward endorsements would not matter, Cervantes
bested Tucker by over 15,000 votes (Thornton, 1965: 1A).
The experience of Raymond Tucker and Civic Progress shows how local political
conditions impact the ability of mayors to independently control development activities.
These conditions include the organization of city agencies and the role of aldermen and
committeemen in local politics. Finally, St. Louis’ urban renewal experience provides a
cautionary note on reading too much power into organizations like Civic Progress.
Whatever the aspirations of its founders, it could be argued that, by 1965, Civic Progress
was only one part of the city’s redevelopment process. Each of these points become
increasingly important for St. Louis as the urban renewal period of the 1950s and 1960s
turned into the New Federalism of the 1970s and 1980s, with federal funding for urban
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areas initially leveling off and then drastically declining under the Reagan
Administration.
From Urban Renewal to New Federalism in St. Louis
Raymond Tucker’s defeat in 1965 illustrated the perils implicit in urban
development policy-making. Unless considerations were made to include local political
leaders in the policy process, urban renewal could create enough enemies to bring the
process to a halt and threaten the political career of its proponents. For local leaders in
St. Louis, particularly mayors, the emergence of New Federalism would provide three
key opportunities. First, the development of this new system reshuffled the development
decision-making process, with a specific goal of providing local mayors greater control
over the disparate federally funded redevelopment activities. Secondly, CDBG continued
the general shift of redevelopment into a broader set of development activities, not just
physical revitalization but also human services, community planning, and even such
“routine” maintenance issues such as street repair and tree planting—infrastructure needs
usually paid out of St. Louis’ general revenue.
Third, although federal regulations mandated that some of all CDBG funds
benefit low and moderate-income residents, this became more of a target than an absolute
standard. Thus, CDBG became an irresistible pot of funds for local leaders across the
city coping with new demands at a time of continuing population loss and economic
decline. The perilous economic conditions of St. Louis in the early 1970s assured that
the development politics of the period would be contentious. With the loss of many
young, middle or working class families to the suburbs, the city retained a residential
based that was older, poorer, and more unskilled (City Plan Commission, 1973a: 30).
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The city lost 56,800 jobs between 1969 and 1972 (City Plan Commission, 1973a: 89),
and lost more than 60,000 housing units between 1950 and the early 1980s (Checkoway,
1985: 244). The changing racial makeup of the city exacerbated the tensions and meant
that economic decline of the city impacted different parts of the city differently. Between
1970 and 1980, the mostly black north side of the city lost between 28 and 60 percent of
its residents, far higher than the integrated and largely well off central corridor or the
mostly white and middle income south side of the city (Checkoway, 1985: 244)
Local Politics under CDBG
By the 1973 mayoral election, the city’s economic decline was foremost in the
public mind. Comptroller John Poelker, a protégé of Raymond Tucker and backed by the
city’s business leadership, ran for the Democratic nomination on the platform of
centralizing the city’s development agencies under a Community Development Agency
(CDA) (Meyer, 1973: C1). Typically, funding for revitalization and state legislation
guiding redevelopment policy had created a number of active agencies—the Housing
Authority, LCRA, the City Plan Commission, the Municipal Business Development
Commission, the Land Reutilization Authority, the Planned Industrial Expansion
Authority, as well as various human service agencies. The existence of these, in
Poelker’s opinion, fragmented the city’s development capacities and weakened the
mayor’s ability to respond to the city’s economic decline. By contrast, CDA was to serve
as an executive-led agency with the technical ability and, after the 1974 CDBG reforms,
the financial control of resources to lead the city’s revitalization activities (Schmandt,
Wendel and Tomey, 1983: 50-1).
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The passage of the 1974 Act left cities with just a small window of opportunity to
meet Round I of CDBG funding, and, through CDA, the newly elected Poelker had an
unusually dominant role. Aldermen were bought into the process only formally after the
application was presented to the Board (Collins and Zusevic, 1975: 118). More
important in this process was LCRA and the Housing Authority, who by virtue of their
pre-existing power and place in the renewal process consisted an “entrenched subsystem”
“whose inertia is difficult to thwart” (Collins and Zusevic, 1975: 88). The expertise of
officials in these two agencies in dealing with HUD allowed LCRA to push continued
federal funding for certain residential and commercial projects, despite their sizeable
budget surplus.
In the initial round of funding, the mayor maintained a tight control over funding
priorities. However, CDBG politics quickly evolved to reflect the input of a variety of
political actors (Collins and Zusevic, 1975: 118). CDA’s monopoly on the process would
not last long, particularly when CDBG funding nearly doubled in 1978. As the process
of CDBG funding became better known, the aldermen gradually inserted themselves into
the process. A September, 1977, Post-Dispatch study found that three south-side wards
were over-represented in the first three years of CDBG funding—all three represented by
powerful political families, one with ties to the CDA Board of Commissioners. The
series also detailed more indelicate examples of political prerogative. CDA shifted $6
million from approved to unapproved projects in the first three years of funding,
including $750,000 for landscaping projects and $838,000 for miscellaneous public
works projects (Prost, et. al., 1977a: 1A), in part to satisfy aldermanic requests. One
CDA commissioner described the fact of aldermanic influence as “a fact of life” that
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“you have to swing with” (Prost, et. al., 1977d: 1A). As significantly, commissioners,
appointed both by the mayor and board of aldermen and representing city departments,
also used their position to push pet projects, specifically community centers in their
neighborhoods (Prost, et. al., 1977b: 1A). Later investigations would find that major
non-profit recipients of CDBG funding had strong connections to their respective
aldermen and questionable track records (Joiner, 1980: 12D).
Aldermen also attempted to control the use of Urban Development Action Grants
(UDAG) and tax abatement procedures, two additional development procedures
commonly used in redevelopment activities, often in combination with CDBG funding.
The first UDAG grant received by the city linked downtown commercial development
with the renovation of the Cochran public housing complex in a specific deal to placate
aldermen (“Partners in Progress,” 1978: 2C). By 1978, the city had abated $63.1 million
in local taxes under a variety of state mandated programs. As problems emerged in
several of the projects, both the mayor’s office and the Board of Aldermen sought
heightened control over their use (Sutin, 1978d: 4B; Malone and Prost, 1979: 1A; Prost,
1980b: 3A).
Debate over CDBG politics included both who should control funding and how
the process of allocating funding should be organized. Proposals made in 1978 by
Poelker’s successor, James Conway, to replace CDA commissioners with citizen
representatives appointed by the mayor fell to aldermanic opposition (Boyd, 1978a: 1C).
The Board of Aldermen worked to take away mayoral control of the process by requiring
that all CDA expenditures require line item approval by both the Board of Aldermen and
the Board of Estimate and Apportionment (Pearson, 1977: 4D). Later compromises
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between the mayor’s office and the aldermen gave the latter greater control over housing,
economic development and public works projects, with CDA maintaining control over
other type of expenditures (Sutin, 1978e: B12). This compromise became long lasting;
although there were attempts to change the allocation process during the Schoemehl
administration, a pattern of joint authority continues today.
Mayor Conway clashed with the Board of Aldermen frequently during his one
term. Previously a state senator who had sought to eliminate the city’s “county” offices,
Conway routinely vetoed or sought to prohibit spending that he considered pork barreling
(Boyd, 1978b: 10C; Sutin, 1978c: 4F; Mannies, 1979: 1B). The mayor and Board of
Aldermen regularly blamed each other for CDA’s sluggishness in spending funds, and, in
1978 and 1979, disagreements between the two branches threatened the CDBG
application and city’s budget.
Over time, local aldermen had two competing goals. First, a mostly white
political leadership sought cuts to the Model City and urban renewal programs with
savings redistributed throughout the city. By contrast, black political leaders sought the
distribution of CDBG funds throughout black communities, rather than in just transitional
neighborhoods (Collins and Zusevic, 1975: 83). In this sense, the gradual response of the
development program to the competing demands placed upon it shows how CDBG
politics closely reflected existing political alliances and divisions. Contrary to the intent
of New Federalism legislation, the introduction of CDBG in St. Louis led not to mayoral
control over development initiatives but political compromises in both control of funds
and use of funds reflecting the existing structure of St. Louis politics. On the south-side,
mostly white aldermen fought to move block grants into the city’s general operating
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budget, fund pet projects, and keep intrusive development projects—particularly low
income housing--out of their neighborhoods. Urban renewal under CDBG continued to
operate in its own institutional setting, with various commercial and housing projects
located in the central corridor and on the near north and near south side. In the central
corridor and parts of the south side, CDBG and tax abatements became an important part
of a strategy by private developers to retain higher income families and attract
newcomers of equal status (Schmandt, Wendel and Tomey, 1983: 44). These activities
became important part of an emerging public-private partnership that attracted national
attention (Prost, 1980a: 1A) and that was lauded by CDA officials (Volland, 1980: 3A).
By contrast, development in the north part of the city was characterized by
targeting of funds to the near north side area, supported by public housing advocates and
a few key developers. Funding of public housing on the near north side reflected the
political linkage of public housing leaders with urban renewal priorities through the
UDAG process (Sutin, 1978a: 4B). While for some this linkage was a sign of progress,
for others this strategy reinforced a strategy of “racial and low-income containment”
(Joiner, 1978: 1B). Development in other parts of the north side was conditioned on
funding from the federal Section 8 subsidy program—a program ripe with administrative
and technical difficulties (Schmandt, Wendel and Tomey, 1983: 40). When this funding
did not emerge, the projects were abandoned. Development on the north side was also
hampered by the increasingly desolate conditions of many north side neighborhoods. As
a local press study concluded in 1977, “part of the reasons for lower allocations to the
North side is the apparent lack of redevelopment projects in that area of the city” (Prost,
et. al., 1977d: 1A). Representing older, increasingly depopulated communities, some
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north side aldermen lacked the expertise to attract development or were hostile to the
developers working flourished elsewhere in the city.
Schoemehl and Development Politics
The notion of the multiple track strategy in CDBG spending clarifies that St.
Louis development politics may be best described as a multiplicity of interests rather the
dominance of one set of institutions. Both Poelker and Conway fought against that trend.
In the process of those debates, however, Conway became broadly unpopular with most
other local political leaders, a fact that helped Vince Schoemehl’s victory in the 1981
Democratic primary. Schoemehl’s campaign included criticism of Conway because of
the closure of the city’s last automobile plant and Conway’s decision to close Homer G.
Phillips Hospital, serving blacks on the north side.
Schoemehl brought to the mayor’s office an extraordinary energy as well as a
consummate set of political skills. As an alderman, he was associated with a “Young
Turk” faction that was challenging St. Louis’ traditional Democratic leadership (Stein,
2002: 190); their support for Schoemehl built a base of support in wards around the city.
Schoemehl’s campaign included many younger volunteers who brought his name to
virtually every door in the city, promoting him as a grassroots reformer. As mayor,
Schoemehl surrounded himself a new set of young professionals who, while novices in
their respective fields, shared their boss’ enthusiasm (Freeman, 1981e: 3B). Schoemehl’s
record of activities in his first term indicated the mayor’s energy. Development activities
championed by the new mayor included an industrial redevelopment fund (Freeman,
1981d: 1A), a deal for financing of the St. Louis Centre project (“Revenue Bonds to Be
Issued to Help Finance Downtown Centre,” 1981: 3A) and continuing activism to break
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the deadlock on the 12-year-old Gateway Mall project. Schoemehl also set up a new
business assistance center to speed the process of receiving city approval (“City Sets Up
Center to Aid Businesses,” 1981: 3A), and, in response to complaints from developers,
modified review policies over historic standards at the city’s Heritage and Urban Design
Commission (Mannies, 1981b: 3A). As a cheerleader for the city, Schoemehl regularly
held town meetings (Schaeffer, 1981: 3A; Freeman, 1981a: 3A), hosted delegations of
developers interested in the city (Prost, 1982c: 3A), and traveled extensively to promote
the city (“Mayor, Aides Inspect Baltimore Development,” 1981: 3A). On regional issues,
Schoemehl backed renewed city-county cooperation (Barrett and Mannies, 1981: 1A) and
restructured city tourist efforts to coordinate them with efforts by St. Louis County
(Hannon and Freeman, 1981: 1A). He began talks with County Executive Gene McNary
on a joint city/county enterprise zone (Sutin, 1982a: 15A). Schoemehl also initiated an
innovative sales tax proposal to create a regional economic development fund for the city
and county that ultimately failed at the polls in August of 1982 (Horrigan, 1982: 1A).
Another way to evaluate the capacity that Schoemehl and his team brought to the
development agencies can be seen in the amount of redevelopment activity that occurred
in his three terms. In the 1970s, changes in Missouri law provided new powers to abate
property taxes to encourage private market reinvestment—these include Chapter 99, 100,
and 353 redevelopments; of the three, Chapter 353 redevelopments have been viewed as
“central” to St. Louis’s revitalization during this period (Community Development
Agency, 1989). In numerical terms, 32 plans were approved between 1960 and 1980,
with 54 projects completed under the plan. The number of plans increased to 95 by 1989,
with another 261 projects completed in the period, including over 100 residential

86

William, Winter, 2006, UMSL, p. 87

projects. Total Chapter 353 investment in the 1980-89 period reached $1.08 billion
(Community Development Agency, 1989: 1). By 1987, the assessed value of commercial
and residential property under all redevelopment types reached $345 million, about ¼ of
the total assessed value of all property in the city, with the total amount of abated taxes
reaching $250 million (Office of the Comptroller, 1987: 55).
Schoemehl’s successes during these first years are all the more remarkable given
the other local challenges that emerged at the same time. Schoemehl had to contend with
a crisis at the St. Louis Housing Authority, ultimately stepping in take control over the
agency after the heat failed in a number of the Authority’s buildings (Freeman, 1982a:
1A). Likewise, financial difficulties at the regional transportation agency, Bi-State, led to
an emergency takeover of the agency, including appointment of former Mayor Poelker as
the interim director (Sutin, 1981b: 1A). Schoemehl feuded with Aldermanic Board
President Thomas Zych on a host of issues, including the city’s budget and layoffs
(“Layoffs Not Certain, Zych Says,” 1981: 3A). Most significantly Schoemehl conducted
a low-intensity struggle over his first year in office with the Board of Aldermen over
redistricting of the city’s wards, a struggle that erupted into an outright conflict when
Schoemehl threatened to lead a campaign to reduce the number of wards (Freeman,
1981c: 1A). The threat was later withdrawn and ultimately Schoemehl lost the fight.
By far the greatest challenges in Schoemehl’s first years were those relating to the
Reagan Administration’s retrenchment from the post-war pattern of federal policy. The
impact of federal budget cuts was dramatic; from 1981 and 1982, total federal support to
the city was cut from $77 million to $49 million (Mannies, 1982: 8A). The elimination
of general revenue from 1983 to 1986 took away a fund that had been used broadly to
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fund local government activities; other federal cuts included the elimination in a federal
urban development action grant program that had been used by the mayor’s office, to
complete complicated and highly leveraged projects. Most significantly, CDBG funds
declined precipitously from their high levels in the 1970’s. In Schoemehl’s first year,
CDBG appropriations to the city declined from $38 million to $30 million; by 1990,
CDBG allocations to the city declined another $10 million (see Table 4 above).
The impact of the Reagan Administration’s changes in federal policy towards
cities was felt throughout city government—from staff layoffs at federal funded human
service organizations (“HDC Will Lay off 180, Close 7 of 12 Centers,” 1982: 1C), to
elimination of transportation planning grants (Curry and Goodrich, 1981: 1A), to a scaleback in public housing modernization (“Budget Cuts to Cost Agency 3,000 Jobs,” 1981:
3B), to a virtual shut-down of the city’s training agency (Freeman, 1981a: 3A). Federal
budget cuts—also affected in state program funds (Ganey, 1981: 1A)—compounded
serious local budget shortfalls. Local deficits meant that Schoemehl took office with the
prospect of laying off 1 out of 7 city employees in his first 6 months (Schaeffer, 1981:
3A) and a budget deficit of $25 million in his administration’s second year (Sutin, 1981c:
3A). Compounding local budget problems were federal tax changes, which one study
estimated would cost the city as much as $11 million in revenue over the next 6 years
(Joiner, 1981: 3A).
In some small way, officials at CDA during Schoemehl’s tenure said that federal
reductions were both a hindrance and help; the perception of deep budget cuts were
convenient response to those seeking support for program initiatives. The perception that
CDBG was diminishing provided professionals at the organization, as well as their
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mayor, with a justification and shield for control over allocations. Schoemehl’s attempts
to control development policy came in a number of forms—from changes to proposed
changes to the CDBG process to limit aldermanic influence, to the use of mayoral office
funds to fill top positions at CDA with aides loyal to the mayor (Sutin, 1981d: 6C).
Despite the obvious accomplishments of Schoemehl’s team, in terms of the institutional
structure of development politics, his mayoralty should be a seen as a consolidation and
continuation of past trends as opposed to any radical shift from past practices. While
declines in funding did increase the contentiousness in CDBG expenditures, other factors
work to stabilize the process, including the mayor’s understanding of the local political
process. As a candidate, Schoemehl had supported changes in the CDBG appropriation
process—providing aldermen control over expenditures (Mannies, 1981a: 3A)—but this
piece of campaign rhetoric was quickly thrown out in the first round of CDBG
negotiations (Sutin, 1981a: 4A). More significantly, Schoemehl instituted a practice of
aldermanic consultation, including the Aldermanic HUDZ Committee and the aldermen’s
black caucus, early in the appropriation process (“The Mayor and the Caucus,” 1981:
2H), a practice that continues today.
“Peak Bargaining” and the Gateway Mall Project
Schoemehl demonstrated that a capable and energetic mayor could utilize the
existing network of development institutions to direct development decision-making even
in the face of federal budget cuts. However, the fate of other development initiatives
during his administration shows how other local forces can counter the power of the
mayor. Top on this list of projects is the Gateway Mall, a major deal that preoccupied
development decision-making for much of the mayor’s first term. Unlike the more
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routine, day-to-day decisions made over the expenditure of CDBG and other community
development funds, the Gateway Mall project represented “peak bargaining” at the
highest levels of development politics.
The Gateway Mall proposals stemmed from decade old plans by the City Plan
Commission to create a central parkway downtown running along Market Street (City
Plan Commission, 1915). The intent of the parkway, following City Beautiful planning
principles of the day, was to create a linear park running across the downtown area, from
12th Street to Jefferson, and a proper vista on which the city’s major public institutions
could be located. The park was implemented in pieces west of 12th Street in the 1920s
and in 1950s and 1960s. These included the development of Aloe Plaza across from
Union Station following a 1923 bond issue, extension of the greenway east to 12th Street
upon the success of a dramatic “Progress or Decay” campaign in 1953, and development
of Kiener Plaza in 1962 following a $2 million bond issue.
Plans for the construction of the Gateway Arch heightened interest in the area,
and the idea of a relatively unobstructed view of the Arch began to take shape. Gradually
a mall plan emerged that would create a greenway between the Old Courthouse on
Broadway and the Civic Courts Building on 12th Street (Russell Mullgardt Schwartz Van
Hoefen, 1953: 7; City Plan Commission, 1960a: 3). However, progress for the project
stalled for financial as well as political reasons. Mayor Tucker was unsuccessful in
garnering federal funds for the work, and city residents declined to approve another bond
issue for the remainder of the mall in 1966. When the city developed a blighting bill for
the area in 1970, it did so without any credible plan to finance the improvements and with
the opposition of some building owners in the area (“Blighting Area Status for Mall Site
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Endorsed,” 1970: 3A). By 1977, a special city task force debated the merits of three
separate proposals, including one that modified the open mall concept preserving some
office and retail space in the area (Community Development Agency, 1982: 54).
The point of the discussion of the Gateway Mall is not to develop the merits of the
proposals that ultimately emerged for the area in 1982, but to use the case of the Gateway
Mall to demonstrate the complicated nature of St. Louis’ development process. Certainly
one of the issues was the emergence of a pro-historic preservation movement that
opposed the demolition of historic properties in the mall area and to support plans by
local developer Donn Lipton to preserve the three most significant buildings (Giles,
1998). Initially, LCRA received approval in 1980 to implement a plan that called for a
half-mall concept, with low-rise retail development on a portion of the site reminiscent of
a suburban mall. The city submitted an UDAG application to fund parts of the plan
(Community Development Agency, 1982: 54).
The failure of the city to receive the grant led candidate Schoemehl to agree with
his Republican rival for a review of the mall plan (Prost, 1981a: 3A). The inability of the
city to garner federal support made the open mall concept unlikely, and so attention
turned to a mix of a green space with retail and commercial development to finance the
project. In 1981, two proposals emerged. The Gateway Mall Redevelopment
Corporation (GMRC) represented primarily local businessmen who were initially openmall enthusiast but came to support a primarily open mall concept with several new Class
A office buildings on selective parts of the site. With John Poelker as its titular head, the
group was run by Robert Hyland, the president of KMOX radio, Richard Ford, president
of 1st National Bank, and H. Edwin Trusheim, president of the General American
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Insurance Company. On the other hand, the Landmark Redevelopment Corporation
(LRC) proposed a half-mall plan with extensive plantings and public amenities and
redevelopment of three historic properties along 6th Street. The group was led by Donn
Lipton, an owner of property in the area, and S. Lee Kling, chairman of Landmarks Bank.
That the project that emerged over the next four years differed so radically from
both the open mall concept and the revised half-mall concept agreed to in 1981 is a
product of both financial reality and the intervening pressures of other actors in the
development process. Local public officials took varying, and shifting positions on the
proposals as the two teams faced off. Schoemehl initially came out for the LRC
proposal, and an aldermanic committee that approved part of the redevelopment bill in
September of 1981 also supported the Lipton plan. Campaigning occurred on both sides.
GMRC officials feted aldermen in March of 1982 at a downtown roast beef and chicken
dinner (Freeman and Sorkin, 1982: 16A). However, an informal poll of aldermen
conducted in the summer of 1982 found that a plurality of aldermen continued to support
the Landmark plan, with eight, mostly African-American aldermen undecided (Freeman,
1982b: 1A).
Planning officials were split on the project; LCRA head Charles Farris opposed
the Landmark plan and in July of 1981 pushed the CDA commission to approve
development guidelines not favorable to preservation (Prost, 1981b: 1A). In January of
1982, the mayor asked CDA officials to announce that they were starting over and asked
developers to submit proposals by April (Horrigan and Prost, 1982b: 1A). CDA’s report
on the proposals in June 1982 called for a compromise between the two plans, with a vote
for the LRC plan if no compromise could be worked out (Community Development
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Agency, 1982: 33). CDA staff also detailed the strengths and weaknesses of both
proposals. In the case of the LRC proposal, this revolved primarily how the half-mall
plan would impact the aesthetics of the remaining buildings in the area. For the GMRC
plan, the staff report cited a lack of specificity on key points of the plan, including the
cost of acquisition of the property, the time frame for implementing the plan, and the
improvements to be made to the resulting green-space. Staff also questioned economic
assumptions about the demand for rehabbed and new Class A office space that the two
plans detailed. While the CDA commission approved the report and recommendation,
passing it on to the Board of Aldermen for approval, opposing the report was Farris and
aldermanic President Thomas Zych (Prost, 1982: 1A).
Opposition to the report led to both plans being introduced into the Board of
Aldermen, even while Schoemehl worked on a compromise (Freeman and Prost, 1982:
1A). Complicating the negotiations for a compromise was the work of Sorkis Webbe Jr.,
the 7th Ward committeeman; Webbe had been involved in the 1981 ward redistricting
debate and ultimately had authored the plan that Schoemehl had opposed. His
relationship with corporate leaders was complicated; during the redistricting debate, local
businessmen downtown had not so quietly intimated their opposition to a plan that placed
the CBD into Webbe’s 7th Ward (Freeman, 1981b: 1A). By 1982, however, Webbe was
an active participant in discussions; while GMRC leaders were initially cool to Webbe’s
compromise plan, in June of 1982, they agreed to support his proposal (“Lipton Will
Support Mayor’s Plan for Mall,” 1982: 1A).
The emergence of a compromise position in July of 1982 backed by a new entity
called the PRIDE of St. Louis Corporation came out of these discussions, with
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Schoemehl directly meeting with Webbe and members of the GMRC group. The intent
of the new corporation was to work out a project agreeable to both parties, but events
soon worked against the participation of LRC team. Lipton withdrew from the
corporation after an inside source leaked to the press that PRIDE was essentially sticking
to the linear-mall concept, threatening the redevelopment of historic buildings that was
essential to the LRC plan. Even after he agreed to return to the organization, Lipton
representatives were turned away from PRIDE meetings (Singer, 1982: 1A), leaving him
in the unenviable position of proposing compromises to his plan which the PRIDE group,
now formal owners of the GMRC group, refused (Prost, 1982d: 1A); Lipton had
previously lost his initial support of local labor, following a meeting between union
officials and GMRC members. Even as the Board of Aldermen continued to express
support for Lipton, castigating the PRIDE group for “dragging its feet” (Prost and
Freeman, 1982: 3A) and stating that the board would not back a plan unless it represented
a compromise (Sutin and Prost, 1982: 1A), the end result of the PRIDE process was a
plan reflecting mostly the original GMRC proposal. Schoemehl himself was pleased
with the compromise (Prost, 1982e: 1A); aldermanic approval of the PRIDE plan
followed in October of 1982 even as the plan violated original design guidelines,
including height restrictions to maintain the view of the Arch, rankling some long time
Schoemehl supporters on the board (Sutin, 1982c: 1A). Key to the approval in the board
was the affirmative votes of a block of African American aldermen, who received
commitments from PRIDE officials of 50% minority ownership in part of the project—
Gateway One, a new Class A office building at the corner of 6th Street and Walnut (Sutin,
1982b: 3A).
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In truth, when the project was completed in 1984, African American interest was
only 5%, a fact that members of the development team wrote off as a “financial reality”
(Freeman and Prost, 1984: 3A). Downtown’s contracting office sector also limited
movement on any other part of the half-mall plan; by 1990, editorial writers at the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch called the plan as a “failure” (“Junk the Half-Mall Plan,” 1990a:
2B). The other buildings never materialized and, in place of one, PRIDE had placed a
surface parking lot, in violation of the original design intent. By 1990, the PRIDE board
was essentially inactive and owed $8.75 million in state taxes (Prost, 1990: 1D). While
members such as Edwin Trusheim insisted that the Mall would get done, ultimately
Schoemehl’s development officials stepped in with a complicated financing deal,
providing state funding to purchase the remaining property from the PRIDE, erase
PRIDE’s debts, and demolish remaining buildings to complete the green space
(Lindecke, 1993: 3A).
Whither the Regime?
In many ways, the elements of the 1980s under Mayor Schoemehl would seem to
be least conducive to urban redevelopment, with drastic federal budget cuts, a prolonged
economic recession, and continued population loss and decline in the city. Despite that,
throughout this period, St. Louis and the efforts of Mayor Schoemehl were held up as
national models of urban revitalization (Prost, 1985), including redevelopment of much
of the central corridor and parts of the south side of the city where private reinvestment
was strong. However, even if the experience of Schoemehl shows how St. Louis’ mayors
can succeed, his tenure also shows some of the lasting features of development decisionmaking that continue to impede present community development policy-making. While
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the capacities of Schoemehl exceeded that of his predecessors and rivaled those of
Tucker, commonalities in the structure of community development politics exist across
the four decades investigated in this chapter.
First, the activities demonstrate that sustaining development initiatives from one
period to the other is difficult. While there is some organizational consistency over the
period, more significant is the fact that each period creates its own patterns of decisionmaking that often incompletely or imperfectly compete with each other in the overall
process. Succeeding organizations clashed with each other—as they did in the Gateway
Mall project—and the internal organization of the institutions created multiple layers for
projects to pass through and for mayors to exert influence over.
Second, while the role of local businesses and businesspeople were important, the
importance of their role is conditional to the project and the structures of development
politics. In fact, Civic Progress as an organization never proved itself to have the local
presence and power that CAP had in Atlanta or the Allegheny Conference had in
Pittsburgh. The difference is something that one of the original founders of the
organization, David Calhoun, recognized early in 1953.
“The success of [Pittsburgh’s] plan revolved largely around one
individual, Richard Mellon, who was in the position to get support of top
people in the community… One of our problems in St. Louis is that we
have no Mellon. We do have many persons in leadership position, but
there has been a great reluctance to accept leadership” (Baumhoff, 1953:
1A).
Tucker himself wanted Civic Progress to take a more activist role, but admitted, “when
Civic Progress has had to fill the activist role, they were not too successful” (Tucker, nd).
Unlike these other organizations, Civic Progress also never committed the sort of
resources that would have provided for a professional staff and organization to carry out
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projects (Baur, 1978: 122). This was a conscious decision of the first members of the
organizations during discussions held in 1954 (Tucker, nd). It is only until the early
1980s that Civic Progress leadership first identified a set of priority areas to guide action,
replacing the early system where individual members brought their own interests to
define the organization’s agenda (Wagman, 1981a; Wagman, 1981b).
While business elites play key roles in development initiatives, they interact with
other actors in development decision-making and are often not in the leadership of
developing initiatives. This suggests that business leaders in St. Louis are neither as
controlling nor as engaged as their counterparts in Atlanta. In addition, the opinions of
St. Louis’ business leaders have by no means been unanimous, nor have the always
agreed with the vision of such strong mayors as Raymond Tucker and Vincent C.
Schoemehl Jr. Corporate leaders clashed in the early 1980s over the attempts of Anheiser
Busch to gain control of the Civic Centre project, comprising both the city’s Busch
Stadium and surrounding area, as well as in the Gateway Mall project. Differences over
the Gateway Mall project led one supporter of the LRC plan to propose creating a new
organization that represented the broader base of local businesses not included in Civic
Progress meetings (Prost, 1981c: 7A). Schoemehl split with such Civic Progress
members as Richard Ford, chairman of First National Bank, and other civic leaders such
as Robert Hyland, general manager of KMOX Radio, on the Gateway Mall Project. His
opposition to the demolition of the Cupples Warehouse area downtown earned him the
enmity of Anheuser Busch, Washington University, and a host of other civic and political
leaders.
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Third, the lack of unity between key members of the business leadership and
between business leaders and the city’s chief executive is replicated in St. Louis broader
political sphere. It is clear that even when St. Louis’ mayors were best equipped, their
powers to initiate and implement development projects were challenged in a political
system that provides multiple access points to development policy-making. Joining the
mayor in this process were the board of aldermen, specific aldermen, the President of the
Board of Aldermen, the Comptroller, and numerous other semi-public officials and
private actors from across the civic spectrum. While the participation of the mayor is
important in each period, the mayor is by no means the only political actor. The mayor
had to negotiate with other local political leaders to plan and implement projects, and
these negotiations often significantly affected the outcomes. Tucker’s urban renewal
regime was perhaps the strongest example that St. Louis has of an archetypal urban
regime. However, even in this case, members of the Board of Aldermen and other localelected political officials tempered Tucker’s efforts; in part, they were able to do because
the city’s decentralized political structure provided them opportunity to impact
development policy.
Summary
In one sense, one could conclude that—given the political structure of St. Louis
and its economic decline over the last forty years—public-private collaboration is
problematic in this city. The political structure of local government—and how it has
been replicated in the semi-public agencies that handle development policy—means that
the mayor will have to do much more negotiating and political trading than his
counterparts in other American cities. The city’s declining economy and demographic
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loss provides a general constraint on the city’s ability to foster revitalization. While there
are examples of where policy-making has been consensual and political debate over
economic development minimal, more often than not development policy-making has
required the interaction of a wide variety of local actors.
On the other hand, even this brief review of St. Louis’ development history
demonstrates that public-private collaboration in smaller, more constrained ways has
been an important component of economic development policy-making. Beyond the high
profile projects that garner most public attention, development occurs on a day-to-day
basis, prompting the attention of numerous city employees, public agencies, private
organizations and local entrepreneurs. Even as the “weak regime” label seems to fit St.
Louis, the regime framework provides no real explanation of the development decisionmaking that occurs. Even if the post-war history of St. Louis leads one to predict that the
local capacity of civic leaders will always remain low, this on its own does not negate the
fact that civic leaders in St. Louis have been able to navigate the difficult waters of local
development politics. Explaining why this occurs requires starting with a different
perspective—an emphasis on what drives the participation of local actors and how the
local environment constrains or provides opportunities for their collaboration. Chapter 4
will more directly investigate the institutional setting surrounding development decisionmaking in St. Louis, focusing upon the organizations and individuals that participate in
development activities and how institutions shape the roles that participants plays in
development decision-making.
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Chapter 4: Local Institutions and Development Decision-Making
Chapter 3’s review of St. Louis’ development history demonstrates that past
development efforts have not been as sustained as those of the archetypical regimes in
such cities as Atlanta. Under the leadership of energetic and visible mayors, some efforts
have succeeded and others have failed as mayors confronted organizational and
institutional inertia. While Stone’s regime concept is inadequate to describe and
proscribe St. Louis’ development efforts, regime theory does point out that any analysis
of the outcome of policy must start with the content of local relations out of which policy
emerges. Regimes as they have been typically understood by urban scholars are just one
of the institutional arrangements that exist in American cities and that help overcome
economic competition, federalism and local political fragmentation.
The thesis of this chapter is that local institutions have created a substantially
decentralized and privatized setting for development decision-making in St. Louis. The
fact that St. Louis does not have an overall regime means that development activities
occur within specific institutional settings delineated by the particular characteristics of
local neighborhoods, wards and development markets. Key to understanding these local
institutional settings are the formal structure of local institutions that impact development
decision-makings as well as informal patterns of behavior that have emerged over time.
Formal organizations include citywide public sector agencies, business coalitions and
groups, and not-for-profit community development corporations, among others. Within
the context of broader political and economic forces, institutions operate among
opportunities and constraints as local actors pursue policies and initiatives. As
importantly, policy actors consciously shape institutional arrangements to maximize their
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input on local actions. Policy entrepreneurs are important components of analysis and
not simply shaped by their institutional context. How contemporary actors have utilized
development institutions will be identified in Chapters 5 and 6 that focus on downtown
development and Chapters 7 and 8 on neighborhood development.
Multiplicity in Development Decision-Making
Even a cursory review of the public sector’s response to local development shows
that there are multiple political actors that impact local development priorities. On the
public side, the existence of multiple agencies reflects periods of political competition
between political actors and the successive influence of waves of federal policy. While
nominally the Community Development Administration (CDA), St. Louis Development
Corporation (SLDC) and the Planning and Design Agency (PDA) have the formal
mandate of encouraging community and economic development in the city, they are just
three of a number of institutions that could impact a development deal.
[Insert Table 5 here.]
The formal development organizations include those from 50-plus years of local
history—from the urban renewal era’s Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority
(LCRA) to the contemporary Tax Increment Financing Commission (TIF). Repeated
attempts to redefine what some have called “the alphabet soup of development agencies”
in St. Louis have failed to stem the tendency for new organizations to exist on top of
existing ones. Outside of the agencies are a variety of additional arrangements, from
civic associations, not-for-profit groups and private sector actors that can be the most
important players in development projects. Infused throughout their processes is the
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impact of local government actors, principally in the mayor’s office, aldermen, Board of
Estimate and Apportionment and other charter-mandated bureaucracies.
The formal public process for planning, approving and subsidizing deals provides
opportunities for the input of a variety of actors, heightening the chance for conflict and
disagreement. Rather than the jurisdiction of one actor, or one organization, or even one
linear process, development in St. Louis occurs with the participation of multiple and
interacting decision makers. Actors and organizations enter into these processes at
different stages of the development process—from planning to implementation. The
input and involvement of various actors depends on the scale of the deal, the level of
financial complexity, the presence of equity partnerships and the use of the project. In
this sense, the development process appears to be a series of haphazard and seemingly
unrelated events, in the view of some participants an endless series of “stop/go” points.
Serial decision-making across a number of institutional settings weakens the
capacity of local decision-makers and leads to development decision-making that is
significantly decentralized and controlled by place-based entrepreneurs. Put another way,
the local systems of development decisions provide incentives to mobilize efforts to
complete projects in specific neighborhoods and specific housing markets. Accentuating
these incentives is a general shift in framework that has supported contemporary
development, one that has substantially privatized development decision-making and
clarified the role of the public sector in supporting development project. Most broadly
has been metropolitan competition for jobs and residents and the declining importance of
public sector resources in financing projects. At the same time, a regional conversation
about the city’s continuing decline resulted both in a shift of regional priorities and an
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increased awareness among city stakeholders in the importance of attracting development
initiatives.
Part of the institutional shift in development decision-making has been intentional
on the part of public officials, particularly those in the mayor’s office, to retool the
development agencies to improve their responses to private market requests and to make
aldermen and other neighborhood stakeholders responsible for development outcomes in
their communities. More substantial is the manner by which local political fragmentation
forces development decision-making from citywide strategies to narrow, market-based
initiatives. In this sense, local institutional capacity matches the desire for the strategic
intervention of public and private capital once certain indicators emerge. In practice,
aldermen and other place-based stakeholders act as entrepreneurs, seeking out alliances
with development professionals to bring development to their wards. Participants in local
developments understand that declining public resources and increased regional
economic competition places a premium on consensus with private market actors and
institutions.
Clarifying the role of public sector decision-making is the increased importance
of the private market. Individuals who participate in development decision-making are
more likely to view the private market as the primary basis for evaluating the suitability
of development initiatives. Because of this, private market actors, including private
market developers, investors and civic participants representing philanthropic resources
and other sources of supplemental capital, have been accorded substantial authority in
planning and initiating projects. Private market considerations and public sector
resources interact to create a specific context that facilitates development initiatives.
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Within an investigation of projects, both in the downtown area and in the neighborhoods,
the structures that facilitate the planning and initiation of a development project—a form
that is characterized here as a substantially privatized decision-making structure—show
both possibilities and limitations. The reality is that a substantially privatized framework
accounts for much of the successes in contemporary urban redevelopment and also many
of its limitations.
Local Constitutional Structure and Development Decision-making
Largely absent from regime theory is an analysis of the independent influence of
local institutions on local responses to urban development. Indeed, part of the story of
the shifting patterns of St. Louis development history is the legacy of specific
institutional arrangements—both the presence of formal agencies and organizations
promoting certain development practices—as well as the broader set of political and
social relationships. This factor includes the analysis of the constitutional structure of
local political power as laid out in the local charter, the organization of public sector
agencies and bureaus and the methods of local policy-making for development projects.
For St. Louis, the city is politically fragmented, both as a city and as a part of
metropolitan region, and this is reflected in the bargaining and competition for control
over development priorities. Even as a function of neo-institutional theory, such a focus
has commanded the attention of only a small, but growing, set of urban scholars. Formal
political authority as laid out in a city’s charter creates a specific set of political
institutions and political relationships that serve to “lock in” individual responses to the
problems and issues facing urban communities (Sonenshein, 2004). These reactions
evolve historically and continue to shape local options long after their initiation and even
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in the face of subsequent changes, crises and new opportunities (Stein, 2002). In
functional terms, individual political behavior is impacted by the organization and
development of specific types of local actors, including, for example, the impact of
modes of election on political priorities (Bledsoe and Welch, 1985; Clingermayer, 1993),
and the representation of specific types of interests in the local political process (Zax,
1990; Bullock and MacManus, 1991). The form of local government also impacts the
role of urban mayors and their abilities to form certain types of partnerships (Svara,
1990), how city structure impacts the ability of mayors to build governance strategies
(Gissendanner, 2004) and how changes in city charters have impacted the power of
mayors to solve urban problems (Mullin, Peele and Cain, 2004).
Historically, the connection between political structure and urban development
has been set in the tone of Progressive politics. Progressives believed machine politics
hurt the ability of local leaders to rationally respond to urban problems. Urban reform
movements in the first part of the twentieth century were populated by business,
professional and upper class groups who sought to expand their scope of political power
and bring to local politics a broader perspective on how urban conditions impacted
business growth (Hays, 1964: 215). Urban reformers specifically advocated changes in
the local structure of government—primarily through changes in the city charters and
state legislation—in order to diminish the power of local councils and strengthen the
power of local mayors. In St. Louis, as in other cities, the urban reform movement
activated middle and upper class residents, including professionals, businessmen and
civic leaders, frustrated with the seemingly parochial nature of the ward-based politics.
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For St. Louis, the discussion of reform and its impact on the city’s ability to
pursue development is not merely a historical consideration of the Progressive reform
period but a function of contemporary debates. Discussions of charter reform have been
a consistent theme in the city’s experience since the Progressive period, most recently in
2004. Over the course of the 2004 charter amendment campaign, local advocates change
have directly related the city’s political structure to the ability to pursue urban
revitalization, arguing that the city’s “weak mayor” system fragments formal authority
and diminishes the ability of political leadership to partner on development initiatives
(“Beer Bust,” 2004: C2; “Amazed and Appalled,” 2004: B2). Contemporary urban
reformers largely reiterated the language of their predecessors, focusing upon three main
criticisms of the city’s political structure. First, they note the system’s fragmented
system, with the mayor sharing with other citywide officials key budgetary and executive
functions. Second, reformers note how the historical legacy of a ward-based political
system has created decentralization that allows considerable control at the aldermanic and
neighborhood level. Finally, reformers note that the unique status of the city as both a
city and county has contributed to the persistence of a set of other locally elected
offices—including a treasurer and collector of revenue—that further fragments local
authority and creates a base for patronage and political influence in the city’s affairs.
Executive Authority and Local Politics
The current structure of local government is a testament to the staying power of
both Progressive reforms as well as the resiliency of basic forms of local political
organization. Figure 1 shows a basic organizational charter for the City of St. Louis as
well as a simplified sense of the hierarchy of local political power.
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[Insert Figure 1 here.]
The mayor serves as the primary executive for the city, elected for a four-year term in
springtime, off-year election cycle. By charter, the mayor has broad control over service
functions of the city government, including most of the functions that directly touch the
lives of residents. Mediating and coordinating the work of the six main service agencies
is the Board of Public Service, comprised of departmental chairs and a president
appointed by the mayor. Outside of supervisory control of the service industries, the
Board of Public Service is responsible for the all design and construction management of
all public work done by the city, including construction of facilities and public streets,
parks and spaces.
The mayor largely dominates local governance because of the office’s visibility
and the relatively large size of the mayoral staff. While the mayor’s appointment
authority is substantial, the city’s charter includes a number of provisions that check
mayoral authority. Chief among these are the Board of Estimate and Apportionment
(E&A), an organization unique to only several cities today. E & A’ function is little
understood by local residents. Charter reformers have specifically targeted it in most
reform attempts. Comprising the mayor, the elected comptroller and the elected president
of the board of aldermen, E&A has authority over all budgeting and appropriation of
public funds, including funds for redevelopment. In practice, E&A operates as a second
legislative body in government, with approval power over almost all city expenditures,
review and approval authority over the expenditures of city departments, and the power
to substantially set annual city budgets. It is by virtue of their approval of these contracts
that E & A members are drawn into development politics.
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Like the mayor, the comptroller and board president are elected citywide for fouryear terms; comptroller elections coincide with the mayoral election, whereas the
aldermanic president is set in a four-year cycle in between mayoral contests on a
springtime schedule. Of the three officers on E & A, the board president sits with the
least authority; in tradition, it has been the mayor and comptroller who have had the most
impact. It is part of the culture of the comptroller’s office, irrespective of the occupant,
to serve as the guardian of the public fisc, and in rhetoric over public deals it is most
often the Comptroller’s office that is most conservative. In between these two forces, the
board president presents a third vote, providing the opportunity for an alliance between
the comptroller and the board president to upset the fiscal priorities of the mayor.
The comptroller’s control over city finances, in E&A and in broader city debates,
is enhanced because the office also oversees the city’s department of finance. The
comptroller and the office’s accounting staff function as a the general auditor and
accountant for the city of St. Louis, maintaining all financial records and disbursing funds
as required for the city. The comptroller also has authority for bonding for city projects,
subject to approval by E&A. Beyond sitting on E&A, the board president’s formal
authority is generally restricted to the operations of the Board of Aldermen, where the
president conducts business, makes aldermanic committee assignments and assigns
legislation to committees. While the board president’s staff and power makes the office
more than just the “29th” aldermen, the board president is the junior partner among the
three members of E & A, with smaller staff and considerably less formal authority.
Board of Aldermen
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St. Louis has a single legislative body, a Board of Aldermen. There is a formal
system of organization on the board, including a vice president, a majority leader and an
assistant majority leader, but the most significant features of board organization is
seniority and chairmanship. Seniority in the board impacts committee assignments and
committee chairmanship; committee assignments reflect aldermanic interests and also
impact the legislative activity of aldermen. High profile committees include Housing and
Urban Development, with oversight over CDBG appropriations and other redevelopment
matters, and the Transportation oversees matters at the city’s airport. Standing
committees have the power to subpoena witnesses and books, although most committee
meetings are perfunctory. Committee meetings do function as public meetings with the
opportunity for public input on legislation or matters presented. Besides aldermanic
committees, there are less formal methods of aldermanic organization, including the
board’s Black Aldermanic Caucus, which has organized occasionally to attempt block
voting on key legislative matters.
The fact that the 28 members are elected from wards has generally created a
system of de facto aldermanic courtesy over most local neighborhood matters, including
legislation to benefit neighborhood development. Aldermanic courtesy means that
almost no legislative activity can occur impacting a ward without the support of the
alderman. Additionally, less formal methods of aldermanic influence have extended
aldermanic courtesy to a range of other departments, including the service departments
and the development agencies. In some departments, department representatives are
designated to solicit aldermanic approval for basic maintenance issues such as stop signs,
street paving and infrastructure improvements (Stein, 1991: 53, 56, 57, 60). Constituent
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services in the form of city services are an important part of the aldermanic role, and
aldermen generally work closely with department representatives and with Neighborhood
Stabilization Officers in order to assure that work orders are processed and citizen
complaints are answered.
While aldermen have significant formal and informal control over ward matters,
their influence is mediated by the fact they lack staff. Aldermen, in groups of 4 and 6,
share clerical staff. While staff at the development agencies is available on development
issues, their work is generally confined to processes such as blighting studies and CDBG
spending certification. Some aldermen utilize staff at neighborhood organizations or
campaign staff in order to expand their reach; additionally, some aldermen have
relationships with development professionals who assist them in organizing development
activity. Both of these approaches are features of the neighborhood projects discussed in
Chapter 7 and 8.
St. Louis as a City/County Hybrid
Another unique feature of the city is its charter as both a city and a county
political subdivision, stemming from an 1876 divorce of the city from the county. In
practice, it has meant the continued existence of certain citywide elected county functions
and, until recently, the protection of the features of the offices by state law. County
offices include a sheriff to oversee court and correctional protection services, a circuit
clerk to supervise local court workers, a recorder of deeds to oversee real estate deed
recordings, a collector of revenue to handle personal and business tax collections, a
license collector to oversee collection of business licenses, a treasurer to handle city bank
accounts and parking, and a public administrator to handle probate estates in local court.
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Elimination of the county offices has been a central part of city reform efforts, but
the offices have survived. In an earlier period of the city’s history, the offices were part
of a broader system of patronage positions; even where civil service reform has
eliminated all of the patronage positions from mainline city departments, county office
employments remain outside the purview of civil service. While the influence of the
county offices over city affairs in general is diminishing, the positions are mostly held by
political actors who are seasoned in local politics and whose connections to aldermen,
ward organizations and other political groups in the city enhances their standing.
Commissions and Boards, Local and State Appointed
St. Louis’ political structure is also defined through the presence of a number of
additional boards and commissions, some within the mandate of local government and
some with authority from the state. This includes everything from the Excise
Commission, which oversees liquor licensing in the city, to the Board of Commissioner
of Tower Grove Park. The composition and powers of these boards is varied, as is their
practices and actual impact on local policy. In the development field, these commissions
include oversight commissions for the various development agencies. State statute
mandates control over the Board of the St. Louis Police Department; even though the
mayor sits as an ex-officio member of the board, the city has little formal influence over
the department and must allocate local funds for the department. The state also controls
the membership of the Board of Election Commissioners. The Board of the St. Louis
Public Schools is also a separate state-mandated organization; the mayor lacks formal
control over the local school district, although mayors relied upon other mechanisms to
try to influence the district’s policy and operations.
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Public Sector Agencies and Local Development
Political competition among local elected officials is reflected in the structure and
outline of St. Louis’ development agencies. Table 1 shows a listing of the city’s
development agencies, past and present, with their main attributes.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
Although the most relevant organizations date from the 20th century, one can also look to
the 19th century for evidence how public sector responses have emerged. In the latter half
of the 19th century, the task of local development was then part of the provision of local
infrastructure and public services. Public contracting for things like sewer, water, roads
and ports was formally organized under the Board of Public Improvements, a five
member body comprising commissioners of local public functions, all appointed by the
mayor (Sandweiss, 2001: 160). The creation of the bureau in the charter of 1875 was
designed to formalize and professionalize the provision of local public services, including
the infrastructure that encouraged and retained local development, which public and elite
opinion believed that they had been lacking. Working against these attempts was St.
Louis’ solution to funding public improvements, a process that was sporadic; one
example of this was the financing of public roads, which required substantial levees to be
agreed to by property owners affected by the improvements. This method, as well as
inability of local leaders to effectively and comprehensively deal with the other sort of
public nuisances that a growing city created, created a legacy of haphazard public
response that effected the efforts of city leaders in the 20th century (Corbett, 1999: 107;
Sandweiss, 1997: 103).
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The City’s first formal planning organization, the City Planning Commission
established in 1912, reflected the desire of many civic leaders to establish order, both
physically and politically, over the city and its future. The Commission rose out a
predecessor effort, the City Plan Association, a private organization of reformers
dissatisfied with the haphazard approach of public government (Sandweiss, 2001: 204).
The board of the commission included both city political leadership as well as civic
leaders of stature in civic reform activities (Porter, 1990: 6); the Commission attracted
similar leadership in its staff, headed by Harland Bartholomew from 1916 to 1962.
Under Bartholomew’s leadership, the Commission went on to set out a vision for St.
Louis that would profoundly shape the city well into the 20th century. These included the
city’s first zoning plan, highway and transportation plans, a downtown plan detailing new
civic buildings and a park system and residential plans detailing urban renewal and public
housing sites. In the face of increasing residential blight in older neighborhoods adjacent
to the downtown, Bartholomew drew up plans that became the public housing
neighborhoods of Desoto-Carr Square (City Plan Commission, 1947).
Despite the breadth of their vision, Bartholomew and other civic reformers at the
time did operate separate from the political context of the city. This fact, recognized by
the Commission’s first leaders, frustrated the pace of implementation (Cultural Resources
Office, 1996). Attempts by the City Plan Commission to strengthen zoning regulations
that would place time limits on non-conforming uses faced political opposition from both
neighborhood and downtown real estate interests (Porter, 1990:16). Generally,
implementation of the Commission’s initiatives lagged. This was due to both the
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inherent political difficulties in its recommendations as well as the requirement of 60
percent of voter approval for the use of city bonds (Sandweiss, 2001: 220).
Post-war federal urban policy provided a revolution in local public efforts in both
financial and institutional terms. As has been already described, a series of urban
programs instituted a pipeline of federal support of local efforts, including funds to clear
blighted areas and construct low-rent public housing. Additionally, with the funds came
new public institutions to plan projects, in St. Louis primarily the Land Clearance for
Redevelopment Authority (LCRA) and the St. Louis Housing Authority. These
institutions followed the mandate of both federal and state requirements as well as fit the
need of St. Louis’s mayors to strengthen executive control over redevelopment
initiatives. Established in 1951 following enabling legislation from the state, LCRA
became synonymous with its long time director, Charles Farris, who was brought to St.
Louis to head the newly created agency, a position he held until 1988.
Then and now, LCRA formally operates under a five-member board appointed by
the mayor. In its early incarnation, these members were local businessmen and civic
leaders associated with Mayor Tucker’s urban renewal priorities; however, from the
1950s to 1980, Farris dominated the agency’s actions. LCRA’s pivotal role in planning
and implementing redevelopment initiatives, funded by using federal dollars, generally
meant that it also dominated its sister agency, the St. Louis Housing Authority (SLHA),
even though SLHA predated LCRA, having been created in 1939 under state legislation.
While the Housing Authority early on built two projects—Carr Square on the near north
side in 1942 and Clinton-Peabody on the near south side—the Authority’s development
work mostly occurred as a result of LCRA’s activities. The link between the two was

114

William, Winter, 2006, UMSL, p. 115

formalized in 1955 when Farris was appointed head of both organizations. LCRA’s work
also shadowed over the work of the older and established City Plan Commission, and
friction occurred between Farris and Bartholomew on key questions.
Both LCRA and SLHA continue to exist today; a vestige of the City Plan
Commission continued until 1974. In general terms, active periods of federal policymaking have created new public institutions to carry out development activities, with the
roles and responsibilities of new institutions added on top of existing ones. The 1960s
War on Poverty legislation prompted the creation of a Model City office within city
government and an independent Human Development Corporation to implement
initiatives, as well as numerous subcontracted agencies within community action areas.
More directly in terms of urban development, 1974 federal reforms created the need for a
new Community Development Agency (CDA) with the main thrust of planning and
initiating the use of new community development block grant funds (CDBG), including
those going to fund LCRA and the Housing Authorities activities. CDA also combined
the work of the Model Cities Office and two other existing development initiatives—the
Beautification Commission and the Business Development Office (Community
Development Agency, 1999)—creating a business development wing and a Heritage and
Urban Design commission to oversee city preservation issues.
CDA’s creation under Mayor John Poelker initially heightened the mayor’s
control over this new discretionary urban development fund. However, over time, the
expenditure of CDBG and work of CDA staff has exhibited the competing as well as
complementary goals of the mayor’s office, the board of aldermen and other political
groups within the city. In 1988, Mayor Vincent Schoemehl took advantage of Missouri’s
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Chapter 353 programs to establish the Economic Development Commission to operate as
a corollary to CDA; the organization was renamed the St. Louis Development
Corporation in a consolidation of development agencies in 1990. As an umbrella
organization, SLDC oversaw the work of not only LCRA but also the Land Reutilization
Agency (LRA), a state authorized agency created in 1971 to receive and sell tax
delinquent taxes; the Planned Industrial Expansion Authority (PIEA) authorized in 1967
to carry out Chapter 100 development projects; the Industrial Development Authority
created in 1979 to issue tax exempt bonds to fund development projects; the St. Louis
Local Development Corporation, created in 1976 to assist small business development in
the city; and the St. Louis Port Authority.
Schoemehl also established new private, non-profit organizations that became
critical components of neighborhood redevelopment plans. Operation Impact, created in
1983, became a major recipient of block group funds, charged with the initiative of
planning and implementing rehab residential housing projects in key city neighborhoods.
In 1988, Schoemehl created Operation ConServ to operate as a corollary; it utilized the
services of a number of existing city departments to bring resources to 13 targeted city
neighborhoods. These resources included code violation reviews, cleanups and
beautification campaigns, boarding of vacant buildings, and some limited housing
redevelopment activities through staff members dedicated to specific neighborhoods.
Finally, in 1991, Schoemehl initiated the formation of the City of St. Louis Tax
Increment Financing Commission in order to utilize this new financing approach for
commercial projects in the city. Like other local authorities, the TIF Commission is
headed by an independent board and staffed by SLDC.
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SLDC’s status as an umbrella organization of existing redevelopment authorities
has meant that the organization’s main focus has been economic development—including
large institutional housing and commercial development—as opposed to CDA’s focus on
residential housing. A key component of Schoemehl’s agenda was the promotion of the
SLDC as the city’s chief development agency. This came about both from changes in the
structure of the agency as well as staff appointments that placed agency personnel
directly under the mayor’s office (Stein, 1991: 114). Further reform of the development
agencies in 1999 under Mayor Clarence Harmon (1997-2001) failed to consolidate the
two agencies as he had wanted, but did reinforce SLDC’s importance. These reforms
also recreated a separate city planning agency, the Planning and Urban Design Agency
(PDA) by pulling planning, research and heritage offices out of CDA into a new, cabinetlevel agency. Harmon’s 1999 reforms also integrated Operation Impact into CDA,
abolishing its position as a separate organization.
Other additions to the public development agencies have included the creation of
the St. Louis Regional Empowerment Zone initiative and the City of St. Louis Affordable
Housing Commission. The first came about with St. Louis’ successful designation as a
federal empowerment zone in 1998, a joint application including the city, St. Louis
County and East St. Louis, Illinois. While a professional staff oversees the work of the
EZ, formal authority rests in a board of directors appointed by chief executive officers in
the three jurisdictions; in St. Louis, representatives generally undergo an informal review
by aldermen from the empowerment zone area. Empowerment zone status brought the
region both a pool of funds to invest in qualified economic development projects as well
as tax incentives and bond authority for project financing. The Affordable Housing
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Commission was created by city voter adoption of a local use tax in the summer of 2000.
The commission operates under a professional staff under assistance of CDA and is
governed by an 11-member board of directors appointed by the mayor and approved by
the Board of Aldermen. The commission provides grant funding and other financing for
housing projects that serve low and moderate-income residents, as well as the homeless
and other populations with special housing needs.
Reorganization of the agencies has also defined fairly clear roles and
responsibilities for the different agencies and the staff within them. “Ninety percent” of
the work of CDA, according to one former manager, involves administration of the
federal funds, with only a minor portion of the activity of the organization involved in
policy decisions about where funds are to be spent. CDA includes staff responsible for
allocation of federal funding and staff that monitor spending through community-based
agencies. The former includes a housing staff comprising a deputy director and a series
of housing analysts responsible for designing and implementing residential projects in
specific areas of the city.
SLDC is more generally responsible for business and commercial development,
including staff for the other agencies—LRA, LCRA, PIEA, etc. Two deputy directors
oversee the real estate function—LRA primarily—and the economic development
department—including redevelopment, business development and the business assistance
center. Senior management at SLDC are more likely to be involved in conversations
involving development priorities as well as technical negotiations on major residential,
commercial and institutional projects in the city, including the HOPE VI reconversation
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projects. This sort of role was formalized more recently with the appointment of senior
staff to a major projects division, a practice continued successive mayors.
Executive Control and Reform at the Development Agencies
Historically, reorganization and consolidation of St. Louis’ development agencies
has occurred both as a function of effectively meeting new challenges and
opportunities—for example, meeting the requirements of new state-level or federal
program requirements—as well as part of a play on the part of St. Louis’ mayors to
strengthen their control over development priorities. According to one development
official, Schoemehl understood this sort of political game—starting new organizations
when he wanted to bypass existing ones as well as modifying existing organizations to
heighten control over their activities. The creation of the Public Development
Corporation (later St. Louis Development Corporation) was one way of confronting the
built-up dominance of LCRA in redevelopment activities, especially the influence of its
long-time head Charles Farris, who had wanted to serve as the new agency’s first head
(O’Neil, 1989a: 9D). Additionally, the establishment of Operation Impact shifted
authority from CDA to the new non-profit organization, a move that led some to charge
that Schoemehl was attempting to privatize neighborhood redevelopment activities
(Mannies, 1989: 1C).
Successive mayors after Schoemehl followed this two-path strategy, with success
and failure. Retrospectively, Schoemehl has decried the “tangled mess” of city
development agencies and supported the reorganization of the agencies under Mayor
Clarence Harmon in 1998 and 1999 (Schoemehl, 1998: B3). Harmon’s return to the
theme of institutional reorganization came after the four years of the administration of
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Freeman Bosley Jr. (1993-1997). Bosley largely ignored these sorts of discussions,
preferring to work under the current system to benefit some of the neighborhoods
excluded from Schoemehl’s priority areas. City development officials indicate that the
Bosley Administration took a passive approach to politics of the agency, to the detriment
of both staff morale and executive control of the agency. At the same time Harmon
sought reorganization of the agencies, he also instituted a reorganization of the mayor’s
office, creating a deputy director of development to more directly oversee development
priorities (Parish, 1998h: 1B). Harmon’s ambitious reform agenda was prompted by a
series of local reports that promoted structural changes to create a strong mayor system to
lead the city’s redevelopment (Focus St. Louis, 1997; Mayors Advisory Committee on
City Governance, 1996). However, his attempts were largely foiled by the board of
aldermen, who expressed concern with the loss of civil service positions at CDA (Parish,
1999b: 6).
In contrast to both Schoemehl and Harmon, Mayor Francis Slay (2001 – present)
has pursued a different path to executive control over the agencies, eschewing formal
reorganization of the agencies’ structure. According to city hall officials, this strategy
reflected the view of the administration that past reform attempts had taken an enormous
amount of time and political capital with very little payoff. In general, Slay’s office has
pursued a policy emphasizing heightened executive control over the agencies rather than
formal reorganization (Prost, 2001d: B5). Slay expanded the role of the deputy mayor for
development, and brought in a local development professional, Barbara Geisman, to fill
it. Geisman also brought the political experience of working as a chief aide for the
President of the Board of Aldermen, as well as previous experience in the Board of

120

William, Winter, 2006, UMSL, p. 121

Public Safety and as head of the Community Development Agency. In terms of staffing
the agencies, the Slay Administration retained special projects officers at SLDC assigned
to work on high-profile projects, and solicited private, foundation support to conduct
national searches to find candidates for the directors of SLDC, CDA, and PDA, as well as
to increase the salary of top administration officials (Schlinkmann, 2001c: B2).
As deputy mayor for development, Geisman has consolidated her control over the
development agencies not only through an aggressive schedule of meetings and review of
potential projects, but also through formal incorporation of the deputy mayor’s position
as a member of key commission boards and agencies. According to interview sources, if
a project must appear before several boards prior to implementation, mandated staff
review by the head of CDA and the deputy mayor for development assures continuity of
action and helps retain “institutional memory” from project to project.
“Hierarchical Coordination” and the Mayor’s Office
Much of the conflict over development priorities, and as a subset of these the
design of development agencies, reflects not so much the bureaucratic inertia typical of
any public agency but the multiple political influences from the city’s elected officials.
Additionally, development activities are organized following the political pattern of
territoriality, a pattern enforced by the city’s 28 wards. Whereas under a more rational
framework development priorities might be designated citywide, ward politics remain
very important, with support, funding and prioritization of specific projects a function of
a ward political process.
It should be noted that over time, the activities of the mayor’s office have
provided citywide coordination of development activities, and in practice, the most
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capable mayors and their staff have recognized the importance of ward-level planning
and implementation. This lesson is perhaps better understood by the current mayor’s
office, but it is reflective of the historical struggles between the mayor’s office and the
Board of Aldermen—and particularly aldermen on key legislative committees. In the
past this conflict has been manifested in aldermanic opposition to reorganization plans of
the development agencies. Aldermanic opposition blunted Schoemehl’s plans and all but
stopped the designs of Harmon to create a single development agency. In political terms,
less pervasive has been the influence of other citywide elected officials, including the
Comptroller, President of the Board of Aldermen, and some of the county offices.
During Schoemehl’s administration, then Comptroller Virvus Jones used his authority
over city bond administration in an attempt to modify development priorities, particularly
regarding minority inclusion in contracting. More recently, current Comptroller Darlene
Green has been maintained a separate negotiating team on key development deals,
including the new downtown Cardinal baseball stadium and the convention hotel.
In real terms, the mayor and his staff dominate other locally elected officials in
control over the broadest development decisions; the role of the aldermen, Comptroller
and other city-wide elected officials is key but confined to distinct parts of the
development process. Put in another way, favorable input of other elected officials is a
necessary but hardly sufficient in advancing development projects; minimally, both the
mayor’s office and aldermen must agree to the broad outlines of a project, but it is in the
mayor’s office where the capacity exists to put the pieces of a development project
together. The power of aldermen and citywide elected officials is mostly reactive and
prohibitory; the power of the mayor’s office is proactive and progressive.
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The domination of the mayor’s office is both because of the institutional structure
of local agencies as they impact development decisions and due to, in terms of one local
official, “leadership and personalities.” The two are mutually reinforcing in both positive
and negative ones. The historical evolution of the development agencies has developed a
process of “hierarchical coordination;” in other words, systems are run from the top down
in a manner over-programmed to solicit the input of key political partners, including the
aldermen, where appropriate. However, such a system is only optimal with a strong
leadership team at the top; lacking that, cross-purpose if not chaos ensues.
Recent changes in the operating procedures at the development agencies have
accentuated this form of coordination. One example already mentioned has been the
practice of placement of key mayoral staff members as board members of separately
chartered commissions and agencies, such as LCRA. Development applications for city
approval now include a series of staff review meetings, including one specifically with
the head of relevant agencies and the deputy mayor for development. That pattern of
executive review is now common for the activities of most of the significant development
commissions and has generally worked to keep competing projects and priorities—at
least within the confines of the development organizations—to a minimum.
Another example comes from a set of policies instituted after 2001 concerning the
operations of LRA, the agency that markets and sells publicly owned property gained
from tax delinquency proceedings. SLDC real estate officials, who staff LRA, are
responsible for taking bids and evaluating the competency of those seeking to purchase
city owned property. The process of the sale of these properties can be politically
complicated. Often purchase or optioning of LRA property can be the first step in
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development project. City officials have the interest in both selling property for the best
possible use as well as keeping vacant property out of the hands of speculators. The
interests for aldermen over the sale of property can differ from citywide development
officials—for both mundane and more substantive reasons. For an alderman, the sale of a
side-lot to a local homeowner is a form of constituent service, whereas for development
professionals it might represent the sale of part of a larger parcel of vacant land that could
be used for a redevelopment project. Most aldermen have a keen interest in LRA sales,
and over time their approval of sales has become a necessary component.
Even where the structure of the development agencies could enhance the tendency
of agency staff to work independently of each other and of external stakeholders to
dominate agency activities, policies and procedures enhance mayoral control and mitigate
structural considerations. One view of the development of mayoral control can be seen in
the creation of the Affordable Housing Commission in 2001. The establishment of the
commission followed after a grass-roots campaign to establish a dedicated sales tax to
support the development of housing units affordable to low-income families. Mayor
Slay, originally neutral on the topic, became a strong supporter of it after his 2001
primary victory. However, Slay’s support came with a political price. Aldermanic
legislation creating the commission, following the vote, tax provided for a commission
largely appointed by the mayor. In selecting the first group of commissioners, Slay
bypassed the majority recommended by the campaign’s grass-roots advocates
(Schlinkmann, 2001e: 13). Slay also clashed with housing advocates as well as some
commissioners by pushing to reallocate over $5 million for general revenue, public safety
purposes; the commission eventually voted to fund over $2 million in city services—
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mostly for emergency shelter space and conservation district housing inspectors (Riley,
2002: B1). Key to the reallocation was the mayor’s political and personal relationships
with commissioners and their staff. Slay’s staff similarly organized to blunt opposition to
a November 2002 vote that reallocated the use of the tax to fund general revenue housing
related expenses, including housing demolition (Moore, 2002b: 8). According to
participants, Slay used key allies among local clergy organizations to convince housing
advocates to support the vote. The Affordable Housing Commission functions like other
development-related commissions—with periodic meetings between the commission’s
staff and the mayor’s staff, including review of agenda items and proposals, and mayoral
review and approval over commissioners, including the chair.
Development and the De-emphasis of Broader Political Themes
Heightening the likelihood of political conflict over development projects are
broader citywide debates, including race and a more traditional divide between
downtown business interests and ward interests. However, one of the features of the
current redevelopment efforts is how city political leaders, and particularly the mayor’s
office, have worked to submerge this theme in current neighborhood development policy,
and to conduct neighborhood development within the context of the deal and its specific
environment rather than as a subset of broader racial tensions. To do so, the Slay
administration has worked to facilitate this trend, and reduce public discord over
development deals generally, by targeting aldermen as “full partners” in the development
process and emphasizing a process where decisions on the use of public resources are
made on the basis of the deal. This emphasis shifted the focus of development politics

125

William, Winter, 2006, UMSL, p. 126

from political grandstanding to the requirement that aldermen, as well as local
stakeholders, participate in a process that provides incentives for private investment.
For some black politicians, Slay’s narrow victory in 2001 represented a
retrenchment in black political representation. Slay’s campaign touted the fact that three
quarters of his aldermanic staff was African-American and that he held the board’s first
retreat on race relations (Mannies, 2001a: A1). He received the personal endorsement of
a several prominent African-Americans (Tuft, 2001: C1). However, polling after his
2001 victory indicated that Slay won largely because of the city’s white voters, with only
12% of black voters supporting him (Mannies, 2001b: A1). Slay’s subsequent clashes
with Comptroller Darlene Green, the city’s second African-American comptroller and the
highest ranking African-American officeholder, intensified the perception of racial
divisions among the city’s political leadership. Green disagreed with Slay over the
course of negotiations on the new Cardinal stadium, continuing her opposition after the
plan was approved (Schlinkmann, 2002b: B2). Other issues between the two included
Green’s “Lease Back Plan” for the convention center and the terms of a proposed
development on Laclede’s Landing (Moore, 2002c: D19; Moore, 2002d: C1). In 2003,
Green accused Slay’s office of trying to unseat her (Moore, 2003b: B2) and St. Louis
Post-Dispatch editorials recommended that the two get together without staff one-on-one
and resolve the “unprofessional rift” between the two (“Where There’s Smoke…,” 2003:
30).
Looking at the Slay administration in racial terms finds similarity to the rhetoric
and political practices during the Schoemehl administration. Where citywide issues
created differences across racial lines, the positions took on a racial character. At the
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same time, the perceptions that development priorities had faltered during their
administrations prompted members of the Slay team to reinvigorate neighborhood
development, and, particularly, try to strengthen relationships with black aldermen.
Slay’s political team has also been adept at negotiating racial politics and has supported
key black leaders in order to advance mutually beneficial agendas. During the 2003
aldermanic election, Slay campaigned hard for black allies (Moore, 2003a: B1). All but
one did, and one city hall watcher noted that his support on the board of aldermen has
gained at least two additional allies since then. Additionally, Slay’s 2005 reelection
campaign brought no substantial challenge. One north side alderman, Irene Smith,
campaigned on the perceived racial problems but only won about one third of the vote in
the primary election. Slay won a substantially a greater percentage of black voters than
he had in 2001. He also had the support of some key African-American leaders, who
opted for him over Smith (Mannies, 2005: B2).
Additionally, Slay and his staff have been able to engage aldermen in
development decision-making, recognizing their critical role in developing the sort of
local partnerships with private market actors to initiate projects. The Slay administration
has initiated a series of shifts in development decision-making that have increased the
hierarchical coordination of the development agencies and the formal role of aldermen.
This has included changes in the review structure at the development agencies to include
aldermen in the review process and CDBG allocations and expenditures. In particular,
Barbara Geisman, the deputy mayor for development, has taken on the position of being a
point person for initiating discussions about development projects and acting as an
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intermediary between developers, aldermen and development professionals on specific
initiatives.
Local Development and the Aldermen
The role of the aldermen in local development remains one of the most
contentious aspects of local development politics. External observers generally blame
aldermen for lack of developments and give aldermen the least credit when developments
are successful. As significantly, the aldermen and the mayor’s office have had varied and
conflicting stances over development priorities. However, policy shifts instituted after
the Slay victory in 2001 sustained a platform of mayoral/aldermanic partnerships and has
allowed the mayoral staff to balance the mixture of professionalism and politics that goes
into development decision-making. In the words of one top staff member, the public
position of the mayor’s office is that “aldermen are our partners,” reflecting a political
realism over the role that aldermen play in development decisions.
According to interviews with development officials, policy changes on the part of
the current administration have recognized and institutionalized the role of the aldermen
while at the same strengthening executive oversight over development processes. In
terms of the LRA oversight process discussed above, the process of reviewing
applications for purchase of LRA properties now formally includes both written and
verbal communication with individual aldermen on proposed sales; in most cases, an
application will not be acted until the aldermen has provided some input. The result is
that the organization of development priorities by wards accents the incentives on the part
of aldermen to act as champions on behalf of local projects. An example of how this
works can be seen in the operations of the CDA housing staff. Housing analysts are
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assigned to wards, which encourages geographic-based planning and implementation.
Aldermen who are effective proponents of housing development can come to rely heavily
upon the housing analyst to be the front person for neighborhood housing strategies.
According to interviews with CDA staff, these can include directing housing activities for
neighborhood non-profits, issuing request for proposals for housing redevelopment, and
overseeing the use of CDBG in development projects. The decentralization of some
development activities means that the most effective housing analysts work as local
entrepreneurs, within the boundaries set by aldermen and senior agency executives.
Another example is the annual CDBG allocation process. CDBG allocations
always have been one area where varying political officials—particularly the mayor’s
office and aldermen—have clashed. While some minor squabbling occurs each year over
the allocation of federal funding, in some years this disagreement draws in conflict over
broader development priorities or political conflicts between the mayor’s office and
members of the board. There is some measure of disagreement among city officials
interviewed over the current balance of power in CDBG allocations. There is a
widespread perception, even among some involved in development politics, that the
city’s political system has meant that CDBG is divided into 28 equal pots, making the
alderman in effect mayor over his or her own ward. This is both factually incorrect, as
well as improbable given the requirements of CDBG spending3. While some abuse of the
funds exists, particularly in the application of CDBG as a part of infrastructure costs for
market-rate housing, to a large extent most of the funds are spent in qualifying areas.

3

According to one source, part of the confusion over the 28 portions comes from concessions made by
Schoemehl in the last years of his administration, when a supplemental appropriation of CDBG funds was
dividing into 28 parts, instead of dictated towards specific projects as would have been the normal course
under Schoemehl.
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This means that some parts of the city, mainly the southwest portion, receive little CDBG
funds.
The balance of power in CDBG/HOME allocations has depended upon the force
and skill of the mayor, the ability of aldermen on the HUDZ committee, and, most
importantly, the legacy of previous allocations. Certainly mayors have differed in their
approaches to the CDBG budget; according to one CDA source familiar with the
workings of the process since the early 1980s, the current mayor shares with former
Mayor Schoemehl a desire to be proactive in the development of the budget. By contrast,
Harmon and Bosley took a relatively hands-off approach, providing greater momentum to
aldermanic wishes. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, Slay’s administrative staff—in
particular the deputy mayor for development and the director of CDA—have tended to
follow the example of the Schoemehl administration in being proactive, but open, in
drawing up initial CDBG budgets. Their orchestration of the annual CDBG plan includes
meetings with the aldermen on projects. Aldermen differed in their desire to seek
confrontation with the mayor over the budget. As the HUDZ committee and its
membership has matured, it has replaced a leadership relatively active and involved in
development issues—former HUDZ chair Martie Aboussie dates from the beginning of
CDBG in the 1970s and was intensively involved in CDBG politics—with a group more
acclimated to the current mayor and his development priorities.
Most significantly, the declining level of CDBG funding and the legacy of
previous allocations has created a stable system in which a broad range of interests is
satisfied. As HOME funds are most restrictive in their use—entirely for low-income
housing—they are mostly allocated by the mayor’s office for large, affordable housing

130

William, Winter, 2006, UMSL, p. 131

projects. Aldermen are allowed a minimal level of funding for ward-based housing
organizations, with little interference from the mayor’s office. According to one
participant in CDBG allocations during the Slay administration, other politically oriented
expenditures—such as funds for the public schools and other program initiatives—are
similarly not questioned, in part because the politics of eliminating the appropriation
outweighs the loss of the revenue for other purposes. Additionally, aldermen have access
to pools of funds targeted towards business development and housing development; some
of those funds are marked towards specific ward accounts or projects as agreed to by the
aldermen and the mayor’s staff in the run-up to the allocation legislation. Over time, the
regularity of the process has helped diminish the political rancor that accompanied
CDBG allocations in the early years of the program. Slay’s deputy mayor for
development and the director of CDA have tended to follow the example of the
Schoemehl administration in being proactive, but open, in drawing up initial CDBG
budgets. Their orchestration of the annual CDBG plan includes meetings with the
aldermen on projects. The tendency is to settle upon a level of CDBG funding for
specific wards, sometimes with specific commitments to projects, but often in flexible
ward accounts that can be allocated to projects as project conditions emerge.
Commitments made under the CDBG negotiations take the form of specific
projects as well as ward commitments in the general housing redevelopment pools. Slay
administration staff have also been proactive in commitments of CDBG funds, and,
increasingly, have required earlier consultation on CDBG expenditures in order to
adequately shape the public sector’s response to a request for support. Most often these
discussions start with the aldermen and/or private developers and senior CDA officials
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and the mayor’s office. Unless they are provided clear signs from senior officials, CDA
housing staff is relatively loath to provide any sort of commitments and will discourage
private developers from short changing the process of executive and aldermanic review.
From the perspective of the mayor’s office, given the relative lack of CDBG and
the degree of need, the emphasis is on leveraging other funds; the preference of
development officials is for private developers to utilize other forms of funding—
including state-level tax credits, tax increment financing and bond financing—prior to the
use of CDBG. Following the general commitment of funds, CDA housing staff is
responsible for managing the completion of the development documents and overseeing
the disbursement of funds for projects. Some private developers, both for and not-forprofit, have indicated that the paperwork requirements for CDBG funds make their use
relatively complex and difficult. The restrictions on the use of CDBG and HOME
particularly make these financing tools less desirable for market-rate developers; as will
be discussed on the chapters on development downtown and the neighborhoods, some
developers choose not to use CDBG at all.
Aldermanic Development Activities
Guiding aldermanic behavior on development has been the strong incentive for
aldermen to treat development activities as part of constituent services and the hallmark
of a successful aldermanic legacy. Promoting development, in general, remains good
politics for aldermanic, and, in this sense, the personal incentives of the aldermen have
matched the strategic interests on the part of developers and development professionals to
find investment opportunities within specific housing markets. Promotion of aldermanic
input into redevelopment has become an important component of local efforts.
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Informally, this has meant courtesy signs on development projects thanking aldermen for
their support of the initiative, as well as participation by aldermen in ribbon cuttings.
Aldermen promote the level of reinvestment in their ward in their campaign literature,
following the widely held belief that neighborhood development is good politics.
Developers and development professionals are extremely important donors for
aldermanic campaigns, especially for incumbents. For the 5th ward, whose incumbent
April Ford Griffin was first elected in 1997, known developers and development
professionals made 50% of the campaign contributions, or about $38,000 in 2005 (5th
Ward Regular Democratic Organization, 2005a; 5th Ward Regular Democratic
Organization, 2005b; 5th Ward Regular Democratic Organization, 2005c; 5th Ward
Regular Democratic Organization, 2005d). For the 19th Ward, campaign contributions
from developers and development professionals totaled 34% of all donations, or about
$31,000 in 2005, when the incumbent alderman, Michael McMillan, faced an
insignificant opponent (Jordan Chambers 19th Ward Regular Democratic Organization,
2005a; Jordan Chambers 19th Ward Regular Democratic Organization, 2005b; Jordan
Chambers 19th Ward Regular Democratic Organization, 2005c; Jordan Chambers 19th
Ward Regular Democratic Organization, 2005d).
While these contribution patterns are not illegal, they are symptomatic of the
working relationships that develop between aldermen and developers. This relationship
is fostered by the requirement of aldermanic approval at multiple points in the
development process, a requirement that has been strengthened under the Slay
administration. These points include purchase of city-owned land, receipt of CDBG
funds, blighting and TIF legislation and major zoning changes. The imprint of the
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alderman is so ingrained in the approval process that the question of aldermanic support
is often the first question asked about a potential project.
While aldermanic support is not sufficient to guarantee a project will get off the
ground, lack of it can kill it. One example of this is a smaller north-side project that got
caught in the middle of the 2001 redistricting, when the project site shifted from the 5th
Ward to the 3rd Ward. Prior to the shift, 5th Ward alderman April Ford Griffin had
approved the project, though declined to provide CDBG funding for it. The project had
the strong support of the mayor’s office, both under Harmon and under the incoming Slay
administration; Slay’s office not only honored a commitment for CDBG funds out of the
mayor’s allocation, but also supported the project in receiving funds from the Affordable
Housing Commission. The support of the project was both a sound development
decision—the developer had the capacity to complete the project and the financing and
marketing structure was deemed strong—but also a smart political decision. The
initiative had the strong backing of a citywide clergy coalition that was Slay’s ally on
other neighborhood redevelopment initiatives, including changes to the Affordable
Housing Commission.
However, after the 2001 redistricting, aldermanic support for the project
evaporated. Third Ward alderman Freeman Bosley Sr. opposed the project’s
sponsorship, a local Catholic church that he perceived as hostile to his election. Church
leaders and members had opposed another project in his ward, and this opposition had
killed the project. Additionally, Bosley used his opposition as a negotiating tool with the
mayor’s office, which had opposed the use of CDBG funding elsewhere in the ward.
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Ultimately, Bosley’s opposition was only removed when the mayor committed funding to
other 3rd ward projects, creating a rapprochement between the two (Berger, 2001b: A2).
Besides relationships with developers, aldermen also can develop close
relationships with development professionals and other private sector partners to assist
them in coordinating ward-wide development activities. These partners enhance the
capacity of aldermen to respond to developer’s requests, as well as ensure that developers
provide campaign support and publicity. One example is the work of Sal Martinez, who
has had close political relationships with a number of aldermen. Martinez also chairs the
St. Louis Housing Authority (2002-present) and was a former staff member at a number
of community development corporations on the north side, including the JeffVanderLou
Initiative, the chief vehicle of 19th Ward alderman Mike McMillan in his redevelopment
efforts. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, these actors and organizations work across
sectoral lines and thus work to expand the development incentives available.
Additionally, while the role is not typical of most neighborhood entities, some local
CDCs also work as direct developers, both by themselves and in partnership with other
citywide non-profit organizations, including RHCDA and the St. Louis Equity Fund.
Legislative Behavior and Development
In legislative matters, the input of the aldermen is due to their sponsorship in the
Board of Aldermen of redevelopment bills, including Chapter 99 and 353 blighting bills,
TIF legislation and other legislation on public financing. In these matters, aldermanic
courtesy reigns. In interviews with aldermen and other development officials,
respondents could recall only one time in the last ten years where the full board failed to
pass a blighting bill introduced and supported by its respective alderman; this had to do
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with the actions of the alderman in distributing copies of the bill and nothing to do with
the merits of the ordinance. Blighting and redevelopment bills are routed through the
aldermanic Housing, Urban Development and Zoning (HUDZ) Committee, which
ostensibly holds public hearings on the ordinance; the hearings are generally routine,
although support or opposition can emerge, with aldermanic support generally trumping
all else.
While redevelopment tools are open to all aldermen, aldermen vary in the amount
of redevelopment legislation introduced, even among the collection of aldermen whose
wards are distressed. Some aldermen see blighting as another form of constituent
service, and promote blighting locally as evidence of aldermanic response to
neighborhood need. While there has been informal discussions about limitations on the
used blighting—both because of the scale of blighting bills unattached to viable
redevelopment initiatives and because blighting ordinances represent a potential loss of
local property taxes because of their tax abatement properties—aldermen have steadfastly
resisted such moves. Professional staff can control the pace and extent of the blighting
bills through less formal means. Since SLDC staff does the substantive work of a
blighting study, aldermen do have to negotiate with SLDC managers for staff time to
conduct studies and provide some reimbursement of some of staff expense through their
CDBG allocations.
In broader terms, aldermen vary in the degree of development activity they
promote, mostly as a function of local neighborhood conditions. Areas with high levels
of distress—large amounts of vacant housing or land—tend to attract aldermen for whom
active redevelopment is a top stated priority. On the other hand, the politics of more
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middle class areas of the city tend to be reflected in a housing maintenance strategy—
initiatives that preserve housing values and owner-occupancy by encouraging appropriate
development and discouraging unwanted uses.
Informally, aldermen play a critical role in development decisions by
championing development deals, writing letters of financial and official support for
projects, and steering the provision of other development-related city services, such as
street and sidewalk repair and demolition of buildings. This support work can be directed
at a variety of agencies at a variety of points within the development process—for
purchasing land from LRA, applying for state low-income housing tax credits, utilizing
CDBG or HOME funds, even soliciting private or corporate support for projects. The
degree of this role depends partly on the personality of the aldermen, with some aldermen
requiring a significant role in the deal and others a more hands off approach.
The personality of the alderman also defines to some degree the positive and
negative relationships between him or her and other development professionals.
Aldermen can act as a channel for influence at the development agencies—over, for
example, the selection of consultants, the provision of public funds, or securing favorable
resolution to a bureaucratic problem—and CDA directors in particular must define a way
of handling these requests efficiently and in a politically sensitive manner. In general,
over the long term, development officials learn to work with their respective aldermen.
While most development officials interviewed had a story of excessive interference by an
alderman in a development deal, most also understand that it was better to learn to work
with aldermen. Experienced officials within the public agencies, particularly those on the
management side, have a system for this interaction; one person interviewed described
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this as a process of sorting out the real deals from the improbable projects and a method
for deflecting bad deals in a manner that retained good graces with aldermen.
Aldermen also influence local development by virtue of legislative structure.
Two aldermanic committees directly impact development deals, the HUDZ Committee
and the Neighborhood Development Committee. Of the two, the HUDZ Committee is
the most prominent; the latter only is used on vacant property where eminent domain is
not necessary. It should be noted that the assignment of legislation to committees is
entirely the function of the president of the Board of Aldermen; however, the tradition of
past referrals weighs very heavily and it is only in the rare case with the support of a large
and representative group of aldermen that the tradition of committee referrals is broken.4.
The HUDZ Committee also considers all aspect of business pertaining to the
development agencies as well as the annual application and disbursement of federal funds
for redevelopment activities. This last responsibility raises both the committee’s
importance and prestige and, in the past, has made the chair of the committee a relatively
more powerful person than board members.
Besides committee assignments, alliances and other forms of legislative
organizing can also impact the fate of initiatives, including those that involve
development. The current mayor, both by virtue of his previous tenure on the board and
the work of his legislative lobbyists, has a more or less stable majority on the board and
so has been successful in seeking passage for his legislative priorities.5 On more
4

One well known break is this tradition of referral came early in the current administration, when street
funding was moved out of the Streets and Traffic Committee to the Transportation and Commerce
Committee; while the referral moved the issue of street funding from the hands of one of the mayor’s
opponents to a committee that was chaired by a supporter, the move was done only with the support of a
large majority of both white and black aldermen.
5
This has included most of the mayor’s development initiatives, including the new Cardinal baseball
stadium that had a vocal Board minority and an action citizen campaign opposed to the deal.
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controversial issues—for example, the city’s 2001 redistricting legislation—aldermanic
positions break down by race. Since most development legislation passes unanimously, it
is typically in the preliminary salesmanship of the initiative that aldermanic alliances are
used. It is not unusual in the lead-up to the development of major projects for the
mayor’s office to facilitate group members with aldermen to push the project. A more
formal aldermanic alliance is the Aldermanic Black Caucus, a lobbying voice for
African-American aldermen. In a system where one-on-one negotiating and political
territoriality has tended to outweigh alliance activities, the black caucus occasionally has
emerged an effective lobbying organization, particularly when other city officers insist on
their input prior to legislation being approved at the E&A level.
Development and other Citywide Elected Officials
Whatever their influence in other aspects of local policy-making or governance,
most other citywide elected political leaders—the so-called “county” officeholders—play
a minor role in development matters. The treasurer’s office can play a role in commercial
development through the office’s sole ability to finance and construct public parking
facilities using revenue bonds secured by parking receipts. This authority has made the
treasurer a significant collaborator for a number of large residential and commercial
projects. While assessment and taxation of property can more broadly impact a host of
development issues and there is some evidence that the collector of revenue and license
collector play a minor role in some development deals, much of the work of these offices
primarily involve business and use taxes. The city’s collector of revenue does have the
authority to institute legal proceedings over properties that owe back property taxes.
State statute gives the collector sole responsibility for determining when such a suit is
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filed, providing an informal point of access for property owners and development
officials. One senior city development official recalled a number of instances when tax
suits were informally averted through relationships between property owners and the
collector’s office. There has only been one public instance where the collector’s office
has imposed itself on one important downtown deal, insisting on payment of back taxes
in opposition to a deal negotiated by the mayor’s office (Prost, 2001h: B1).
For most residential projects, the process of tax abatement is relatively
standardized, involving the aldermen and development officials. On the other hand,
larger deals involving tax increment financing and other forms of public subsidy bring a
more complicated set of negotiations between the mayor’s office, the comptroller and
sponsoring aldermen, and often approval by members of E&A. Where the issue of
valuation or abatement becomes a public issue, the publicity may prompt concern that the
proposed deal may be too lenient or too demanding (Nicklaus, 2004b: C1; Wagman,
2005a: A1), reflecting disagreement between city-elected officials over the deal.
Others—such as bond financing, TIF and tax abatement—require input from separate
boards that increasingly provide formal support after the most significant negotiations
have occurred. While the mayor’s office and proxies in SLDC/CDA are most involved in
them, another point of formal approval rests in the Board of Estimate and Apportionment
(E & A), and, by virtue of this, the President of the Board of Aldermen and the
Comptroller can become significant political players in development politics.
Enhancing the role of E & A members is the requirement for their assent to a host
of “subsidy-specific interactions,” particularly TIF financing, city bonding and other
decisions regarding the use of other types of city subsidies. In practice, the majority of
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items before the board pass without comment, and most of the monthly meeting of E & A
is conducted in a rather perfunctory manner. This includes most neighborhood-based
development projects, tax abatements, real estate sales and line item expenditures of
CDBG. According to one aldermanic source familiar with E&A decisions, there has only
been one high profile example in recent years of E&A members modifying a line item
allocation of CDBG funds; in that case, all three members of the board voted
unanimously to restore funding to an agency whose budget was cut by the sponsoring
alderman.
On larger projects, friction can occur between E&A board members, historically
between the mayor and the comptroller. As with the board of aldermen, broader political
differences can be drawn into issues involving E&A approval. This sort of dynamic
particularly characterized the relationship between Mayor Vincent Schoemehl and
Comptroller Virvus Jones in the early 1990s; conflict between the two reflected problems
that Schoemehl had with other black politicians. In general terms, the mayor’s office is
largely in charge of developing the shape and scale of significant development projects,
whereas the comptroller is responsible for overseeing the impact of the deal on public
finances, including some details on public financing. The comptroller has historically
had a dominant role in managing financial oversight on city deals, including hiring
outside financial expertise, and overseeing city bond and tax financing. One notable
example of how this conflict has played out in the past occurred when Jones held upon
work on bond financing of the city’s new hockey stadium following Schoemehl’s suit
over the Comptroller’s office non-payment of certain bills (O’Neil, 1992a: 3A). More
recently, Mayor Slay publicly objected to the fees paid for convention center bond
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refinancing, prompting an escalation of public conflict between the two and their staff
(Moore, 2002c: D19).
Contemporary conflicts between the mayor’s office and the comptroller’s office
involve both development deals and other political factors, both large and small (Moore,
2002d: C1; Moore, 2003a: B2). According to one interview, the competition between the
two offices has led them to hire parallel but different consultant teams to assist in
negotiations over large development projects. Beyond the friction, however, there
appears to be a tendency in the system for the E&A members to reach a compromise in
terms of process even if differences in policy remain. One example of this in progress
has been the routinization of tax increment financing (TIF) over the last three years in a
form that accommodates both the interests of the mayor’s office and the comptroller’s
staff. Prior to 2000, TIFs were a public financing technique generally not utilized in St.
Louis, although their use was widespread in commercial financing in St. Louis County.
TIFs are similar to tax abatement in that they utilize changes in tax rates as an incentive
to redevelopment; in this case, TIFs commit a certain level of future taxes based on the
redevelopment for use in financing bonds for construction of the project. Both what to
include in the TIF—in terms of both the physical property and the relevant taxes—as well
as more technical requirements on the part of the developer are open to negotiation as a
part of the deal.
St. Louis City’s experience with TIFs had been relatively poor in the 1990s,
mainly consisting of one, largely unsuccessful commercial project. Following the
election of Francis Slay in 2001, the use of the TIFs dramatically increased for
commercial projects, mixed-used districts such as the Grand Center cultural district and
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for single residential projects downtown. Like other forms of public subsidy, TIFs
became a site for political conflict between the relevant political offices, particularly as
the number of TIF deals and the pace of the approval process quickened. According to a
member of the mayor’s staff, initial conflict over some TIF deals has been largely
replaced by a good working relationship between the mayor and comptroller’s office.
Part of the reason for the decline of conflict has been the mutual decision by the two
offices to restrict district TIFs in favor of single project TIFs. While that has increased
the number of approvals, it has also allowed the two parties to negotiate jointly with
prospective developers over the size of the TIF.
The fact that the comptroller and the board president are E&A also gives the two
offices particular impact over routine budget and contract activities involving the
development agencies, particularly CDA. CDA contracts with the comptroller to
complete auditing functions, including auditing of subcontracted activities. Additionally,
the comptroller appoints people to a variety of the development-related commissions,
including a member to LRA’s three-person board. Representatives of the comptroller
and the board president also sit on committees formed to hire CDA consultants and
undertake other large planning activities. Much of this interaction with CDA staff and
the executive staff of the comptroller and board president is routine, in contrast to the
policy interactions between development officials and the mayor’s staff. For example,
some observers noted that the requirement for all three E&A members to sign CDA
documents, including for such simple matters as the reallocation of subcontractor funds
from one category to another is more a hassle in terms of paperwork and time than a
necessary form of check and balance. However, this oversight function does provide
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both the comptroller and the board president opportunities to lobby agency officials on
behalf of other stakeholders involved in the development process. Such interactions,
however political their basis, is generally regarded by agency management as to be
expected, and, as with the input of aldermen, most long-term staffers at the agencies
develop a proficiency at dealing with and responding to the input.
The Business Sector in Urban Development Decision-Making
While popular rhetoric often follows scholarship in ascribing to business interests
the dominant role in development policy-making, the case of St. Louis suggests a more
complicated story. While instances of direct input can be seen, these are specific and
confined to the highest level of decision-making. In terms of the day-to-day activities
involved in planning and implementing development projects, the input of corporatelevel organizations like Civic Progress is often absent. A more complex picture of how
businesses impact development decision-making starts with several observations. First is
that, while regime theorists largely focused on the conduct of CEO-dominated
organizations like Civic Progress, in institutional terms, such an organization is not the
only form that business influence can take. A consistent theme of corporate leaders in St.
Louis over the last 20 years has been a growing dissatisfaction of a number of local
businessmen with the closed membership of Civic Progress and their desire for
alternative organizations to channel their input into civic matters as well as gain
recognition for their contributions on civic affairs (Gillerman, 1989: 1A; Miklasz, 1993:
1D; Faust, 1993: 7). Besides Civic Progress, other organizations both compete as well as
collaborate for public attention for their development priorities, including the Regional
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Commerce and Growth Association, the Regional Business Council, Downtown St. Louis
Partnership, and other geographically-based business associations.
Following this, for a subset of local businesses, corporate engagement in
development decision-making is not simply a function of charity but intimately tied to the
economic interests of the business. Corporations are obviously promoters of both
economic investments in general as well as seekers of public investments that improve
their bottom line, in the form of tax abatements, TIF financing and other public support.
Additionally, some businesses are involved in development decision-making as a
function of their core businesses. Beyond their philanthropic and charitable interests, a
subset of local businesses shape urban development as a function of their primary
interests in real estate and investments. These include housing and commercial
developers, real estate lawyers, banks and lenders, and consultants who work on
development projects.
As the interests of these professionals are significant, their influence over
development politics is significantly greater than broader business coalitions. First, these
actors have significant private and professional relationships with political leaders,
including as sources of funding for campaign contributions. For example, among
contributors to the city treasurer’s campaign contributions include contractors, lawyers
and financial advisors who have a direct relationship with the office in its development
activities (Committee to Elect Larry C Williams, 2004: 5-6). Contributors to the 2005
comptroller’s campaign financial contributors include numerous developers, real estate
lawyers and other professional developers (Darlene Green for Comptroller, 2005:
various). Slay’s prodigious campaign fundraising efforts raised $1.7 million for his 2005
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re-election victory; the $300,000 raised in a one month period prior to the March primary
election likewise included numerous contributions from development professionals
currently working in the city (Slay for Mayor, 2005: various; Wagman, 2005b: A1).
It should be noted that none of these contributions were illegal or improper;
however, it underscores the relationships that emerge between development professionals
and specific political leaders, a type of relationship that is repeated on the aldermanic
level, as will be discussed in Chapter 7. More fundamental is the key role that
development professionals play in setting development priorities and planning and
completing development projects. The way and the consequences development has
become substantially privatized and the role that development professional play in
planning and initiating projects will be taken up next in a case study of downtown—
Chapter 5 and 6—and in two city neighborhoods—Chapter 7 and 8.
Civic Progress and Regional Coordination
Lacking the political or economic connections to the field, it should not be
surprising that corporations are generally disinterested in urban development. This
disconnection has become more pronounced as the era of local, family-owned
corporations passes, replaced by fewer corporations in the region headed by executives
from and tied to the region (Salisbury, 1995: 3B). Observers of local corporate
philanthropy have noted the increasingly smaller number of locally owned corporations,
particularly Fortune 500 corporations (Nicklaus, 2003a: C1). According to one civic
leader, there is a wide spread perception that that the corporate leadership that started
Civic Progress in the 1950s was of a quality and character not present in lacking in
contemporary leadership. For this earlier generation of corporation leaders, not only
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were their businesses located in St. Louis, but also they lived and grew up in or close to
the city, and, as a consequence, they had an interest and enthusiasm for St. Louis. St.
Louis’ banking community, in particular, has gone through a series of mergers over the
last ten years that have tended, in the view of one former banking official, to distance
managers from local community needs and shifted the bank’s community investments
from local personnel with a familiarity of St. Louis to a national board with little
knowledge of the city.
In this regard, one of the important roles of an organization representing local
corporate leaders is that it can institutionalize the connections between its corporate
members and local political processes in the form suggested by regime studies. This
impact is historical and iterative. Even as the broader trends of business location impact
most American metropolitan regions, regions with strong corporate organizations create a
culture in which civic participation and collaboration is expected and the norm. That
Civic Progress plays this role only weakly was suggested in Chapter 3’s review of St.
Louis’ past experience with development initiatives. Civic Progress was most active in
urban renewal initiatives and, since the 1950s, present only in the highest level of
discussions on the city’s most important projects. Since that point, Civic Progress has
lacked a consistent presence in the city’s revitalization efforts. This situation is as much
a function of Civic Progress as of the difficulties of community improvement in the city
as a whole. Leaders of the organization have consistently described Civic Progress as not
an “action-oriented” organization (Mihalopoulos, 1996c: 4B; Mihalopoulos, 1998e: C1)
and the organization has resisted the call for changes that would make it both more
transparent as well as more activist.
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The legacy of these decisions is that the organization continues to lack a strong
central focus and instead at best acts an information pool and coordinating body based on
the interests of its individual members. As described in Chapter 3, this operating style
was a conscious choice of the organization’s founders and has resisted numerous calls by
various entities over the last 50 years for a revamping (“Civic Progress,” 1991: 2B;
Berger and Uhlenbook, 1997: D1; Mihalopoulos, 1998d: A1; Mihalopoulos, 1998e: C1).
Reforms of the organization in the 1990s did consolidate the group’s committee structure
around six key issues areas, but did not substantially change the organization’s hands-off
attitude towards developing and implementing key regional initiatives.
In contrast to business groups in other cities, Civic Progress has a small staff, at
the most 3 to 4, many of who serve under contract as a part of their work with other local
corporations. The staff works with a relatively low profile and continues their service at
the bequest of the board chair. Their function is really as much local service as it is
employment. The structure of members—self-nomination by existing members,
consciously kept small—accentuates the group’s narrow-focus. The group meets
monthly; subcommittee meetings occur at the discretion and interest of individual
members.
According to some observers, Civic Progress has been especially handicapped by
its inability to fully represent the base of interests in the region, both economic and
regional. The lack of African American representation led first to the development of a
Civic Progress race-dialogue group in the late 1960s. However, the perception that the
committee had no real power led to the resignation of most of the committee’s African
American membership in 1998, following the release of a Civic Progress organization
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plan that failed to substantially change the membership structure (Mihalopoulos, 1998c:
A1). Civic Progress’ exclusive membership requirements have also antagonized other
business leaders not recognized among the region’s top corporation (Faust, 1993: 7), and
led in 1997 to an organization representing the civic engagement of smaller and middlesized companies, the Regional Business Council (Nicklaus, 2004a: E1).
The chair of Civic Progress can provide some centralizing energy to the
organization, and most enter into the position with a pledge to increase the visibility and
vitality of the organization. One recent chair of the organization has emphasized the
importance of developing the region’s intellectual capital, both in terms of attracting new
technology companies as well as creating the places that attract and retain high tech
workers (Tucci, 2003b: C5). However, even with this dynamic, the group’s operating
rules mean that in practical terms its support for community initiatives come as a function
of the interest of particular members. To a large degree, the commitment of Civic
Progress to an initiative is a commitment of individual members. Corporate and civic
officials interviewed for the study uniformly described the monthly meetings as relatively
low-key affairs involving informational presentations by potential project partners, staff
information and an infrequent general commitment of support. The interest of a Civic
Progress member secures a place on the agenda; however, to transform that into an actual
commitment requires additional meetings at the level of specific corporate offices. While
this sort of process means that Civic Progress members can differ on their
commitments—in the words of one person interviewed who works in corporate relations,
there can be no “one no” to a proposal for support—it necessarily multiplies the numbers
of interactions required to gain a level of support for initiatives.
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The way Civic Progress works is recognized by most seasoned participants in
urban development—decried by many who are asking for support and defended by some
on the giving side—but largely misunderstood by the general public. While the range of
issues that Civic Progress is involved in can be broad, its operating style means that
organization’s involvement is strikingly shallow. This can be in contrast to the
involvement of particular corporations, and, importantly, the CEO. St. Louis has its share
of CEOs who are engaged in local affairs, including some who take leadership roles in
development initiatives. Generally, successful private developers who require additional
subsidies and support outside of conventional market financing develop long standing
personal and professional relationships with local businessmen. These relationships
influence the philanthropic thrust of corporate support and shape the developer’s
interactions with Civic Progress members. However, it generally does not alter the basic
operating pattern of Civic Progress as a body.
More than a Checkbook?
The manner in which Civic Progress operates means that the engagement of
members on a whole range of issues competes with the widespread public opinion that
the organization merely acts as the region’s checkbook. Specific business leaders blend
the two roles differently—some emphasizing their role as a funder and others
emphasizing their personal commitment to civic issues (Mihalopoulos, 1998c: C1).
Through the organization’s political action committee, the organization has provided
campaign financing for a host of local, regional and statewide initiatives, including
transportation levies, parks and trails financing, and local governmental reform. In many
cases, Civic Progress support is matched by contributions directly from member
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corporations. For the largest corporations in the area, corporate and personal
philanthropic activities exceed the collective work undertaken under the rubric of Civic
Progress.
As one topic for consideration by Civic Progress members, urban development
competes with a host of other issues, and the interest of members in it has waxed and
waned over the 50 years of the organization’s existence. Civic Progress and its member
corporations have been consistent boosters of the region’s sports and recreation economy;
member companies provided equity investment for the city’s new baseball stadium in
1965 (Primm, 1998: 485), helped finance the construction of a new hockey arena in 1994
(Dames, 1994: Style Plus 2), and provided logistical and financial support to move the
Los Angeles Rams to St. Louis in 1995 (Schlinkmann, 2000a: A12), as well as smaller
investments in facilities and programs across the region. Civic Progress members have
also been actively involved in education issues, with key members taking on long–term
roles in the settlement of the region’s desegregation case (Pierce, 1999a: B1), as well as
supporting changes in the city’s public schools (Wagman, 2003b: C1). Members have
been similarly engaged in public health care in the region, including a long-term
commitment to Regional Hospital, a joint city-county healthcare facility that replaced the
city’s public hospital in 1985.
Other Business Sector Groups
Other organizations both predate and have emerged since Civic Progress’
founding, and some of these have impacts on development initiatives. Most of the
political impacts of these sorts of groups have been on the city’s business climate,
including the availability of development sites, the city’s tax and regulatory policies and
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the assistance of the city in business development and retention. The Regional
Commerce and Growth Association is the region’s chamber of commerce; headquartered
downtown, it is an active participant in regional economic growth strategies, including
fostering public policies to support investment and growth in key policies. Whereas
RCGA represents the voice of larger business entities, a more recent addition, the
Regional Business Council, is a group oriented towards medium and small businesses.
Both organization can play small roles in development initiatives, mainly as an
opportunity for charitable and equity investment in projects. Additionally, there are
associations that represent businesses in specific geographic areas; preeminent among
them has been the Downtown St. Louis Partnership (DSTLP), a partnership of downtown
businesses and property owners founded in 1957. Throughout its history, DSTLP
functioned as the primary management organization for downtown, including sponsoring
development plans for improvements. Since 2000, the Partnership has operating a tax
supported community improvement district in the downtown core to fund safety patrols
and beautification programs. More recently, DSTLP has become a major booster of
downtown living, publishing an annual inventory of downtown residential units and
conducting housing tours as units have been brought to the market. DSTLP also has
taken primary responsibility in marketing new commercial spaces downtown to new
retailing outfits, including implementing a retail plan that has targeted downtown for a
new home furnishings district.
Extensions to Business Influence
To some degree, the weak institutional focus of Civic Progress is overcome by
informal methods of connecting businesspeople and their organizations to regional issues.
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This includes the work of Civic Progress staff, consultants and other informal advisors to
the group, a group of individuals with informal, varied and extensive influence across a
range of fields. One prominent past member of this group, the late Al Kerth, not only
spoke on behalf of Civic Progress to the media, but also was regarded as the “go-to” guy
for communicating between top political leaders and business leaders and between
leaders themselves. Corporate leaders also use the resources within their own businesses
to help monitor local matters, although shifts in local corporate structure are making these
positions less numerous than they once were. Even where businesses do not designate a
member of their public relations or community relations department to interact with local
policymakers, some corporate heads designate key managerial staff to represent them in
key community initiatives, particularly in fund-raising and corporate communication.
This sort of informal advisory system operates both as a method of building
capacity and a system of gate keeping. Civic Progress meetings and affiliated local
conversations take place out of sight of most within the region, including important actors
in the development field. The necessity of knowing and accessing gatekeepers in order to
access business support and resources tends to confine the general impact of the business
sector among known entities and discourages innovative solutions. In practice, it means
that there is relatively little direct contact with Civic Progress members, beyond the top
political leadership. Even though St. Louis’ mayor no longer shapes the organization’s
agenda as Mayor Tucker did in the urban renewal period, the mayor and the St. Louis
County executive serve as ex-officio members of the organization, as do the county
executive of St. Charles County and St. Clair County in Illinois. Besides other initiatives,
Mayor Schoemehl used Civic Progress backing to supplement the salaries of key
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executive staff, as has Mayor Slay in more recent years (O’Neil, 1989b: 3A;
Schlinkmann, 2001a: B2).
Civic Progress has also used the development of subsidiary organizations to
impact regional issues, although this practice is diminishing. This has been particularly
true in development, where a number of well-known and prominent non-profit
intermediary organizations have their roots in Civic Progress. In 1988, Civic Progress
created the St. Louis Equity Fund, a non-profit organization initiated to receive corporate
investments in state low-income housing tax credits; by the organization’s 15 year
anniversary in 2003, the Equity Fund had leveraged investments to create over 2,500
units of affordable housing in over 80 projects located mainly in the City of St. Louis
(Nicklaus, 2003b: C1). In 1990 and following, Civic Progress supported the creation of
the Technical Assistance Corporation (TAC), an organization set up by Mayor
Schoemehl to rescue troubled residential projects and take on other difficult development
deal (O’Neil, 1990b: 1B; Prost, 1992a: 1D). Civic Progress and member corporations
have also provided significant support to the Regional Housing Alliance (RHA), a nonprofit organization founded in 1992 to assist neighborhood-based non-profits complete
housing development projects (Prost, 1992b: 1A). This support for the organization has
continued since the merger of TAC and RHA in 1996, creating the Regional Housing and
Community Development Alliance (RHCDA), an organization that has become a
significant actor in the constellation of civic organizations promoting development
initiatives in the city.
Civic Organizations and Development Initiatives
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While Civic Progress-funded organizations—both those directly funded by the
organization and those funded by member corporations—have become some of the most
important not-for-profit organizations in local development, they are not the only civic
organizations active in the field. The input of civic organizations has been least
understood in the regime framework (Ferman, 1996: 5), but recognized as significant
actors in neighborhood renewal (Vidal, 1997: 430; Grogan and Proscio, 2000: 4). The
term civic generally refers to a “third way” of organizing local behavior between the
poles of public sector activity and genuinely private market activity (Salamon, 1994: 109;
Bradley, 1998: 157), and in this case refers both to nonprofit community development
corporations (CDCs) as well as other not-for-profit citizen groups, planning organizations
and public engagements associations.
Urban CDCs not only provide services in a manner outside of both local political
structures and private markets, they also assist residents develop local political identities
that can help sustain local action and build local social capital (Smith, 2001; Clarke,
2001). In some American cities, CDCs access training, support and investment capital
through their relationships to regional and national community development intermediary
organizations, including the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, Local Initiatives
Support Corporation (LISC) and the Enterprise Foundation (Liou and Stroh, 1998).
While St. Louis intermediary organizations date back to the 1980’s and have received
support from corporations and local business groups, observers generally regard St.
Louis’ nonprofit development sector as weak and under-funded (Bogart, 2003: 15). St.
Louis largely missed out on the growth in nonprofit investment that occurred in
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comparable cities such as Cleveland and Baltimore (Novak and Linsalata, 1991: 1A;
Peirce and Johnson, 1997c: 14).
At issue for some national nonprofit leaders was the perception that CDCs were
captured by local political leaders and lacked the professional capacity to plan and
implement projects. Evidence for this charge can be seen in each era of the city’s
development history, from the Model Cities period to initiation of community
development block grant funds (Kerstein, 1980; Joiner, 1980: 12D), and the charge
remains persuasive even as public funding for nonprofit development corporations has
declined. Funding and political control over CDCs has been seen both as a function of
conflict between the mayor and aldermen and a function of ward-based politics.
Schoemehl’s initiation of Operation Impact in 1983 coincided with the funding of new
neighborhood development corporations, regarded by some observers as an attempt to
dictate neighborhood development policy, to the detriment of aldermanic influence.
While there have been clear examples of direct aldermanic influence over nonprofit
management and governance (Fernandez, 2001: 3; “Trust—Not Slush—Fund,” 2002:
B2), more important is the critical role of aldermen in directing neighborhood
development policy. CDBG funds are an important source of operational support for
neighborhood development organizations (City of St. Louis, 2004), and these allocations
require specific agreement by respective aldermen. CDBG funds directly support only 23
organizations, most with a relatively low level of production. One of the most
professional, DeSales Community Housing Corporation, produced only 12 units in 2003
(DeSales Community Housing Corporation, 2003: 2).
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Even with the subset of existing CDCs, most combine housing development
activities with activities more typical of a volunteer neighborhood association. In some
cases, development activities occur under the rubric of a neighborhood association or
through a housing development corporation affiliated with the neighborhood
organization. This reflects the fact that the number of neighborhood groups in St. Louis
generally dwarfs the number of development organizations actively producing housing
units or otherwise completing development projects. Moreover, the tension between the
two settings—between representing a local neighborhood and its residents and also
gathering the technical capacity to organize and implement development projects—can
often work to the detriment of development activities. For many organizations, the dual
responsibilities complicate the hiring and retaining of professional staff and diminish
overall development capacity.
At the same time, the fact that neighborhood organizations have responsibilities
other than direct development also reflects the importance of non-development activities
in the redevelopment process. These include neighborhood and project planning, public
input and consent, neighborhood-cleanups, beautification and marketing and
neighborhood security. In particular, the creation of a neighborhood story is perhaps the
most important function of neighborhood groups, both formally through plans, press
reports, web sites, and neighborhood newsletters as well as informally by representing the
neighborhood in meetings, development conferences and other opportunities.
Indeed, these sorts of development images are an important, but unrecognized,
part of the development process. By creating images about their neighborhood’s assets
and its potential, neighborhood advocates attempt to link to city and regional civic
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organizations that facilitate local decision-making and provide resources and leadership
to community initiatives. These include development intermediaries like RHCDA,
whose professional staff members have played critical roles in major neighborhood
redevelopment projects. Additionally, neighborhood groups attempt to place the
trajectory of neighborhood development into a broader set of local and regional priorities
by developing partnerships with other civic sector organizations. These include formally
organized citizen groups, planning organizations, and local philanthropic organizations
and informal efforts such as leadership programs, “visioning” campaigns and local
collaborations (Jones, 2003: 107).
As will be indicated in the specific studies of downtown and neighborhood
development, civic sector resources can be an important part of development initiatives.
One of the component parts of recent city development activity has been a new round of
regional agenda-setting in which civic organizations have played a key role. Starting
with the Peirce Report in 1997 and continuing with the St. Louis 2004 initiative (19982004), regional leaders led by members of both the civic and business community have
engaged in a series of conversations—some public and some in private—about the future
of the region and the place of the city in it. In practical terms, these activities have
shifted regional priorities and created a consensus around specific projects and initiatives.
Additionally, the process reenergized the funding and supporting for key organizations to
work on local issues, including development downtown and development in key
neighborhoods. As these initiatives have rolled out, civic sector resources, both in terms
of funds and individual and organizational energy have played a critical role in
reinvestment. They have stood in at the planning and predevelopment period and,
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through investments in projects, have built the interest of private market actors in
development activities. In this sense, a renewed sense of urban revitalization has led to a
renewed interest in private sector initiatives in St. Louis’ housing markets. The shape of
this development process accounts for some successes in redevelopment; however, it also
demonstrates the limitations of a substantially privatized development framework.
Summary
The institutional structure of St. Louis—in the political structure of local
government, the organizational patterns of local business elite and the interventions of
members of the city’s civic sector—emphasizes a form of development decision-making
that is substantially decentralized. In political terms, the city’s ward-based system has
created a tension between the desires of a strong mayor to control development decisionmaking and those of aldermen to set development policy within their wards. Over time,
this tension has created a system where competent mayors set the agenda for the use of
particular incentives and rely upon the full participation of alderman to act cheerleaders
for development initiatives. One of the main tasks of public leadership, particularly the
mayor’s office, is to facilitate the “hierarchical coordination” of development
professionals working in the city’s multiple development agencies. At the same time,
aldermen have strong incentives to partner with development professionals in advance
development initiatives. In general, development is good politics, and incumbents
promote redevelopment activities as part of their platform to re-election.
In contrast to other American cities, the organizations representing St. Louis’
business leaders play a less prominent role in local affairs and development decisionmaking. Much of the work of corporate leaders on development projects is done outside
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of the formal authority of such organizations as Civic Progress in the long term and
personal relationships between specific leaders and specific developers. Civic Progress
leaders have consistently resisted a more activist role in local affairs, despite frequent
calls over the years for the organization to broaden its membership base, strengthen its
staff and organizational structure and take a more active role in local affairs. While
corporations have supported intermediary organizations to work on development
initiatives, one consequence of Civic Progress limited engagement and the city’s
decentralized political structure has been the historical weakness of the area’s non-profit
development organizations and the general limited and sporadic activities of other
members’ of the city civic sector to reenergize redevelopment activities.
The key impact of this structure is that where development activities occur they
do so with the strong interest and participation of private sector actors. In this sense,
development activities in St. Louis are substantially privatized. At the same time,
planning and implementing development projects requires a framework of collaboration
to support private sector initiative, with specific supportive roles being played by local
political officials and other stakeholders. As the next set of chapters will demonstrate, at
the center of development efforts are private market actors, including local developers
and financiers and their supporters elsewhere in local structures. In light of the
institutional fragmentation of local decision-making, planning and implementing projects
can be difficult. However, the projects investigated demonstrate how key actors mobilize
to create institutional settings for decision-making that enhances the ability of developers
to complete projects. For contemporary development downtown and in the
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neighborhoods analyzed, elements of these institutional settings include a new vision for
redevelopment and new incentives and institutions to foster redevelopment.
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Chapter 5: Decline of the Central Business District
The thesis of the next two chapters is that the city’s decentralized institutional
structure creates a system of development decision-making where private market actors
play a central role in planning and initiating development projects. On the one hand, the
city’s institutional structure suggests that the public sector blunts the ability of local
mayors to control development decision-making. Even with the recognition that the
powers of St. Louis’ mayor have incrementally grown, in structural terms St. Louis’
political processes is one that emphasizes collaboration and not command and control.
Added to the complexities of multiple elected officials and multiple development
agencies are the plethora of incentives and mandates from other levels of government.
This bleak view of St. Louis’ redevelopment prospects thus suggests that the city’s
institutional capacity is unfocused and not conducive to complicated redevelopment
projects.
On the other hand, the review of development projects contained in the set of
chapters —reviewing the trajectory of development initiatives in downtown St. Louis
(Chapter 5 and 6) and in a near north side cluster of neighborhoods (Chapter 7 and 8)—
shows that this view is only part of the story. Even given the complexities of most
projects, development in St. Louis can achieve a form of stability. This comes about as
the incentive structure for development activity shifts, routinizing collaboration between
stakeholders and diminishing the risk for private market investment, in both financial
terms and in terms of time and prestige. Additionally, the experiences of downtown and
neighborhood development indicate that not only do private market forces dominate
development decision-making, they are regarded the motor force of projects and their
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priorities set the priorities for specific markets. As much as public officials and the local
business elite, civic sector actors play critical roles in changing the incentive structure for
investment and creating new institutional arrangements to support new investment.
The first projects reviewed are those occurring in downtown St. Louis, with an
emphasis on development occurring from 1995 to 2005. This chapter will focus a review
of past redevelopment efforts downtown and demonstrate how economic decline in
downtown’s traditional retailing and office sector deteriorated confidence in downtown’s
planning and redevelopment efforts. The next chapter will show how this declining
confidence in the traditional vision of downtown set the stage for a new round of
downtown planning, a new vision for downtown as a residential neighborhood and new
incentives and institutions to carry out redevelopment activity. In this analysis,
downtown refers to the central area of the city of St. Louis, stretching from the
Mississippi River to the east, Jefferson Avenue to the West, Cole Street to the north and
I-40 to the south.
[Insert Figure 2 here.]
While the area is broader than the conventional definition of the central business
district—generally confined to Tucker on the west—it is the area represented as
downtown in most postwar planning studies.
Although downtown has played a unique economic and symbolic role, over time
these two aspects have become divergent. As the central business district, it is the
location for major private investments in office buildings, civic places, and sports and
entertainment facilities. Downtowns usually draw attention on the broader issues
involved in urban redevelopment as opposed to the local, constituency-driven politics in
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the neighborhoods. Yet, regional economic trends have diminished the economic
sectors—mainly retailing and professional, office-oriented sectors—that built the skyline
of the city over the course of the 20th century. At the same time, there is growing
recognition that many urban downtowns have achieving renewed population growth on
the basis of a emerging residential population, including downtown loft living (Gratz and
Mintz, 2000; Katz, Nyugen and Lang, 1998; Sohmer and Lang, 2001).
Downtown Planning and Development in the Post-war Period
In many ways, the renewed opportunity for downtown development that emerged
after 2000 was unanticipated in the conventional planning rhetoric that had dominated
planning in the post-war period. Increased commercial and residential competition from
the city’s suburbs and socio-demographic changes in the city had eroded downtown’s
central role in the regional economy. Downtown plans attempted to reverse the area’s
downturn by promoting large-scale public improvements in order to encourage the
construction of new office buildings, hotels, and entertainment and tourist facilities.
However, it was apparent by the 1990s that the physical separation between downtown’s
main features—particularly the separation of the Arch from the remainder of downtown
by a major interstate—and the lack of activity in the central business district as a whole
meant that downtown served more as a collection of individual assets and less as a part of
a whole.
Left out of the equation in most downtown planning initiatives, at least until the
middle 1990s, was any sort of realistic reference to a downtown residential population.
This situation put St. Louis behind other major American cities that had invested
political, civic and economic energy in downtown living and seen their downtown
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population increase from 1990 to 2000. A 1998 survey of downtown residential patterns
St. Louis found that the city had just over 7,000 residents with a projected population of
only over 10,000 by 2010; St. Louis’s residential population was significantly smaller
than such midwestern cities as Cleveland, Detroit, Minneapolis and Milwaukee (Katz,
Nyugen and Lang, 1998: np). Even at this relatively low level, St. Louis’ numbers are
misleading in that they do not reflect the young, urban, professional dweller most coveted
by urban planners (Moulton, 1999), and include significant numbers of subsidized public
housing on the fringes of downtown, including the Carr Square Apartments and Cochran
Towers and Townhouses, and the mixed income areas of the O’Fallon Apartments and
Columbus Square Apartments. By the 1990s, the only real concentration of market-rate
housing in the downtown area was Gentry’s Landing, a group of three residential towers
built on the eastern edge of downtown as a part of a larger urban renewal project in the
1960s. Indeed, because of population loss in the urban renewal and public housing areas,
St. Louis’s downtown is one of the few of major American cities that lost population
from 1990-2000 (Sohmer and Lang, 2001: np).
Even at its worst, downtown remained the largest employment location in the
region and the location for some of the region’s most important firms. In this sense,
reports of downtown’s absolute economic irrelevancy were overblown, even given the
complaints among many of the region’s civic and business leadership that downtown had
lost its focus (Woo, 1989: 2B; Prost, 1996a: 1B). Significantly, these reflections came
after decades of major redevelopment initiatives—commercial, institutional and
residential. A complete survey of these post-war investments is beyond the scope of this
study; however, a sense of them, and their strategic intent for a general view of
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downtown and its future, can be gathered through a review of some of the major post-war
plans. These documents include formal city plans for downtown completed in 1960,
1974, 1987 and 1993 (City Plan Commission, 1960a; City Plan, 1974; Community
Development Agency, 1987; St. Louis Development Commission, 1994)6.
Accompanying them are various planning studies conducted for project areas in
downtown and completed by both city planners and private planning and design
organizations (Russell Mullgardt Schwartz Van Hoefen, 1953; City Plan Commission,
1960; John Graham and Company, 1970; Team Four Inc, 1975b; Team Four Inc., 1980;
Washington Avenue Redevelopment Corporation, 1983; St. Louis Development
Corporation, 1991-1992; among others). The plans and studies indicate the general
character of downtown development and the persistence of a vision of downtown
development. Also included in the analysis of planning are the redevelopment plans
completed for specific projects in order for their qualification for Chapter 99/100/353
designation (Mansion House Redevelopment Corporation, 1959; City Plan Commission,
1961; City Plan Commission, 1969; City Plan Commission, 1973b; Broadway/Olive
Corporation, 1980; Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority, 1990; among others).
Given the importance of blighting to qualify for local tax abatement, these redevelopment
plans are as important as formal plans for the development of downtown.
Urban Renewal in the City Beautiful
In many ways, the plans have remarkably consistent elements, reflecting longstanding goals on the part of the city’s business and government elite. These elements
reflect a “City Beautiful” vision for St. Louis dating back to the first part of the 20th
6

The 1987 plan was completed but not adapted by either the city’s planning agencies or by legislative
body; however, the analysis uses the plan as it reflects consensual as well as competing views of St. Louis’
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century, emphasizing the role of public buildings, parks, open spaces, boulevards and
parkways as a catalyst for new office and residential development. From the perspective
of this “public city” (St. Louis Community Development Agency, 1987: 5), post-war
downtown plans echo a commitment to the Memorial Arch and the 91-acre Jefferson
Memorial Park. The desire for a rejuvenated riverfront dates back to city proposals in the
1930s (City Plan Commission, 1933) and is replicated in successive plans for a
riverfront-planning district (City Plan Commission, 1960a: 26; City Plan Commission,
1974: 14.) until largely completed in the late 1970s. A second aspect of the downtown’s
public infrastructure is the desire for the creation of a central parkway emanating west
from the Arch to the western edge of downtown at 20th Street. Both the eastern aspect of
the parkway, known as the St. Louis Central Parkway in the 1950s (Russell Mullgardt
Schwartz Van Hoefen, 1953: 7) and the western portion Plaza area became known as the
Gateway Mall by the 1970s and are regarded by most downtown plans as the major urban
element in downtown St. Louis (City Plan Commission, 1974: 19; St. Louis Community
Development Agency, 1987: 15; St. Louis Development Corporation, 1994: 60).
The intention of the creation of these open areas was to spur a cluster of
development initiatives around them (Russell Mullgardt Schwartz Van Hoefer, 1953: 8),
and subsequent plans and initiatives reflect the presence of a multitude of
developments—including hotels, office buildings and residential towers—adjacent to
them. The success of this strategy was buoyed by the early redevelopment of the 3rd and
4th Street corridor facing the new Arch (City Plan Commission, 1960a: 26-7; City Plan
Commission, 1974: 17), including the Mansion House development completed in 1965,
the Gateway Tower in 1966 and Stouffer’s Riverfront Inn in 1966. Similarly, the
downtown during this period of transition.
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construction of the Gateway Mall—created over a fifty-year period—transformed
downtown’s surrounding skyline. The western portion of the mall flanked a set of civic
buildings on the south, a continuation of the Public Group Plan of 1919 (City Plan
Commission, 1919), and Plaza Square Apartments on the north, planned and constructed
in 1959 as a part of the city’s urban renewal activities. Bounded on the east side by the
Old Courthouse and on the western edge by the Civil Courthouse, the Mall became
surrounded a series of new glass and steel towers. These include on the south the
General American Life building (1976), the Broadway Marriot Inn (1968) and the
Equitable Life building (1969) and on the north the Southwestern Bell Telephone
building (1990), the Boatman’s Bank building (1974), and Gateway One building (1986).
Also annunciated in post-war planning studies is a downtown stadium area on the
southeastern edge of the central business district. The location of the stadium, completed
in 1966, was in part selected to connect to the intersection of a number of new highways,
particularly the elevated Daniel Boone Expressway, now Interstate 64 (City Plan
Commission, 1960a: 28). Like the creation of the Jefferson Memorial area, the intention
of the stadium was to spur redevelopment eastward, northward to the Gateway Mall and
westward to Tucker; the adaptive use of Union Station, proposed in the 1974 plan,
created the impetus for a South District planning area stretching from the riverfront to a
new North-South Connector just west of 20th Street (City Plan Commission, 1974: 21).
Accentuating this trend was the development of the Kiel Center (later Savvis Center), a
new sports arena west of Tucker completed in 1994, and the introduction to downtown of
light rapid transit (MetroLink) in 1993.
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Redevelopment activities in both of these areas demonstrate that urban renewal
activities—primarily commercial office buildings and tourist-related facilities—were
built on top of downtown’s public improvements in terms of open spaces and parkways.
In general, the plans largely set the context for private sector development, which took
advantage of the financial incentive under tax abatement provisions under Missouri
Statute 353 (City Plan Commission, 1974: 26; City Plan Commission, 1987: 6; St. Louis
Development Commission, 1994: 72). While some of the public improvements called for
were completed in one form or another, the Gateway Mall being one example, others
remained on the drawing board due to lack of funding or consensus (St. Louis
Development Commission, 1994: 73). Included in this latter group was the plan for an
Esplanade, a pedestrian-oriented, retail and entertainment district, along 10th Street west
of the stadium (St. Louis Development Commission, 1987: 6). The Esplanade plan
received blighting and TIF approval from the city in 1991 (St. Louis Development
Corporation, 1991), but remained on the drawing board when development rights to the
plan expired in 1996.
Post-war planning in other parts of the central business district—a sub-district
north of Gateway Mall and east of Tucker and a second area south of the Mall and west
of Tucker—similarly proposed large-scale public improvements in order to encourage
private market investments in office and commercial activity, with varying degrees of
success (Team Four, Inc., 1975: 15). The Core area is of particular interest to city
planners throughout this period (City Plan Commission, 1960a: 22; City Plan
Commission, 1974: 15; City Plan Commission, 1987: 5; St. Louis Development
Commission, 1994: 63), reflecting the importance that this area played in the commercial
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and retail life of the city. Initial postwar plans followed the pattern of urban renewal
activities, calling for large-scale public improvements in the form of open space and
pedestrian only walkways. These included the creation of a public plaza at the site of the
Old Post Office, pedestrian-only shopping mall along various streets and selective
demolition or reworking of buildings within the area (City Plan Commission, 1960a: 2225).
Most of these ideas were not realized, with redevelopment confined to the
northeastern portion of the downtown (Larry Smith and Company, 1974: i). Most
significant was the construction of the Mercantile Tower in 1974 and the Cervantes
Convention Center just to the north in 1977. The 1974 downtown plan built upon these
developments, calling for construction of a new three-story atrium shopping mall that
linked the tower and center with two of downtown’s department stores, Stix Bauer and
Fuller (later Dillard’s) and Famous Barr (City Plan Commission, 1974: 16). The
convention center—later augmented by a newly named America’s Center in 1993 and an
adjacent new football stadium in 1995—came to define the northern edge of downtown,
with its back on Cole Street facing the Cochran public housing area. Following public
protest over the proposed demolition of the Old Post Office (Committee to Save the Old
Post Office, 1965), the 1974 plan shifted the area’s public center northward as a part of a
new pedestrian-only walkway along Locust from 4th to Tucker Avenue.
Investments around the city’s convention center meant that the rest of the Core
district lacked a broader strategic vision, outside of calls of renovation of “important”
older buildings in order to preserve the area’s architectural heritage (Community
Development Agency, 1987: 17). While the strategy of rehabilitation proposed in the
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1980s—a time of interest in preservation prompted by federal tax credits—was a step
above reconstruction strategies followed in the 1950s and 1960s (City Plan Commission,
1960: 22), it hardly amounted to a genuine plan for the district’s older buildings. An
even more piecemeal approach was used in the treatment of the substantial portion of
downtown located north of the Plaza Square Apartments and west of Tucker. The area is
barely recognized as a part of downtown in the 1960 plan, seen mainly as an extension of
the Plaza’s new residential district. This plan reserves the commercial and wholesaling
activities in the northern and western portion of the area around Washington Avenue for
“further study” (City Plan Commission, 1960: 34).
The 1974 downtown plan largely continued this tradition of neglect, noting that
the district’s current commercial uses could be strengthened by the introduction of
highway access through the North-South connector (City Plan Commission, 1974: 20).
The clearest vision for the area prior to planning activities in the 1990s—which first
recognized the large-scale potential for renovated loft housing along Washington
Avenue—was a 1980 economic development strategy that called for public incentives to
maintain the area’s wholesaling and commercial character (Team Four, Inc., 1980: vii).
At that time, the district largely remained as it had been developed by the 1920’s,
although demolition of properties for surface parking lots meant that about 25 percent of
the area was vacant land (Team Four, Inc., 1980: 1). City plans also called for new
industrial districts in the northern portion of the area along Delmar (City Plan
Commission, 1974: 19; Community Development Agency, 1987: 14) and for expansion
of a Civic Center adjacent to the downtown public library, including further educational
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and residential facilities (City Plan Commission, 1974: 19; Team Four, Inc., 1980: xi;
Community Development Agency, 1987: 12).
Doubts and Debate in the 1980s
Gradually, over the 1970s and 1980s, much of the area immediately to the north
and south of the Gateway Mall saw the replacement of older, turn of the century office
buildings with new glass and steel towers. The central business district portion of
downtown added 82 new office and commercial buildings after 1950, expanding the
amount of available office space (Office of the Assessor, 2005). Elsewhere in this core
area, this sort of reconstruction did not occur, leaving downtown’s early 19th century
skyline intact and leading to the sort of two-track office sector as discussed previously.
One the one hand, downtown planners and their supporters in the city’s business
community understood the basic trends in downtown’s changing functions (City Plan
Commission, 1958: 11; City Plan Commission, 1960: 6; Community Development
Agency, 1987: 2). Indeed, the practical impact of redevelopment initiatives throughout
the post-war period was the reshuffling of space in the central business district,
particularly the whittling away of manufacturing and wholesaling uses and a
strengthening of the area’s office, governmental, and, increasingly, entertainment uses
(Economic Research Associates, 1980: 72).
On the other hand, St. Louis’ best-laid plans met the reality of economic
conditions in the region as well as the reality of downtown’s overall capacity. In retail
terms, downtown’s prominence declined throughout the post-war period. By 1967,
downtown had nearly 1.3 million square feet of retail space, with the largest decreases in
the sort of convenience retail uses dependent upon pedestrian traffic (Larry Smith and
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Company, 1974: 6). Successive city plans noted the obvious increasing vacancy of
street-level retailing, including numerous vacant storefronts operating as “dead-zones”
for pedestrians (City Plan Commission, 1974: 15), but at the same time contained
dramatic plans for expansion of downtown retailing, both in terms of departments stores
and pedestrian retail (City of St. Louis, 1988: 5).
By the 1990s, it was apparent that even the retail anchors in St. Louis Centre and
Union Station were failing to adequately compete with suburban shopping malls. Given
the level of public investment required to open it—a 1978 UDAG grant requested nearly
$8 million in federal funding for completion of the mall—St. Louis Centre’s precipitous
failure was particularly shocking. Planning studies completed before the mall’s opening
predicated its success on the ability of the mall to attract visitors from outside the city and
downtown area, particularly patrons who traveled downtown primarily to shop (Larry
Smith and Company, 1974: 8, 16). However, just five years after the mall’s opening,
mall owners were eliminating evening hours in recognition that the mall was not
attracting any substantial suburban traffic; just over a third of the shoppers at the facility
were downtown workers with just under 50% traveling less than 10 to 15 minutes to visit
the mall (VandeWater, 1989: 12).
Additionally, St. Louis Centre suffered competition from both Union Station,
opened in the same year, and the Galleria Mall, which underwent a $337.5 million
expansion in 1991 (Thomson, 1991: 1E). By the early 1990s, press reports on St. Louis
Centre were peppered with store closings, particularly on the first floor, where merchants
complained that “the traffic was not there” to sustain business (Faust and Berger, 1992:
9C). While mall merchants hoped that the arrival of MetroLink in 1993 would revive
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business, MetroLink construction on the adjacent meant that streets and sidewalks around
the mall were blocked from more than two years prior to the line’s opening (Wallstin,
1991: 3A; Prost, 1995c: 1B). Court filings in 1994 over responsibility for debt on the
mall showed that the facility had never broken even, was less than 80% occupied and was
worth far less than the debt held on the building (Faust, 1994: 6). By 1996, with an
occupancy rate of only 50%, mall owners reported that the structure was worth only 1/6th
of the total $92 million of mortgages on the buildings (Faust, 1996: 1A). With the failure
of a plan in the same year to replace a portion of the mall with a new convention hotel,
mall owners officially gave up on the facility’s use as a retail space, and started exploring
commercial and office uses for major portions of the structure (Prost 1997: 1E). None of
these plans stopped two foreclosures on the mall in 2001 and 2004; the second time the
property sold for just over $5 million (Prost, 2004b: C1). An initial “wait and see”
attitude on the part of city planners has more recently been replaced by frustration as the
lack of progress hampers a $40 million dollar restoration of the Dillard building—
connected to the mall by a pedestrian bridge—into a hotel and apartment building (Van
Der Werf, 2005: 1D).
The failure of St. Louis Centre caused much soul-searching on the part of the
city’s development community, including the opinion that retrospectively downtown was
not ready or able to sustain much retailing (Faust, 1996: 1E; “Downtown Waits, And
Waits,” 1999: B6). By 2000, downtown retailing was confined mostly to tourists and
visitors in such enclaves as the Union Station and Laclede’s Landing and daytime
establishments catering to downtown office workers. The lack of the sort of retail
establishments that traditionally catered to personal and business services downtown as
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well as those that catered to tourists and visitors added to a general sense of downtown’s
emptiness. The lack of after-hours pedestrian presence downtown was so noticeable that
one local civic organization started a weekly campaign in 1997 to draw people downtown
once a week in an attempt to convince restaurants and bars to stay open (Mihalopoulos,
1997c: 1A).
Retrospective reflection in the 1980s and 1990s also questioned the office
construction strategy that dominated downtown redevelopment schemes. From a purely
physical perspective, the overestimation of planners in downtown plans is obvious. City
plans traditionally had worried about whether the downtown had enough buildable sites
for Class A office towers (City Plan Commission, 1958: 33; City Plan Commission,
1960: 7; Community Development Agency, 1987: 9); on the other hand, many thought
that downtown office space was overbuilt (Koman, 1989b: 4; Faust, 1989: 20). One
consistent theme in the trajectory of downtown’s office projects was how they were
scaled back over time. Perhaps the most infamous example of this sort of overestimation
was the case of proposed redevelopment of the Gateway Mall under the “half mall” plan
proposed in 1981. Only one of the three of buildings was built, and the redevelopment
corporation went out of business in 1993 with losses of over $12 million (Grone, 1993:
1).
The St. Louis Centre project originated in a multi-unit proposal in 1973, including
the enclosed mall, up to three new Class A office towers and a 500 bed hotel room to
serve the convention center planned for the area (City Plan Commission, 1973b: 2; City
Plan Commission, 1974: 15). While the Mercantile Tower was quickly built in 1974, the
rest of the plan stalled. A competing plan for part of the area was introduced in 1979
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(SBF Redevelopment Corporation, 1979) and the entire plan for the district was
reintroduced in 1982 after receipt of a UDAG to fund some of the area’s improvements
(Mercantile Center Redevelopment Corporation, 1982). By this point, the original
developer of the enclosed mall, locally-based May Corporation, had been replaced by a
national owner and operator of shopping malls, the Simon Company, and the location and
number of ancillary buildings to the mall—hotels and office towers—were significantly
pared down. Only one office tower, One City Centre, was built, completed in 1983, and
the city would wait until the 2004 to get their convention center hotel.
While some disputed that downtown office vacancy rates were abnormally high
given the overall absorption rate downtown (Sanford, 1989: 4), trends in the sector
created a difficult market for owners and brokers and an opportunity for renters looking
for deals in a variety of parts of the region (Faust, 1990: 27; Bryant, 1995b: 2B). New
Class A office space also increased the obsolescence of existing, older buildings
(Economic Research Associates, 1980: 80). Increases in the occupancy of new towers
such as Metropolitan Square, constructed in 1988, came at the expense of increasing
vacancy in Class B and C buildings (“Downtown Occupancy 80.1,” 1992: 14).
Complicating downtown’s soft real estate market were federal tax changes in 1986 that
wiped out tax deductions favoring ownership and investment in older buildings
(Thomson, 1990: 1E; VandeWater 1990: 1B). By the 1990s, the state of downtown’s
office real estate market was “a tale of two distinct cities” (McLaughlin, 1997a: 7A)—
represented on the one hand by new, gleaming and largely occupied office towers and on
the other hand by older, and increasingly obsolete, buildings built in the first half of the
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20th century. Vacancies in the latter portion of the market left downtown with significant
sections with few commercial occupants and little commercial activity of any kind.
Consensus and Critique in Downtown Planning
The lower expectations for downtown reconstruction met a renewed interest on
the part of some civic leaders to emphasize rehabilitation and preservation of downtown’s
early 20th century heritage (Committee to Save the Old Post Office, 1965; Economic
Research Associates, 1980: 40-45; Toft, 1989: 3B). These views brought a new
generation of civic entrepreneurs—including successful redevelopers of such reclaimed
neighborhoods as Soulard, Lafayette Square and the Central West End—into direct
conflict with political and business leaders who lauded the city’s redevelopment with 353
projects (Farris, 1989: 3B; Ward, 1989: 3B). Conventional proponents of downtown
development saw in the expansion of Class A office space the necessity to prune the
market of older buildings—thereby reducing the supply of office space, creating parking
facilities for downtown visitors and reserving space for future reconstruction (Farris,
1989: 3B; Thomson, 1990: 1E; Albinson, 1993: 3B). Opposing these voices were
individuals and property owners that supported preservation and historic district status
(Economic Research Associates, 1980: 45) as well public and private organizations that
advocated for preservation and worked to block demolition of historic buildings. Chief
among these was Landmarks, Inc., a private not-for-profit group founded in 1959 to
promote and preserve the city’s architectural heritage, and the city’s own Heritage and
Urban Design Agency, a commission-led organization with a specific mandate to
preserve historic buildings and authority to block demolition of city-recognized historic
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landmarks. The latter especially provided a stumbling block for demolition of landmark
status buildings in the downtown core (Tucci, 1994: 1A; McLaughlin, 1994: 5A).
While the preservation strategy was only marginally successful—downtown’s
Laclede’s Landing being the largest scale example of preservation—its critique of
conventional planning and development strategies added to the sense that the strategic
vision for downtown was flawed. The conflict between the two goals—preservation, on
the one hand, and redevelopment, on the other—is obvious in terms of the city’s
downtown plans; a historic district nomination for much of the central business district
proposed in 1980 found that 39% of the properties proposed for nomination are indicated
in the 1974 as ones to be cleared for new development (Economic Research Associates,
1980: 94). Nomination of historic buildings brought great controversy, with many in the
city’s political and business leadership opposed to district nomination and opposed to the
individual nomination of their own property (Economic Research Associates, 1980: 5,
40). Because of this opposition, the district nomination plan did not take place.
A spate of rehabilitation downtown in the 1980s also spurred on proponents of
preservation; in these developments, federal tax incentives served as the carrot to
ownership and reinvestment. Prior to the introduction of these incentives, federal tax
policy encouraged demolition of older structures and their replacement with new
buildings. In 1976, however, changes in the tax code began allowing developers of
historic commercial buildings to write off the cost of rehabilitation over a five-year
period. In St. Louis, the changes prompted approximately $67 million in investment in
historic rehabilitation, most of it in the Central West End and Laclede’s Landing (Porter,
1990:3C). A more significant incentive for preservation came with additional tax
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changes in 1981 that allowed investors in historic rehabilitation projects to take a tax
credit of up to 25 percent in the cost of rehabilitation. The changes prompted an
investment of over $430 million in the restoration of historic properties in St. Louis,
including a number of commercial buildings downtown (Porter, 1990: 3C).
The elimination of federal tax incentives in 1986 sharply brought rehabilitation to
a halt, including work on key buildings downtown. One developer active in the period
reports how the loss of the incentives radically reduced his ability to complete projects.
Overall, the loss of the credits had a large impact on the number of rehabilitation projects
in the city, with the number of large rehabilitation dropping to less than 10 in 1987, down
from 190 projects in 1984 (Porter, 1990: 3C). While some small incentives remained,
their use was complicated by new Federal Park Service regulations that tightened historic
standards on interior work, an area where developers had had a freer range in the past.
The loss of the credits resumed pressure to demolish buildings downtown; in retrospect,
the level of demolition is significant. From 1975 to 1995, the core area of downtown—
Tucker Avenue east to the river, Cole Street to Highway 40—lost 300 of its 500
buildings, with 100 buildings replaced by office towers and hotels and 65 buildings by
parking lots and garages (Prost, 1996b: 6A).
Encouraging a criticism of downtown development priorities was the gradual
institutional shift in the organizations involved in downtown development away from an
urban renewal approach to an emphasis on broader development goals. The distinction
between the two approaches can be overdrawn—for example, contrary to many urbanist
critiques of urban renewal planning all city plans up to the 1970s emphasized the
importance of a pedestrian presence downtown and talked about preservation of some of
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the city’s architectural and historical legacy. However, leadership of urban renewal
agencies like LCRA did represent an older mentality that was often at odds with younger
planners, particularly after the creation of CDA in 1974. According to several long-time
observers of local development politics, LCRA head Farris was dismissive of the city’s
new development mandate and chaffed under the supervision of the new agency’s control
of CDBG funding.
Accompanying the shift in power within the city’s formal development agencies
was a growing criticism of downtown’s business management organization, Downtown,
Inc. Founded in 1958 following a study commissioned by Civic Progress members,
Downtown Inc. was modeled on downtown organizations found in other American cities
(Uhlenbrock, 1989: 3). Representing downtown property owners and businesses, the
organization functioned as the area’s chamber of commerce and was intimately involved
in the planning and initiation of development initiatives. As such, the organization’s
leadership was involved in key downtown projects, both in a formal capacity as well as
organizers for Chapter 353 corporations in key development areas. One telling sign of
Downtown St. Louis’ place within downtown’s planning and development apparatus is
the fact that, upon Charles Farris’ retirement from LCRA, he went on to work for the
organization.
As a part of downtown’s leadership, the organization received criticism
throughout the 1980s because of the seeming lack of progress downtown mounted
(Porter, 1989: 3DZ). Compounding these difficulties were internal splits within
downtown’s core leadership group, including differences of opinion over Mayor
Schoemehl’s plan to save the Cupples Warehouse District (Gillerman, 1989b: 1D).

180

William, Winter, 2006, UMSL, p. 181

Likewise, the organization was rocked by both a financial scandal in 1996 and evidence
that it was inflating downtown occupancy and workforce numbers (“A Frank Assessment
of Downtown,” 1996: 10B). This lead to the resignation of the group’s long-time
executive director and a period of transition in the organization, including a new name,
Downtown St. Louis Partnership, in 1997, and a new mission (Downtown St. Louis
Partnership Inc., 1997). However, doubts about the organization’s effectiveness
continued, hampering a new round of planning. Personality conflicts between the
organization’s new director, Kim Kimborough, his staff and other stakeholders
downtown complicated downtown planning efforts and gradually convinced planners of
the need for a new organization, Downtown Now! (Berger, 1999d: A2; Manning, 1997c:
1).
The institutional shift in planning agencies and their allies among downtown’s
leadership also reflected a new generation of political leadership that assumed power in
the city during the 1970s and 1980s. These included younger black and white aldermen
who cut their teeth in neighborhood revitalization movements and a younger mayor in
Vincent Schoemehl Jr. whose election in 1981 was due to neighborhood organizing and
grass-roots style politics. Schoemehl had an ambivalent attitude towards the city’s
existing power structure. On the one hand, he revitalized contact between the mayor’s
office and local business leaders, asking for their input on a host of city initiatives
(O’Neil, 1989b: 3A). On the other hand, Schoemehl publicly clashed with the
conventional view of downtown planning a number of times, Gateway Mall being one.
While he eventually reversed course on the preservation of historic property in the
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Gateway Mall scheme, he remained at odds with downtown interests until the end of his
term.
Schoemehl’s reform of the development agencies, particularly the creation of
SLDC as a mayor-led agency to coordinate the city’s efforts, accentuated the trend away
from an emphasis on urban renewal. According to long-term observers, Schoemehl and
LCRA head Farris disagreed over downtown priorities and Schoemehl quickly sought to
further minimize Farris’ position. Schoemehl’s first head of SLDC, Christopher Grace,
brought with him a new perspective on downtown development and a desire to model the
city on such “renaissance” cities as San Francisco and Boston (Prost, 1989b: 3D; O’Neill
and Prost, 1991: 1E). By the time of his third term, Schoemehl was publicly questioning
some of downtown’s major initiatives, including the construction of new Class A office
buildings and the development of the Gateway Mall (Porter, 1991: 4C). At the same
time, Schoemehl had little advice on how a better form of downtown planning could
emerge at a time when cities were all but ignored by the federal government and were
unable to provide basic city services.
Summary
For most of the post-war period, downtown redevelopment consisted of
development in office buildings, public buildings, and commercial, retail and tourist
facilities. The projects benefited from both the investment advantages of Chapter 353
blighting designation, as well as public sector expenditures and support. By the 1990s,
however, this strategy appeared played out and inadequate to foster recovery as economic
trends depressed the area’s historic role in the region’s retail and office sector.
Increasingly, downtown’s landscape reflected numerous dead zones, with numerous
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underused or even abandoned buildings and little pedestrian or commercial traffic. In
institutional terms, economic decline resulted in a concomitant decline in the authority
and prestige of a set of local actors that had promoted this downtown strategy. On the
public side, newer agencies supplanted the primary role LCRA had played in the urban
renewal period; private sector organizations such as Downtown St. Louis likewise
underwent a crisis in leadership, resulting in a diminution of the organization’s prestige in
downtown planning and project implementation.
The next chapter shows how the decline of downtown set the stage for a new,
more successful round of development activities in the 1990’s, and presents a framework
of how local actors work together to foster redevelopment. Through a series of planning
exercises, a broad coalition of downtown stakeholders defined a new vision for
downtown radically different from the central business approach preferred in earlier
decades. This vision, emphasizing a new downtown residential neighborhood, promoted
the authority of new round of downtown leaders, including a new public-private
partnership, Downtown Now!, to oversee implementation of a new plan. This new
institutional setting for development decision-making encouraged both the activities of
individual entrepreneurs in creating residential loft buildings as well as supported largescale, lynchpin projects like the convention center hotel and the Old Post Office District.
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Chapter 6: The Rise of Downtown Loft-Living
The legacy of postwar planning and development provides both constraints and
opportunities for downtown leaders as they engaged in another round of planning and
redevelopment in the 1990s. First and foremost was the physical and economic impact of
the projects pursued, both those completed and those still outstanding. The latter
comprised a list of commitments that city officials had to struggle to fulfill, including
renovations to the city’s convention center, the development of convention hotel, gaming
and entertainment facilities on the riverfront, and redevelopment of the area around the
ballpark. Elsewhere in downtown were a series of outstanding proposals, some times at
this point failed projects with ownership structures of key properties that complicated
future redevelopment. The legacy of completed projects was no less difficult. Chief
among them was the St. Louis Centre, by the mid-1990s largely regarded as a planning
mistake, and the footprint of the Gateway Mall, which had never materialized in the
entirety that planners had envisioned.
The legacy of postwar planning and development also remained in institutional
terms in the stakeholder community. Conflict and a lack of consensus—replicated in
personal conflicts between individuals and differing agendas among agencies—
represented an obstacle that future efforts would have to overcome or at least diminish.
Mayors had to overcome the institutional fragmentation of the city’s development
agencies, as well as the general bureaucratic inertia in all city agencies, and facilitate
consensus among the civic organizations interested in promoting a view of downtown
development. In political terms, the mayor remained the key elected official, and was
required to unite the disparate forces necessary to plan and complete projects. In general,
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aldermen played a lesser role in downtown planning, except where conflict over
projects—such as the Gateway Mall plan—spilled over debates at the board of aldermen.
The central role of the mayor and his staff was a benefit where mayors exercised energy,
leadership and visions—for example, during Schoemehl’s three terms—but also meant
that progress lagged when mayors for political or personal reasons did not pay enough
attention to downtown priorities.
In light of these constraints, it is remarkable that a host of new incentives
materialized in the late 1990s—institutional as well as economic—that allowed for
entrepreneurs to find new opportunities and new successes in a manner that became
routinized and accepted. The thesis of this chapter is that the collaborative work of
political officials, stakeholders from the city’s civic sector, and private market actors
created a new institutional setting for downtown development decision-making and the
creation of a series of projects that have transformed St. Louis’ downtown. This new
framework created a pivotal moment for the city and for revitalization of downtown,
including rehabilitation of parts of downtown’s historic core that had become quite grim.
Over a series of planning exercises, downtown stakeholders created a more or less
consensual view of downtown, with downtown housing and loft living as the symbol for
reinvestment of resources, energy and excitement.
This new view of downtown matched a shift in the general conception of the
importance, aesthetically and economically, of urban spaces, particularly the excitement
garnered by a residential district downtown. Historic downtown streetscapes became
prized and promoted for their ability to shape positive and exciting interactions for
tourists, consumers and residents. While the arts were a starting point—many of the
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“pioneers” in loft living in the 1980s were artists—the receptivity of the image of loftliving survived as developers transformed the loft district from a post-industrial arts area,
to an edgy club area, to a professional residential district. In economic terms, a new set
of tools encouraged investments in the existing fabric of downtown, the historic buildings
that had largely been untreated by past planning efforts. Most importantly, downtown’s
redevelopment was conditioned by the expansion of the capacity and interest among local
civic leadership, leading to their reinvestment in the downtown planning process. In the
redevelopment of downtown that emerged in the late 1990s, civic leadership played
critical roles in developing interest in downtown and at key points in the process
providing expertise and resources to allow entrepreneurs to continue the redevelopment
process. While conflict did emerge over key projects and priorities, they have been
relegated to a subset of activities and have not threatened the general tenor of
redevelopment activities occurring downtown.
Downtown Planning Again: Starts and Stops in Downtown Living
The development of lofts corresponded to a synergy between a positive financial
outlook for rehabilitation, the creation of a supportive institutional framework that
supported developers, and a more or less consensual view of loft living as the hallmark of
a new downtown. It should be noted that although loft living serves as a symbol of
downtown’s revitalization efforts this does not mean the projects associated with them
represent the largest economic investment in the downtown core. The investments in
lofts downtown is far outstripped by the $270 million investment in the new convention
hotel, the $646 million cost of the new baseball stadium or the projected $200 million
that will spent on a new gaming and hotel complex on Laclede’s Landing. Additionally,
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these other commercials projects have taken as much and probably more energy on the
part of downtown stakeholders than loft developments.
However, loft living and the Washington Avenue Loft District plays a particular
place in contemporary downtown development strategies, and investments in it have
provided visible evidence of downtown’s comeback. The physical location of the loft
provides a spine linking tourist facilities to a broader downtown streetscape. Over time,
the possibility of a relatively high income residential population has created and sustained
an economic market for personal and retail services that had previously eluded
downtown’s managers.
While downtown housing dates back to the urban renewal period—and even
earlier in vestigial forms in older industrial and commercial districts—St. Louis was a
relative latecomer to the contemporary phenomenon of loft living. Lofts generally
comprise the adaptive use of warehouses and commercial buildings into residential or
live/work units. The practice began in the late 1970s and early 1980s in cities such as
New York, initially oriented towards artists and bohemians whose residence at these
urban spaces reflected their participation and consumption in an exotic urban lifestyle
(Zukin, 1982; Gratz and Mintz, 2000). These converted spaces represent a novel form of
urban residence: high ceilings, open floor plans, exposed brick walls, with visible
mechanical workings and minimal interior finish. Since that point, lofts have become a
recognized housing choice in most American cities, catering not only to young artists but
also to professionals of all ages, including older “empty nesters” downsizing from a more
traditional suburban house (Buchholz, 1999: T6; Prost, 2001k: C1).
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The general observation that downtown housing—a new downtown
neighborhood—was the symbolic draw to a rejuvenated downtown core was reinforced
through planning activities conducted over the 1990’s. These included a 1994 master
plan started in the last years of the Schoemehl Administration and completed after Mayor
Freeman Bosley Jr. assumed the office; a planning process begun by Bosley just prior to
the 1997 mayoral election and consequently aborted by his predecessor Clarence Harmon
in the same year; and the Downtown Now! Planning process begun in 1997 and
completed by 2000. Throughout this period, city development officials were also busy
working on some of downtown’s previously stated priorities, including opening the
America’s Center convention facilities in 1993 and the adjacent football stadium in 1995,
as well as pursuing redevelopment opportunities on Laclede’s Landing and pinning down
a site and redevelopment plan for a new convention hotel.
The 1994 plan began with a two year planning process initiated with the
recognition that downtown progress had stagnated (Freeman 1992: 1C) and that the 1987
plan for downtown had failed to gain traction (Albinson, 1991: 3B). The 1987 plan came
under criticism for a number of reasons; proponents of a new planning process noted that
the plan had been completed by an out-of-town consultant under contract with the city’s
development agency, that the plan had not covered all of the parts of downtown and had
failed to cover such issues as economic planning, transportation and parking (Prost,
1992b: 3A; St. Louis Development Commission, 1994: 73). In the background was the
lack of progress on the most dramatic proposals—the Esplanade retail district and new
downtown housing—and the lack of consensus around certain development issues,
including those involving the preservation of existing buildings (Albinson, 1993: 3B).
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By contrast, downtown leaders promoted this planning process as an inclusive one
that would come to involve over 125 city leaders sitting on 5 committees, including urban
design, infrastructure and transportation and economic development and tourism (St.
Louis Development Commission, 1994: 74). In a manner adopted by later planning
processes, the 1994 plan included three public visioning sessions to gain input for local
stakeholders and residents. The plan also relied heavily on the contributions—financial
as well as technical—of local economic development and planning consultants, including
Richard Ward of Development Strategies Inc., an individual whose expertise in
downtown and city development extended back into the late 1960s. Landmarks
Association, a historic preservation organization and frequent critic of downtown
development strategies, also served as a consultant on the planning process.
The 1994 plan served as a strategic vision for downtown, with broad themes and
goals as well as specific action points to encourage future planning (Prost, 1994b: 1D).
In general, its formulation reflected a new strategic view of downtown markedly at odds
with the 1974 plan. The plan’s initial emphasis was on downtown as a place for culture,
activity and excitement, a place of high quality design and historic preservation and a
downtown linked to surrounding neighborhoods (St. Louis Development Commission,
1994: 10-13). The first and primary goal for the plan was the promotion of downtown
housing, including loft housing and new townhouse housing in locations like Laclede’s
Landing and near the Gateway Mall (St. Louis Development Commission, 1994: 19).
Goals for development of the area’s downtown office supply stressed balancing new and
rehabilitated office space and increasing marketing and retention of businesses in key
corporate sectors (St. Louis Development Commission, 1994: 24). Similarly, planning
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for downtown retail specifically discouraged the additional development of large-scale
malls or retail centers, with a major goal to expand pedestrian-level and street front
shopping (St. Louis Development Commission, 1994: 37, 39). Planning for tourist and
convention facilities promoted the recently completed America’s Center convention
center, the critical task of completing a new convention hotel, and the ability to use the
history and culture of downtown and the region as a major visitor attraction (St. Louis
Development Commission, 1994: 31).
Freeman Bosley and Downtown
Beyond the participation of leadership from the development agencies,
Schoemehl, busy campaigning for the governor’s office in the last year of his mayoralty,
took little visible ownership over the planning process, and the plan’s adoption after the
1993 election put it squarely as a mandate for the new Bosley administration. Downtown
was a major feature of the 1993 mayoralty campaign, with most of the major candidates
pledging support for downtown development (O’Neil, 1993: 3A; Prost, 1993a: 1B).
Bosley’s election brought to office the city’s first African-American, and his initial focus
suggested that a program for downtown would be balanced by a concern for the
neighborhoods as well (Freeman, 1993: 4B; Mannies and Holleman, 1993: 3A). Bosley
set out a broad neighborhood agenda, including a city-wide plan to reorient public
expenditures to link new housing and investments to institutional and commercial
anchors in key parts of the city (Gross, 1994a: 1B).
Civic Progress corporations supported Bosley only after his victory in the
Democratic primary (Schlinkmann, 1993: 1C), and commentators suggested that a Bosley
administration would bring a new set of priorities to downtown projects (Derks, 1993: 38;
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Linsalata, 1993a: 1A). However, while Bosley brought in a new perspective and some
new players, it did not amount to a public embrace of the broad set of projects outlined in
the 1994 plan. Bosley did support downtown living, but also specifically stressed in his
campaign the importance of entertainment and tourism as the key to downtown’s future.
This included new gaming facilities on the city’s underutilized riverfront (Prost, 1993a:
1B), a priority he repeated throughout his term (Linsalata, 1993b: 1A; Linsalata, 1994:
1B). One of the Bosley’s administration’s first actions was to reopen the bidding process
on a casino site, putting aside a recommendation made right before the 1993 election by a
panel appointed by Schoemehl (Linsalata, 1993b: 1A). Bosley tied the development of a
casino with broader development goals for the riverfront and the convention center area,
including a new 1200 convention center hotel, parking facilities and residential
development (Holleman, 1993: 1B).
While his administration successfully mastered the political process of getting a
favored proposal through a new selection committee and negotiating a merger of two
proposals to favor the city’s comptroller (Prost, 1994a: 1D), negotiations over the
proposal stalled over the spring of 1995. The selected developer withdrew its proposal
(O’Neil, 1995: 1B). A second round of proposals in 1995—scaling back radically the
requirement for ancillary developments—led to a second proposal for casino facilities
and approval from a new selection committee in May of 1995 (Gross, 1995a: 1A).
However, the project bogged down over condemnation of land by private owners (Prost
and Faust, 1996: 1B), and, with the election of a new mayor Clarence Harmon in March
of 1997, the casino project was essentially shelved.
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Bosley’s plans for new casino ran up against the realities of economic
development in the 1990s, decreased federal aid and a poor investment climate.
Additionally, the project suffered from the pulls and pushes of local politics as competing
developers sought access to the variety of actors involved in the decision-making,
including the mayor. While Bosley was able to steer his choice through this minefield,
the process also suffered from a perception that Bosley’s requirement for some form of
local ownership in the casino development opened it up to undue influence. Press reports
that some of the local owners were local political actors with connections to elected
officials, including the mayor (Derks, 1993b: 1), prompted repeated calls to reopen the
process (Gross, 1995: 2B). The death of the first casino proposal also set back activity to
build a new convention hotel, another priority left over from the Schoemehl
administration after financing for the project fell apart (Moore, 1993: 1; Faust, 1995: 1E).
A three-member committee chaired by Missouri Senator Thomas Eagleton began another
round of discussions on the hotel in 1996, including the possibility of public financing
and ownership on the hotel (“Convention Hotel Appears Feasible,” 1996: 12B).
However, talks with one prospective developer stalled, and early in 1997 city officials
again reopened the process (Lindecke, 1997a: 2B).
If Bosley’s casino plans unfairly opened him up to questions of cronyism—
Schoemehl’s choice for a convention hotel, for example, was a major campaign
contributor (Grone, 1991: 1)—such charges complicated the process of providing clear
leadership over development priorities. Observers suggest that Bosley’s position as the
city’s first African American mayor made him cautious to rely upon the existing, mostly
white power structure that had handled development initiatives under Schoemehl. Bosley
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missed an opportunity to reshape the city’s development agencies, waiting until relatively
late in his term to appoint a new chief of SLDC (O’Neil, 1997a: 6A). Indeed, there is
also no public evidence that any significant attention was paid to the strategies outlined in
the 1994 downtown plan, or that additional planning occurred after its adoption, a
position that one downtown planner asserts also existed in private. Bosley early on
angered preservation opponents, supporting the demolition of the Arcade Building in
1994 and 1996 for a surface parking lot (Prost, 1994: 1B; Prost and Tuft, 1996a: 9C), and
publicly announced during his re-election campaign that he supported further demolition
in the downtown core area (Prost, 1996: 6A).
By the end of his first term, Bosley faced criticism that downtown development
had once again lost momentum, and downtown again became a major campaign issue in
the 1997 mayoral campaign (Kee and Prost, 1997: 1A). Bosley’s defense of his record
included calls for a new downtown planning process, to be led by a steering committee
including key downtown business people, political leaders and stakeholders
(Mihalopoulos, 1997: 12). Former police chief Clarence Harmon, Bosley’s main rival in
the contest, directly questioned the mayor’s leadership on downtown, charging Bosley
with ineptitude and cronyism (O’Neil, 1997b: 1A) and openly courted the support of
preservationists, and supporter of small business and housing for downtown (Kee, 1997:
8D).
The Rise of The Washington Avenue Loft District
Harmon’s election in 1997 capitalized upon a renewed interest in downtown
living, an idea that had been percolating in St. Louis since the late 1980s. St. Louis’
experience with lofts was shaped both by the economic feasibility of investing in older
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commercial buildings in the downtown core as well as a growing perception of the
importance of downtown housing as a symbol of a renewed city center. The perception
of downtown housing in most city plans prior to the 1999 Downtown Now! Plan
generally regarded such housing as new urban townhouses and designated a variety of
sites as the possible location of these new communities, including adjacent to the Plaza
Square apartments and north of Laclede’s Landing (City Plan Commission, 1974: 20, 24;
Community Development Agency, 1987: 11-12). The models for this type of housing
came from the reasonable success of the Columbus Square town homes, a series of
attached residences and condos built just north of downtown in 1986, and from the
example of new row houses built in cities such as Memphis and Pittsburgh (St. Louis
Development Agency, 1994: 16).
While construction of many of these new housing projects never materialized, city
development officials did pursue a new housing project for the Laclede’s Landing site.
Initially proposed as part of a failed casino expansion project in 1994, the project was
revived in 1998 when city development officials reached a preliminary agreement with a
nationally known developer for construction of the units (Schlinkmann, 1998b: B1).
However, the project was delayed in 1999 while the city searched for $6 million to
support the deal (Schlinkmann, 2000b: C8), and it was set back further in 2001 when
negotiations over property acquisition bogged down, leaving the city in the hole for
another $2.6 million (Bryant, 2001: C8).
The prominence of these sorts of new housing projects in city planning as
opposed to loft development was also reflected in differences of opinion between some
downtown developers and development professionals. One planner who was involved in

194

William, Winter, 2006, UMSL, p. 195

the 1994 plan admitted that he was late to understand the viability of the loft
phenomenon. Officials at the civic organization St. Louis 2004 and key supporters in the
development field such as Richard Baron of McCormick Baron Salazar and Andrew
Trivers, a downtown architect, strongly supported the goals of building new housing in
order to diversify downtown’s residential population (Trivers, 1997: 3B; Stamborski,
1998: B1).
City plans prior to the 1990s included the outlines of a loft strategy even as other
residential and commercial options were the primary backbone of planning objectives.
Even as other city plans were calling for expanded incentives for commercial businesses
on the Washington Avenue loft district (Team Four, Inc., 1980), the 1987 downtown plan
advocated residential conversion of most of the commercial buildings along Washington
from Tucker to 14th Street (Community Development Agency, 1987: 12). The plan
captured the general interest in rehabilitation fostered by a wave of rehabilitation in the
downtown core in the early and mid-1980s. As a part of this, efforts by the Washington
Avenue Redevelopment Corporation (WARC) succeeded in rehabilitation of buildings on
Washington Avenue east of Tucker, namely the Lammert building in 1986. A subsidiary
of the Pantheon Corporation, which had completed large scale renovation projects in the
Central West End and the Skinker DeBaliviere area, WARC produced a plan for the area
in 1983 (Washington Avenue Redevelopment Corporation, 1983) and received city
approval for the plan in 1984. The redevelopment plan emphasized reuse of historic
structures, mostly for commercial and office space, capitalizing on favorable federal tax
incentives that promoted reinvestment in historic structures.
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At the same time, the designation of two Washington Avenue national historic
districts in 1987 created the impetus for preservation and rehabilitation of the structures
(St. Louis Development Corporation, 1987a; St. Louis Development Corporation,
1987b). The nominations, made under contract with the city, identified contributing
historic structures within the districts and designated their significance to Washington
Avenue’s historical role as a commercial and industrial center. The nomination was
followed in 1991 by a redevelopment plan for the district developed jointly by
Landmarks, SLDC and the St. Louis Chapter of the American Institute of Architects (St.
Louis Development Corporation, 1992) that was widely circulated by city development
officials to encourage interest in the district (Prost, 1992c: 1D).
Initial proposals and interest in downtown loft living emphasized a variety of
potential sites (Prost, 1989a: 14A; Prost, 1992e: 1A). However, preliminary proposals for
Washington Avenue concentrated interest in loft living downtown there, and led to an
initial profusion of plans, proposals and scattered redevelopment of property in this
general area. While the city provided a small amount of grant money for projects along
Washington Avenue (Prost, 1991b: 1D), rehabilitation was complicated by the
elimination of federal tax incentives in 1986 that had encouraged rehabilitation and
adaptive reuse in commercial structures. This loss largely shelved redevelopment plans
by the Washington Avenue Redevelopment Corporation, leading to a sale of the company
and its properties, including the Lammert Building, in 1989 (Koman, 1989: 1). With the
decline in the economic feasibility of preservation and the reduction in the value of
downtown property came a new generation of owners of some of the district’s most
significant properties; these owners generally had single buildings or smaller collections
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of property (Sahm, 1991: 14A; Berger, 1991a: 1E; Berger, 1993: 1F; Prost, 1993b: 1B),
and were part of an eclectic group of developers, residents and businesses that actively
promoted the district as an area of cafes, galleries, art loft studios and inexpensive rental
space (Futterman, 1991: 8; Petersen, 1992: 1).
Even with this interest, by the mid-1990s the number of residents in the district
was small and almost entirely renters. The small population and turnover in commercial
establishments reflected the relatively ad-hoc nature of the development effort. One of
the most successful projects, ArtLofts, a 63 unit art studio project completed in 1996,
utilized state low-income tax credits awarded by the Missouri Housing Development
Commission and investment from Boatman’s Bank Community Development
Corporation (Prost, 1995a: 17A). Most other projects were smaller and financed through
less extravagant means. In promoting the district, restaurant and entertainment
establishments noted the relatively cheap space, but acknowledged the lack of evening
traffic (Flannery, 1993: 12). Developers also charged that the city gave little support to
their efforts, and one developer rejected the city’s grant money, claiming that he could
not get clear answers from the city’s development agencies on use of the funds (Prost,
1991c: 3A). Rhetoric often outstripped tangible signs of progress. Numerous projects
started and then stopped—including one where the city had to repurchase from a
developer who had that bought city-owned property but had made no improvements
(Tuft, 1996b: 1A). Additionally, city officials were forced to deal with dangerous or
shoddy work (Tseng, 1999: F8).
The largest owner of property in the district, Larry Deutsch, typifies some of the
characteristics of development in this period. By 1991, Deutsche owned a number of
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buildings in and around Washington Avenue, mostly east of Tucker (Recorder of Deeds,
2005). In 1995, Deutsch fully controlled the Washington Avenue Redevelopment
Corporation, including the development rights guaranteed under the city’s 1984
redevelopment agreement (Secretary of State, 2005). While Deutsch was lauded early as
one of Washington Avenue’s pioneers (Prost, 1991a: 2D; Berger, 1990a: 1D), his onagain/off-again redevelopment plans for such buildings as the Merchandise Mart and the
Bank of St. Louis building as well as attempts to demolish key downtown buildings for
surface parking lots earned him the ire of both preservationists and downtown planners
(Berger, 1991b: 1D). More significantly, Deutsch’s ownership of key buildings and
development rights put him into conflict with city officials and other downtown
stakeholders as development priorities shifted (Cole, 2003: 1). Deutsch’s 12-year battle
with the city-affiliated Technical Assistance Corporation (TAC) held up redevelopment
of the Bank of St. Louis building; ultimately, officials had to let Deutsch exercise his
right to the building in 2004, leading to his sale of the property three months later at a
significant profit (Tucci, 2004: B1; Peterson, 2004: C2). Similarly, Deutsch’s
development rights over the Lennox Hotel site held up convention hotel negotiations until
a state court ruled that his development corporation has relinquished his rights to the
property (Bryant, 1995a: 1B). Deutsch’s ownership of the Merchandise Mart building
ended only after the city agreed to pay $4.3 million for the building in 1998
(“Metrowatch,” 1998: B2).
Harmon and the Downtown Now! Plan
Deutsch was only one of the owners of downtown properties that city officials
would have to confront as development activities peaked after 1997. The owner of the
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Century/Syndicate Trust building just west of the Old Post Office ran afoul of city
officials throughout the 1990s because of a lack of progress on the building; the city’s
Heritage and Urban Design commission blocked demolition in 1995, leading the owner
to install a 10 foot wooden fence around the building (Prost, 1995b: 1B; Mihalopoulos,
1996e: 3B). The fence became a major issue in the 1997 mayoral primary as a sign of
downtown’s decline, with Harmon pledging for force the owner to move it. In part,
owners of vacant buildings in the district felt that their investments should reflect the
added value of property as the incentive for use of the buildings increased, particularly if
the city blocked their attempts to convert their buildings to parking garages and lots. At
the same time, many thought some of the owners were speculators who were holding up
downtown’s progress (Schaenen, 1999: B7; Cole, 2003: 1).
The new Harmon administration’s interest in downtown development caught the
wave of interest in loft living, pushing downtown development to the front of the new
mayor’s agenda. While Harmon’s leadership would quickly come under question—like
Bosley, he would end up a one-term mayor—Harmon’s administration put into place a
number of building blocks of downtown redevelopment. Key among these was a new
round of downtown planning, called Downtown Now!. Despite initial criticism, over a
six-year period the process grew to a regularized method of planning and project
initiation involving public officials, private development officials and downtown
developers and investors. Downtown Now!’s core group oversaw development of the
plan and continued to orchestrate downtown development under Harmon’s successor,
Francis Slay. Downtown Now! officials served as a one-stop-shop for downtown
development, including direct support for public investments in the loft district and
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collaborative problem solving for specific redevelopment projects with private
developers. While roadblocks occurred in the redevelopment process, reflecting both the
difficulties of development and the competing priorities of political and economic
stakeholders, downtown’s new leadership structure maintained key relationships across
the city’s political, business and civic sector, ensuring that critical milestones have been
met. Ultimately, Downtown Now! was part of a broader part of shifting the incentive
structure of investment downtown, creating a stable environment whereby developers,
investors and other entrepreneurs could continue to plan and implement projects, even
when disagreements over priorities emerged.
Despite requests from Bosley’s planning committee to continue their work after
the 1997 mayoral election, Harmon elected to put the planning process on hold.
However, his initial appointments indicated his intention to keep downtown development
on his agenda. Key among them was the designation of Mike Jones as his chief of staff.
A former alderman in the City of St. Louis, corporate executive with Anheuser-Busch
executive, Jones was well known to city politicians and business leaders and also was an
early supporter of Harmon in the mayoral campaign (Manning, 1997b: 1). Jones would
come to play a critical role in Harmon’s administration; he assumed a supervisory role
over SLDC and CDA, and eventually became Harmon’s deputy mayor for development
following the reorganization of the city’s development agencies in 1998.
Harmon also made Jones his representative on Downtown Now!. Joining Jones
as co-chairs of planning process was Richard Fleming, the head of the Regional
Commerce and Growth Association; John Fox Arnold, the chair of the Downtown St.
Louis Partnership; Joanne LaSala, head of St. Louis 2004, and Robert Baer, CEO of
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United Van Lines. Former Republican Senator and Danforth Foundation chair John
Danforth replaced LaSala in December of 1997. Also added as co-chairs in May of 1998
was David Darnell, president of NationsBank Midwest; John Dubinsky, CEO of
Mercantile Bank; Priscilla Hall-Ardoin, president of Southwestern Bell Missouri; Dean
Wolfe, executive vice-president of May Company; and Larry Williams, treasurer of the
City of St. Louis. The planning process also utilized a fifteen-member management
committee comprising staff at various downtown stakeholder organizations and city
agencies to manage the planning process and provide staff support. A task force of about
50 people—comprising stakeholders, residents, building owners and downtown
investors—was additionally formed to act as an advisory organization for completing and
approving the plan. (The task force ultimately grew to about 150 persons before the
Downtown Now! Master Plan was released in June of 1999.)
At the initiation, Jones placed a six-month deadline for the planning process,
stating that the goal was to create specific and doable projects to revitalize downtown.
Jones also stated that planning leaders had already decided that downtown housing and
jumpstarting the Washington Avenue Loft District would be top priorities for Downtown
Now! (Schlinkmann, 1997a: 2B). After a series of public and private meetings, the group
returned with an initial action plan in January of 1998. Recommendations sought further
private investment in the downtown core and more specific times such as instituting a
downtown safety and beautification corps (Downtown Now!, 1997: 6-7; Prost, 1998c:
B1). The report affirmed that development downtown would be market-driven, with
public investments to complement and encourage private developers. As significantly,
the Downtown Now! team indicated that it would continue more specific planning,
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including hiring consultants and other planning officials to conduct a second series of
meetings to flesh out plan priorities. The consultants included local firms such as Trivers
Associates, Development Strategies, and David Mason and Associates, a minority
architectural team, and the national planning and architectural firm EDAW. After
announcement of the report and follow-up planning process, NationsBank announced it
would fund half of the $950,000 cost as a part of $100 million commitment towards
downtown revival (Prost, 1998b: A1; Prost, 1998c: B1). Other contributors would
include Southwestern Bell Corporation and the Danforth Foundation.
Early Downtown Now! efforts and the emphasis on residential development
downtown were bolstered by complementary reports conducted by its partnering
organizations. A January 1998 study conducted for St. Louis 2004 by Zimmerman/Volk
Associates concluded that downtown could absorb about 500 units of new or rehabbed
residential housing downtown each year and recommended a number of potential sites for
downtown housing, including Washington Avenue (Parish, 1998c: B1). A second study
by the same firm in July of 1998 conducted for the Downtown St. Louis Partnership
completed initial feasibility estimates on various sites and called for the creation of a onestop center to assist in residential development (Prost, 1998f: C2).
Additional work and meetings of the consultant and leadership led to the creation
of Downtown Now!’s “First Directions” report in June of 1998, released to the public in a
series of public meetings in July and again in September. Also called the Downtown
Action Plan Phase II, the report organized short and long term objective in downtown
development around four key goals: downtown as a 24 hour urban center; downtown as
a cultural and entertainment center; downtown as an educational and technological
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center; and downtown as a connected, pedestrian oriented urban place (Downtown Now!,
1998b: np). The plan divided the downtown area into subdistricts, but concentrated on
providing broad planning goals and development recommendations on four main
districts: Washington Avenue, the Old Post Office/CBD Core, Laclede’s
Landing/Riverside North, and the Mall area (Downtown Now! 1998b: np). Another set
of public meetings in December of 1998 provided initial cost estimates for projects in the
four project areas (Downtown Now!, 1998c: np) and follow-up meetings in March of
1999 reviewed streetscape and urban design standards for key streets in the downtown
area, including a proposal to narrow Market Street (Downtown Now!, 1999: np). Finally,
after public “Studies Review” held in May of 1999 (Downtown Now!, 1999b), the
Downtown Now! Master Plan was released in June (Downtown Now!, 1999c).
The Downtown Now! Master Plan reaffirmed four major themes for downtown—
downtown’s residential, economic, education and cultural importance—and detailed
major development districts in the downtown area, particularly the importance of the
Washington Avenue Loft District and the Old Post Office District (Downtown Now!,
1999c: 6-10). The plan incorporated an open space framework plan—detailing among
other things improvements to the Gateway Mall—and transportation framework plan—
proposing interstate improvements to I-70 downtown leading to a Mississippi River
Bridge to the north (Downtown Now!. 1999c: 11-12). Year one priority actions for the
Washington Avenue Loft District included a goal for beginning major streetscape
improvements to Washington Avenue west of Tucker by 2000, issuing an RFP for the
Merchandise Mart, and jumpstarting three to five loft conversions in the district
(Downtown Now!, 1999c: 18). The year one action plan for the Old Post Office District
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called for securing ownership over critical buildings, issuing a request for proposals of
revitalization for the buildings, and finalizing plans for Webster University’s use of the
Old Post Office space (Downtown Now!, 1999c: 20). The plan also detailed plans for
new residential communities on Laclede’s Landing in the North Riverfront area mirrored
on similar townhouse developments developed in Alexandria, VA, and Milwaukee, WI
(Downtown Now!, 1999c: 21).
Financial Incentives and Downtown Development
Downtown Now!’s implementation efforts were significantly shaped by the
introduction in the fall of 1997 of state-level historic preservation tax credits, which
dramatically improved the feasibility of loft projects. The idea of a state-level incentive
for reinvestment in historic properties first emerged at a 1996 meeting between board
members of Landmarks Association and the Downtown St. Louis Partnership. Efforts to
introduce legislation began when the legislature reconvened early in 1997 (Prost, 1997a:
1B). The legislation called for a state tax credit for 25% of eligible rehabilitation costs
for eligible historic properties—either qualifying properties in historic districts or
properties on the National Register of Historic Places. In an attempt to cast the credit as
broader than just an urban redevelopment effort, the effort was ostensibly led by a
statewide coalition of preservation organizations, and rural legislators promoting the
credit noted it would assist redevelopment in the state’s smaller towns (Prost, 1997b: 2C).
However, Landmarks Association board member Jerry Schlichter and the organization’s
director Carolyn Toft largely carried the campaign forward. Schlichter, a local lawyer,
had also been involved in preservation efforts in the 1980s and had been one of the
property owners who had been badly impacted by the loss of federal historic tax credits
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in 1986. RCGA also assisted the campaign by placing the proposal on its legislative
agenda, lobbying for the bill in Jefferson City and also discussing the legislation with
Missouri Governor Mel (Janecke, 1997: 2).
While the initiative quickly gained the support of mayoral candidate Clarence
Harmon (Williams, 1997: 8A), according to those involved in the campaign for the
credits, local political officials were not closely involved in the legislative efforts. The
proposal was quickly taken up as a part of the session’s emphasis on state economic
development. However, in the state Senate the proposal got lumped into a broader
economic development proposal that combined the tax credit with other economic
development proposals, including a sales tax cut and other tax credit measures, pushing
the cost of the measure $70 million beyond the size that the Governor wanted. The bill
survived legislative maneuvering, receiving final House approval in May (Young, 1997a:
9A), but the governor vetoed the bill in July, citing one part of the bill detailing revisions
in the state’s tax increment financing program as “dangerous to our fiscal integrity”
(Young, 1997b: 1A). Even with the veto, the state tax credit had attracted little
opposition, and Carnahan pledged support for it in calling for a special legislative session
in the fall of 1997 (Young, 1997c: 1B). This time, city officials increased their lobbying
efforts in support of the legislation, appointing a former state representative to lead the
lobbying for the bill (Berger, 1997: 1E). The bill won support in the Senate, and
Carnahan signed the bill in September (Young, 1997d: 1C).
Passage of the credit was lauded among downtown boosters (Boyle, 1997: B7)
and immediately incorporated in a number of key downtown projects, including the new
convention center hotel. Since that point, virtually no project downtown has been
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accomplished without the credit; all loft projects have used it, specifically the ability to
syndicate the credit to bring additional financing into projects. This use created a market
for the credit that a number of local banks have pursued, with several opening downtown
offices to purchase and sell credits nationwide and to oversee downtown investments
(Manning, 1998: 2). Downtown developers state that without the credits many
downtown loft projects would have been very difficult if not impossible.
Additionally, the credits fit the model of development emerging downtown by
supplementing but not replacing private investments; use of the credits rested upon the
financial feasibility of the project as determined by private developers. In this sense,
historic tax credits, and project-based tax-increment financing, avoided the political
difficulties of the use of other public incentives available to downtown developers.
Indeed, CDBG funds have been rarely used in downtown loft developments. A plan by
one developer to apply for CDBG funds ran up against the opposition of developers as
well as city development officials who understood the use would set a politically
explosive precedent (Tucci, 1999a: 2).
On the state level, the political popularity of the historic tax credits has made it
difficult to repeal, even with state budget woes and a majority Republican legislature in
2003 (“Use a Scalpel, Not an Ax,” 2003: C12; Evans, 2005c: C1). One illustration of the
political successes of the credit can be seen in contrast to the other major initiative for
public support for downtown projects, the use tax campaign waged in 1999 and 2000.
That campaign, sponsored by Downtown Now! and St. Louis 2004, came directly from
the estimated $1.5 billion cost of the downtown plan. Early proponents of the tax stated
that the idea came from a best practices trip undertaken by regional leaders in 1999 to
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Denver sponsored by RCGA, whose director, Richard Fleming, had been director of a
similar downtown initiative there (Tucci, 1999b: 1). A December, 1999, plan proposed
increasing the sales tax 4/10th percent in St. Louis City and St. Louis County to fund
public improvements—sidewalks, lighting, parking, streetscape improvements and
security—in the downtown area and tapped former Senators Eagleton and Danforth to
lead the campaign (Tucci, 1999c: 1). The proposal required state legislative support
followed by a vote of residents of the two areas. However, the idea hit early opposition,
both from Republican leaders in the state house as well as county representatives (Prost,
2000a: B1; Bell Jr., 2000: B2). Both county Republicans and urban Democrats wanted to
use the funds for other older, urban neighborhoods (Stern, 2000: E1; Mannies, 2000: A1).
Because of this, the measure failed to get out of the state Senate in April, and backers had
to admit that the plan was dead.
The use of other major incentives, like low-income housing tax credits, faced
similar obstacles to widespread application downtown. First, the mayor’s office had to
specifically request the credits for the project in the face of the competing need for the
credits elsewhere in the city, including HOPE VI public housing conversion credits.
Secondly, use of the credit evoked reactions from some downtown developers who
wanted the city to emphasis the district’s market-rate housing (Prost, 2001e: C1).
Ultimately, securing additional public investment in downtown—whether low income tax
credits for lofts, empowerment zone bonding for the new convention center hotel, or state
investment board bonds for the Old Post Office District—required broader political
effort, including that activated around the Downtown Now! plan.
Downtown Now! and Local Civic Actors
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In financial as well as institutional terms, historic tax credits were a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for downtown development. Changing the financial calculation
on loft projects is only one portion of the redevelopment of downtown; as important were
the increasing capacity of downtown developers and the ability of a broader network of
downtown stakeholders to support their work. One of the important components of the
Downtown Now! agenda is its ability to intervene in downtown development in the face
of roadblocks. Some downtown stakeholders, including some of who were members of
the Downtown Now! task force, questioned the need for more planning, particularly the
$1 million cost associated with the plan (Prost, 1998c: B1). Some participants in public
meetings were dissatisfied with the level of detail provided to the public about plans
(“Consultants Hired by City Show Their First Drafts of Ideas to Revitalize Downtown;
Final Plan isn’t Ready, Project Manager Says,” 1998: B3) and about the proposed $1
billion cost of improvements (Hillig, 1998: B2); behind the scenes, discussions around
project priorities led to vigorous debates and recriminations (Berger, 1998: A2; Berger,
1999a: A2). Disputes over the plan spilled out in the public during the planning process,
including visible disagreements between the mayor and planners over what to do with the
Gateway Mall (Schlinkmann, 1999b: B3) and disagreements with plan priorities after the
release of the Master Plan (Prost, 1999c: B1). The planning process ran out of money
mid-way in 1998; rewriting of key sections of the plan delayed its release until spring of
2000 (Berger, 2000: A2). Other cracks within the planning process appeared as
partnering organizations jockeyed for prominence and credit claiming in the plan and its
implementation (Prost, 1998f: C2; Berger, 1999b: A2; Berger, 1999e: A2). In interviews
five years after the plan’s initiation, some downtown developers continued to question
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the effectiveness of the Downtown Now! process and whether its implementation made
much difference.
The strategic, and some would say limited, role of Downtown Now! in
implementation of the master plan is a function of both the composition of the
downtown’s stakeholders and the nature of development initiatives downtown. Given the
competing interests, programs and priorities, some level of competition is to be expected
among planning participants and downtown developers; one of the key roles in the
implementation phase was to minimize conflicts. Some level of personality and
organizational conflicts was only resolved with the resignation of Kim Kimbrough from
the Downtown St. Louis Partnership in 2001. As importantly was the designation in
October of 1999 of a principal implementing staff person, W. Thomas Reeves, former
head of lending at Mercantile Bank (“Ex-Bank Official Will Lead Downtown Now,”
1999: B2). Reeves brought to the job both specific familiarity with downtown projects;
he had worked with Deputy Mayor Jones in putting together the financing for the new
convention center hotel (Schlinkmann, 1999e: B1) and, according to participants, had
served as Mercantile’s representative on the Downtown Now! planning process, playing
particularly important roles in developing options for the Old Post Office District
(Berger, 1999c: A2). Reeves’ background in banking brought a new level of confidence
to downtown efforts among corporate officials and actors. His presence was particularly
important in building confidence among local bankers in investing in downtown loft
projects; he assisted local developers in regularizing their development financing plans,
creating a standardized template for loft development and marketing that template to
banks, investors and other financial entities.
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The primary role of Downtown Now! staff was to coordinate and utilize the
activities of downtown partners, recruit and oversee the work of professionals in
problem-solving activities, and remain a visible point person for downtown progress on
Washington Avenue and the Old Post Office. Like the campaign for tax credits led by
Landmarks, activities in support of revitalization predate Downtown Now!’s
implementation phase but intensified after Reeves’ appointment. In terms of civic sector
participants, critical roles were played through the mobilization of business, political, and
civic leaders in a regional assessment and planning process that began with the Peirce
Report process in 1996 and 1997 and continued with St. Louis 2004.
The Peirce Report—a week long series of articles in March of 1997 by urban
experts Neal Peirce and Curtis Johnson appearing in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch—was a
deliberate attempt on the part of RCGA leader Richard Fleming to initiate a conversation
about the future of the St. Louis region. Fleming, who came to St. Louis in September of
1994, put the development of a regional consensus at the top of his agenda (Flannery,
1994: 1E). Fleming’s previous stint in Denver, where he had spearheaded a
redevelopment initiative of the Lower Denver (LoDo) area made him particularly attuned
to the importance to downtown development. Fleming also initiated a series of regional
leadership exchange trips that took a cross section of St. Louis political, business and
civic leadership to other American cities to explore how they approached revitalization
and to bring those best practices to St. Louis.
Prior to the 1996 trip to Cleveland, Fleming approached Peirce and Johnson, who
had conducted regional assessments in other cities (O’Neil, 1996: 1B). Peirce also
participated in the Cleveland leadership trip, where participants pledged their support to a
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similar undertaking in St. Louis to develop a regional assessment (Mihalopoulos, 1996a:
4B). Joining the RCGA in supporting the Peirce report initiative was the William T
Kemper Foundation, the charitable arm of the local Commerce Bank, and the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch. Post-Dispatch editor Cole Campbell saw the report as a part of the
newspaper’s vision of service to the region in the form of “public journalism”—an
ongoing series of reporting and analysis that discussed local initiatives and assisted in
local problem-solving (Peirce and Johnson, 1997a: 1B; Campbell, 1997: 1B).
Peirce and Johnson’s research in the region took all of fall and winter of 1996-97
and involved staff at RCGA and key contacts across the region. The report, published
over eight days beginning on March 9, 1997, covered a number of key themes, including
the area’s regional fragmentation, the declining role of corporate and civic actors, the
lack of racial trust and cooperation, and St. Louis’ deficiency in terms of neighborhoodbased development initiatives. The report also stressed the role of downtown as the
region’s “common ground” and highlighted Denver’s downtown revitalization efforts
(Peirce and Johnson, 1997b: 1A). Additionally, the two consultants called for the newly
created St. Louis 2004 to take leadership in transforming St. Louis through a new round
of “civic experimentation” (Peirce and Johnson, 1997d: 1B).
The Peirce Report launched a series of meetings and debates about St. Louis,
(“Group Follows Report,” 1997: 9B; Desloge, 1997: 1). The report reemphasized the
importance of downtown and was followed by calls to start the area’s revitalization with
a focus on downtown (“Start City's Revitalization with Downtown,” 1997: 3B). By far,
the most significant outcome from the report was the boost given to St. Louis 2004 as an
organization to continue discussions and start the process of defining implementation
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strategies (LaSala and Danforth, 1997: 3B). St. Louis 2004 had a sprawling and, some
would say, overambitious agenda for the region encompassing all aspects of regional
life—from community and economic development, to medical access and educational
reform, to recreation and green spaces. The effort was itself the outcome of a deliberate
call on the part of civic leaders; in a speech in January of 1996, Andrew Craig, outgoing
president of Civic Progress and chair of Boatman’s Bank, called for a series of task forces
to plan events and improvements to culminate in a celebration of the city’s 1904 World’s
Fair in 2004 (Craig, 1996: 5B). The speech was written by Alfred Kerth, a public
relations official at Fleishman-Hillard, and the main staff person for Civic Progress;
Kerth played an influential role in promoting the concept of St. Louis 2004 before
stepping back from the process in September of 1996.
Kerth’s exit from 2004 brought former Republican Senator John Danforth in as
chairman of the organization and JoAnne LaSala, a senior vice president at FleishmanHillard, as the organization’s first director (Lindecke, 1996: 4A). A month later, Peter
Sortino, a lobbyist with the mayor’s office who had experience locally, statewide and
nationally, joined as vice president of governmental affairs; the staff grew to 15 members
with a budget of $2.3 million. The new team retooled the effort’s public outreach,
creating a series of action teams around key regional issues (Tucci, 1996: 1) and hosting a
series of “visioning” sessions in December of 1996 to gather public input (Mihalopoulos,
1996f: 1D). 2004 staff presented preliminary concepts and released a comprehensive set
of regional priorities in January of 1998 (Schlinkmann, 1998a: C1)
Danforth’s position at St. Louis 2004 was more than just honorific. First, he
brought his name and his energy to the 2004 process and to promoting the organization
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and its plan including downtown redevelopment efforts. On a personal level, Danforth
quickly became a prominent player in the downtown efforts, providing funding for the
effort through the Danforth Foundation, and promoting downtown redevelopment in a
variety of forums (“Cheap Loans? Banks Say, ‘No Way’”, 1997: 6B; Volland, 1997: 1B;
Danforth, 2001: C19). Danforth became a co-chair of the Downtown Now! plan as well
as a board member for the reorganized Downtown St. Louis Partnership. Additionally,
Danforth used his political connections both statewide and in Washington to lobby on
behalf of downtown initiatives; Jefferson City initiatives included lobbying for special
district status for downtown in 1998 (Danforth, 1998: B5), the regional tax campaign of
1999/2000 (Tucci, 1999c: 1) and a new Cardinal ballpark (Ganey, 2002: B3). Danforth
also lobbied Washington for support, including funding for improvements to the loft
district and new uses for the Old Post Office (Shesgreen, 1999: A5). According to
observers, Danforth’s access to Washington provided the impetus for a $4 million federal
appropriation sponsored by Republican Senator Kit Bond, leading to a total of $17.3
million in pedestrian and street improvements along Washington Avenue.
Also significant was the input of Peter Sortino, who took over as president of the
organization in December of 1999. Sortino brought significant political contacts to the
organization, particularly in the Board of Aldermen (“The Bosley Record,” 1997: 9A).
Even prior to LaSala’s resignation, observers report that Sortino was the point person on
downtown development; he came to serve as one of the three members of a downtown
brain trust that meet weekly to discuss downtown issues and that included Reeves from
Downtown Now! and, after the 2001 mayoral elections, Barbara Geisman, the deputy
mayor for development.
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The intervention of Danforth in downtown issues allowed him to commit the
resources of the Danforth Foundation to planning and redevelopment initiatives. The
Danforth Foundation, capitalized by family wealth from the Ralston-Purina Corporation,
was the largest private foundation in St. Louis, with total assets of more than $400
million dollars (Tucci, 1998b: 1). The role of the foundation in St. Louis initiatives
heightened after Danforth assumed chairmanship of the foundation in the spring of 1997
and the foundation announced that it was changing its mission from a nationally oriented
educational foundation to a foundation focused exclusively on the St. Louis region
(Editorial, 1997a: 6B; Danforth Foundation, 1997: 11). The change in the mission
brought significant resources to local projects, as well as the interest of the foundation’s
board and staff. In announcing the change, foundation leaders noted “a renewed sense of
optimism in the region” and specifically mentioned St. Louis 2004 as a sign of
willingness among St. Louis area citizens in defining and solving a number of the
region’s major problems (Danforth Foundation, 1997: 12). Danforth intended the change
to break the generally apathetic pattern of local philanthropy towards local needs and set
a precedent for other locally based funders (Tucci, 1998a: 1).
Foundation resources would be significant for a whole host of 2004 related
projects, including restoration of Forest Park, neighborhood planning in the
JeffVanderLou community, and development of the region’s biotech sector. However, it
was in downtown activities that the foundation’s support was most strategically applied.
Even prior to this change, the foundation was a funder of start-up activities of St. Louis
2004 (Mihalopoulos, 1996c: 1D; Danforth Foundation, 1997: 43). The foundation
committed $1 million annually after 1997 to the organization, the largest portion of the
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group’s $2.5 million annual budget (Mihalopoulos, 1998b: C1; Danforth Foundation,
1998: 18; Danforth Foundation, 1999: 31; Danforth Foundation, 2000: 25).
Danforth Foundation resources also became integral to Downtown Now!
implementation of the plan, particularly around the Old Post Office. In contrast to St.
Louis 2004, the foundation consciously held its activities and the specifics of its
investments in a private manner. However, comments of observers and participants in
downtown development provide some clues. The clearest part of the picture has been the
ongoing support of the Danforth Foundation for implementation of the Downtown Now!
plan, beginning with a $1.4 million investment in for the 2000-2001 program year
(Danforth Foundation, 2001: 24). The foundation also provided $1 million in support of
Downtown Now! in the 2001-2002 program year (Danforth Foundation, 2002: 32),
$715,000 in 2002-2003 program year (Danforth Foundation, 2003: 3), and $375,000 in
the 2003-2004 program year (Danforth Foundation, 2004: 7). Downtown Now! staff
indicate that the first year of funding came only after a submission of a detailed plan of
activities demonstrating how the funds would be used and matched.
Additionally, the Danforth Foundation used other funds, both grants and direct
contracts with the organization, to support the work of professionals in development
projects as well as direct investments in downtown projects, mostly around the Old Post
Office (OPO) District. Danforth funds paid $123,000 for a series of a feasibility studies
on Webster University’s proposed use of the Old Post Office building as a downtown site
for classes (Danforth Foundation, 1999: 31; Prost, 2000d: B1). Over the course of 2001
and 2002, foundation activities paid for a series of professionals to the OPO plan, an
amount totaling just over $200,000 (Danforth Foundation, 2001: 23; Danforth
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Foundation, 2002: 31). The foundation’s investments in the district culminated with the
purchase of Missouri Development Finance Board tax credits after the finance board
approved the development plan for the area in November of 2002. The cost of this
investment was $4.3 million for the 2003-2004 period (Danforth Foundation, 2004: 7) of
a projected $8 million dollar total investment. The foundation also made a $900,000 loan
to the developers of the Merchandise Mart, providing the final and only cash investment
in the stalled project (Danforth Foundation, 2002: 43; “Investing in Urban Miracles,”
2001: C18), and made a series of loans to Downtown Now! in 2002 totaling $785,000 to
support the organization’s redevelopment efforts around the Old Post Office District
(Danforth Foundation, 2002: 43).
Development professionals interviewed indicate that the prestige of the
foundation became a critical component in implementation of key parts of the downtown
plan, including the investment of resources to gain site control of property from
speculators whose ownership of buildings has stymied past development plans.
Foundation resources attracted other development professionals to the projects, including
lawyers from Bryan Cave, where John Danforth practiced, and financing strategists with
a history of completing difficult projects. These requests often came through other
parties. For example, in his capacity as one of Danforth’s “chief of staff” for downtown,
Al Kerth directly recruited real estate financing guru Steven Stogel to help resuscitate the
Old Post Office project (Stogel, 2005). Downtown Now! director Reeves’ connections
with officials at DESCO led to the commercial real estate development firm’s
participation in the OPO project.
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The support of the foundation was critical to Downtown Now!’s ability to foster
investments in projects, particularly those around the Old Post Office, by acting as an
incentive for additional contributions and investments by other corporations and
charitable organizations. After his appointment, Reeves became the point-person for
both accessing and pointing the use of these resources. One of Reeves’ principal tasks as
he assumed the position was securing additional commitments to the implementation
process, financial as well as in-kind resources. These resources built the capital available
to Downtown Now!; the organization was able to make direct investments into the OPO
District, including purchasing an adjacent building in 2000 (Berger, 2000: A2) and
borrowing $10 million to support predevelopment work on the OPO project (Prost,
2002d: E1).
Downtown’s Evolution: From Harmon to Slay
Danforth Foundation resources and resources from other business and civic
organizations interested in downtown redevelopment operated as a quasi-privatized form
of public investments in key downtown projects. These sets of resources were deployed
privately and in a relatively unobtrusive, behind-the-scenes manner to resolve difficult
ownership issues and jump-start highly leveraged but critical projects. The funds
complement other, more-explicitly public-sector resources, which also were generally
overseen by the same Downtown Now! leadership team. Most visible among these were
the funds dedicated to streetscape improvements undertaken along Washington Avenue.
The improvements were detailed in the July 1999 Downtown Now! Master Plan, with
schematics and construction documents on the first phase of the project due shortly and
construction to begin in 2000. The $17.3 million project included $4 million in federal
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aid committed by Senator Kit Bond during his 1998 election bid, $3 million from a
regional transportation fund, and over $10 million in federal transportation funds
managed by the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council (Schlinkmann, 1999d: A1).
The plan, released in December of 1999, after a series of public planning meetings, called
for wider, tree-lined sidewalks for outdoor seating, a new public plaza adjacent to
Washington Avenue, new street signage and street lamps, and decorative paving
throughout the area (Prost, 1999d: A1).
Developers and building owners hoped that the improvements would create a
“domino effect” for private investment in the area (Schlinkmann, 1999d: A1); however,
delays in the project depressed business activity, severely restricted access in the area and
pushed the project far past its optimistic 2000 starting date. Part of the delay stemmed
from the resignation in June of 2000 of SLDC’s principal planner with expertise in
streetscape improvements (Prost, 2000f: D1). In addition, the project stalled as complex
city, state and federal requirements for the use of the funds taxed the time and resources
of the city’s Board of Public Service (Prost, 2001b: C1).
Delays in the project became a minor issue in the run-up to the 2001 mayoral
campaign and renewed persistent questions about Mayor Harmon’s leadership style. One
hundred days into his administration, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch released the first in a
series of editorials about Harmon’s leadership, calling for a return to the momentum for
change his primary victory reflected and noting that Harmon’s “rather phlegmatic
personality” may make rekindling that spark “not an easy task” (“Mayor Harmon: 100
Days and Counting,” 1997: 2B). A press report in the fall of 1997 stated that Harmon’s
honeymoon “appears to be over” as regional officials criticized Harmon over his lack of

218

William, Winter, 2006, UMSL, p. 219

leadership and vision in a failed MetroLink campaign (Tucci, 1997: 1). The report also
indicated what would become a persistent criticism of Harmon’s apolitical style, that is,
his seeming inability to make a decision and follow through with it.
Connected to these criticisms were changes among the city’s development
officials that hampered Harmon’s administrative control. Reports of Maureen McAvey’s
“abrupt” resignation in June of 1998 cited the lack of a “common goal” on city efforts,
but did not specifically target Harmon (Tucci, 1998: 1). The inability to appoint a new
director, and Harmon’s protracted campaign to redesign the development agencies, left
downtown development effort in the lurch at a time when Downtown Now! was in the
process of issuing its master plan. One public criticism called the delay in leadership
“criminal” at a time when momentum and incentives existed to heighten development
efforts (“City Hall Stands Still,” 1999: B2). Harmon’s appointment of a new CDA
director without consultation with his top development officials led one editorial writer to
suggest that administration appointments were “starting to resemble the deck chairs on
the Titanic” (“Outrageous Developments,” 1999c: 32). Another editorial early in 2000
stated that “on matters large and small, Mr. Harmon has too often come up short” and
that “Harmon may still end up a one-term mayor” (“The Leadership Problem,” 2000:
B2).
One participant in city development matters at that time indicated that part of
these public concerns about the mayor’s leadership came from the private comments of
his chief aide, Michael Jones. By 1999, it was common for Jones to express exacerbation
with the mayor in planning meetings with downtown stakeholders. Declining relations
between the two individuals marred the ability of Jones to effectively represent Harmon
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in development negotiations. These tensions came to a head in November of 2000, when
a disagreement between the two came public and Harmon abruptly fired Jones. While
Harmon refused to discuss the matter, others stated that the firing came after Jones
privately questioned Harmon’s intention to reverse his support for the Merchandise Mart
deal (Schlinkmann, 2000c: C1). Jones’ departure left the city without a permanent head
of SLDC or an experienced deputy mayor for development; it also left unfinished and
uncertain a host of important development initiatives, including concluding final details
of the convention hotel project and completion of a couple pending downtown projects,
including city assistance on loft projects.
While Harmon did recruit someone to take over Jones’ spot in the convention
hotel negotiations, Jones’ dismissal heightened criticisms of Harmon as an ineffective
leader at the same time the mayor began a campaign for re-election. Ultimately, the
perception that Harmon’s administration was just a caretaker combined with the
opposition of two strong candidates in the 2001 Democratic primary sealed Harmon’s
fate. Harmon received only 5% of the vote, with Francis Slay, the current President of
the Board of Alderman beating both him and former mayor Freeman Bosley Jr.
Slay’s victory in 2001 provided both a continuity to Downtown Now! efforts and
reestablished strong political and administrative support to downtown efforts. In one
sense, the Slay administration’s abilities are predicated on the political and civic energy
invested in the past four years, particularly in the completion of the convention center
hotel project. On the other hand, Slay quickly prioritized and organized his activities and
brought in a management team that could reestablish city government’s supportive role in
development projects. Slay wisely utilized Harmon’s leadership structure, particularly
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the central role of the deputy mayor for development, appointing Barbara Geisman to the
job. Geisman had experience as both an aide to a former aldermanic president and as a
development professional both in the private and not-for-profit world, including
development of a loft building on Washington Avenue. Geisman and Slay eschewed a
lengthy and protracted battle to reorganize the development agencies. Instead, according
to one downtown observer, they relied on philanthropic support to conduct national
searches for new directors of SLDC, CDA and the Planning and Development Agency.
This led to the designation of permanent directors of each of the development agencies,
including a high profile hire of a former bank executive from Chicago as head of SLDC
(Moore, 2002a: C2).
Geisman’s role downtown was to provide strong public sector leadership for
advancing development projects, and observers both within the public agencies and in the
broader development community credit her for her ability to manage multiple project
details. While her attention to detail has brought private charges of micro-management,
it has just as often brought praise in solving what seemed to insurmountable obstacles
(Prost, 2001c: B1). In terms of downtown, Geisman early on indicated her support for
the Downtown Now! plan and the market-driven direction that the plan proposed (Prost,
2001d: B5). She became one of three leaders who met weekly—along with Reeves and
2004’s Peter Sortino—to manage Downtown Now! implementation. Geisman is also
credited by observers in creating a stable permit review process for loft development
inside the city’s building division and also creating mechanisms for more effectively
using TIF funds for loft projects.
Institutional Stability and the Old Post Office Project
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Geisman faced conflict of interest charges over her association with the
Washington Avenue project because she was a property owner and developer in the area
where the improvements would be made. However, she quickly took over the role that
Jones had established, assuring that Downtown Now! projects would continue to
advance. The improvements that she made in securing public financing and approval for
loft projects also matched the primary emphasis of downtown development: the
redevelopment of loft spaces by individual developers and entrepreneurs. At the same
time, Geisman walked into the continuing debate over the Old Post Office (OPO) District
and the need to bring the plan to conclusion.
Downtown Now! participants viewed the Old Post Office as another critical
lynchpin for downtown redevelopment, akin to the convention hotel deal, and a problem
that had to be solved in order to establish a context for redevelopment of the properties
around the post office. Among all the other Downtown Now! projects, the plan most
tested the stability of Downtown Now!, both its vision for downtown and its ability to
muster agreement and movement on downtown development. The fact that the plan
emerged and moved into implementation even with the disagreement of some downtown
stakeholders indicates the ability of Downtown Now! as both a planning process and a
leadership to enforce consent over downtown development. Additionally, the ability to
move the project forward shows the changing nature of incentives impacting downtown
development; even with profound disagreements, critics of the project saw the utility of
their continued participation and progress on individual projects.
Downtown Now! planners recognized early in the planning process that the Old
Post Office’s historical importance did not take away from the building’s issues in terms
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of adaptive reuse. Following struggles to maintain the building and stave off demolition
of the structure in the 1960s, the federal government renovated the property and opened
the building as government office space in 1982. By 1997, security considerations as
well as the opening of more modern office space elsewhere downtown limited the
effectiveness of the building (Prost, 1997e: 5B), and the federal GSA announced its
intention to either sell or board up the property as surplus property (Prost, 1997d: 1A).
Compounding problems with the use of the OPO were surrounding vacant buildings,
including the Paul Brown/Arcade/Wright buildings to the south and the
Century/Syndicate Trust to the west.
The federal Government Services Administration (GSA) put an October of 1997,
deadline for renovation proposals, the deadline was extended until the end of the year
after no proposals emerged. City officials saw the proposals as preliminary in light of the
Downtown Now! planning process that released its “First Directions” in January of 1997.
Downtown Now!’s initial ideas on the building fit within the institutional design of the
building and fed into the increased interest in the building by Webster University (Prost,
1998h: D3). Webster’s discussions with the GSA over the building became public in
June of 1998 (Prost, 1998e: A7), and were prompted by Danforth Foundation funds for
feasibility studies on the possible reuse.
Downtown Now!’s September, 1998, presentations on the OPO District utilized
Webster University’s potential reuse for the building with three options for use of the
surrounding buildings; two of the options planned demolition of parts of the
Arcade/Wright building in place of a new office building, an urban square, or a
combination of both (Downtown Now!, 1998b: np). Observers stated that proposed

223

William, Winter, 2006, UMSL, p. 224

demolition of the structures was the most controversial part of the proposals; these
competing opinions led Downtown Now! planners to assemble a special team to review
options for the OPO district prior to the release of the Downtown Now! Action Plan in
May of 1999 (Prost, 1999b: D1). Partly as a salve, the May action plan included both
plans for partial removal of the Paul Brown building to the south as well as options that
maintained all existing buildings in the district (Downtown Now!, 1999b: np). The
master plan released two months later also largely punted final decisions on the district’s
configuration, calling for technical and feasibility studies to examine uses and final plans
for buildings in the area (Downtown Now!, 1999c: 20).
The framework of the master plan for the district provided a context for further
decision-making about the area, largely led by Downtown Now! implementation partners
and private developers in the area. The purchase of the Paul Brown building by Pyramid
Construction, a private commercial development company, largely answered questions
about the probable reuse of that building (Prost, 1999e: C10); Pyramid’s announcement
of an option to purchase of the adjacent Arcade/Wright building likewise took the
building off the table for demolition or use as a parking facility (Prost, 2000c: C1).
Additionally, the entrance of Steve Stogel, a legal and financial real estate expert, and
Mark Schnuck, president of the local commercial development company DESCO,
occurred as Webster’s plans for the building hit a roadblock. Initial feasibility studies on
the reuse indicated that the cost of maintaining the facility would be enormous (Prost,
2000d: B1); the university’s preference of renting space and not owning the building was
not the preference of GSA, which wanted a new ownership team to own, rehabilitate and
manage the building.
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Stogel came by invitation of the Danforth Foundation through Al Kerth in the
summer of 2000; he first attended meetings at Webster University about reuse of the
building in August of 2000. Schnuck was invited downtown by Reeves, who gave him a
tour of the area in March of 2000 and introduced him to some of the developers working
on projects. Both brought a significant amount of experience in commercial
development. Stogel in particular had the reputation for completing difficult deals that no
one else could close. Stogel served as vice president of the residential development firm
McCormick Baron throughout much of the 1980s. In 1990, he became the principal staff
member of the Technical Assistance Corporation (TAC), a private development company
funded by Civic Progress to complete development projects on behalf of the city (“The
Right Tack for Troubled Properties,” 1990b: 2B). TAC was responsible for rescuing
multi-family residential properties that were having problems, as well as a plan to reach
closure on the Gateway Mall plan (Prost, 1992a: 1D). Some of TAC’s work included
negotiations over downtown buildings, including the Bank of America building and the
Arcade/Wright. While Bosley initiated changes in city policies distancing TAC from the
city’s development agencies in 1993, Stogel continued his work in local real estate
matters through his own firm, the DFC Group, including work on behalf of the developer
of the convention center hotel.
A lawyer as well as a seasoned development professional, Stogel combined the
capacity to negotiate and craft development deals with the ability to ferret out
institutional, private and public investments for projects. When the convention hotel deal
lost its chief financing in March of 1999, it was Stogel who stepped in to put back
together the multi-million dollar financing package, including over $107 million in
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private financing and a projected $80 to $100 in public financing incentives
(Schlinkmann, 1999c: A1). Stogel also brought to the table close political relationships
with state Democrats and Democratic officeholders, including Governor Bob Holden
who was elected in November of 2000 (Mannies, 1999c: B1; Manning, 2000: 1). When
it became clear that Webster’s plan for the building would be insufficient to guarantee
investment in the building, Stogel and Schnuck formed a partnership and initiated a
second phase of planning for reuse of the building and the surrounding district (Tucci,
2000: 1).
Unlike the Downtown Now! planning process, subsequent investigations
revolving around the reuse of the property were conducted largely out of public view.
Initially, one of Webster’s criteria for use of the building was a resolution of the vacant
Syndicate Trust and Century building, and Pyramid Construction’s failure to achieve title
of the property in 2001 intensified the need for a viable district plan (Prost, 2001a: C6).
The seeming lack of private developer for the Century/Syndicate Trust collided with the
desire of the Stogel/Schnuck development team to identify a site for parking adjacent to
the Old Post Office; the potential that the Century building would be as a site of the new
garage set in place a protracted disagreement between the developers and downtown
preservations (Prost, 2001j: B1).
The city’s purchase of the Century and Syndicate Trust buildings in July of 2001
removed ownership issues from the development plan and accelerated planning on the
OPO District (Prost, 2001g: C8). Details of the Stogel/Schnuck OPO plan, released
preliminarily in October of 2001, included turning the Century building into a parking
garage, acquiring the Syndicate Trust for residential or commercial uses, and
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rehabilitating the Old Post Office for commercial offices for Webster University, a
relocated Missouri Court of Appeals and other retail and commercial users (Prost, 2001i:
B1). The proposal to relocate court offices to the building, where they had been located
decades earlier, came out of discussions between Stogel and Chief Judge James Dowd in
the summer of 2001. Press reports indicated that the financial plan was largely the work
of Stogel and would include a combination of state and federal tax credits as well as
financing from the Missouri Development Finance Board (MDFB); local supporters of
the plan, including Stogel, officials from Webster University, and Mayor Slay, traveled to
Jefferson City in October of 2001 to discuss MDFB’s participation in the project (Prost,
2001i: B1).
The OPO plan, formally released in November of 2001, spelled out the
replacement of the Century building by a new parking garage and the formal participation
of Webster and Appeals Courts. Local preservationists allied with some of new
downtown loft residents came out in opposition to the Century’s demolition (Prost,
2001j: B1). Opposition to the demolition led to a competing proposal for the Century
complex on the part of two downtown developers, Loftworks LLC and McGowan
Brothers Development, and an Indianapolis financing firm. City officials greeted the
proposal as an “11th hour” proposal and reiterated support for the garage plan (Prost,
2002b: C1). Withdrawal of the alternative plan in March of 2002 came along with
rumors that its developers had been threatened and forced to sign a letter distancing them
from the proposal (Shinkle and Prost, 2004: B1). Ultimately, opposition to the OPO
project culminated to a court case filed in May of 2003, with it developers charging that
the case impeded the start of the project until summer of 2004 (Stogel, 2005).
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However, public opposition to the project was just one of the difficulties in
moving the project to the development stage. The Old Post Office’s unique historical
nature—not just a national historic landmark, but a landmark with over 139 items of
historic significance in the building—created a 5 month process of historic review
involving not just local developers, but also officials from the National Park Service, the
GSA, the National Trust for Historic Preservation and local officials from the city’s
Cultural Resources Commission. Secondly, the development team had to cover an
estimated $72 million dollars of the project cost for the OPO project, including the $38
million Ninth Street parking garage, with a building that had serious commercial
liabilities. DESCO estimates on the project determined that the operating costs for the
building would be roughly double of commercial office space elsewhere downtown and
that only 50% of the building would be usable space (Stogel, 2005). Ultimately, gap
financing for the project would come not just from state and federal historic tax credits,
but also from federal New Market tax credits and corporate contributions to support
MDFB bond financing (Prost, 2002a: C1). Stogel teamed with Reeves and Geisman in
asking for corporate and philanthropic commitments (Jackson, 2002: 1). MDFB bond
financing would require not just approval from the state agency, but the agency’s
agreement to own the OPO as well as the garage building and lease the property back to
the developers on a long term basis.
Finalizing details of the financing would take the project development team most
of 2002. Withdrawal of Bi-State from the project in April meant the removal of a bus
transfer station from the plan (unpopular with some downtown stakeholders) and the
concomitant the loss of almost $15 million in funds and tax credits (Prost, 2002c: C1).
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The project got initial approval from MDFB in July of 2002; controversy over the
proposed garage and developer fees associated with the project delayed final MDFB
approval until November of 2002. Even with these commitments, a final $500,000 gap in
Webster’s budget threatened to pull the entire project down (Jackson, 2003: 1). The gap
ballooned to over $3 million in May of 2004; Webster announced that it would be using a
far smaller space in the building, and additional city and private sector commitments
were required to move the project to closing (Jackson, 2004a: 1). Closing on the project
in September of 2004 ended Stogel and Schnuck’s four years of planning on the project.
Demolition of the Century building began in October of 2004.
Downtown and the Loft Builders: Success and Stability
The Old Post Office project was on one level highly symbolic of the sorts of
interventions that political, economic and civic leaders made in support of downtown
redevelopment. It required the intentional and careful intervention of a whole host of
downtown leaders, including Reeves, Geisman, RCGA head Fleming and others, and the
active professional interest of the city’s most connected and seasoned real estate
professionals (Jackson, 2004b: 1). The financing of the project required an active assent
from each level of government and commitments from a variety of organizations and
boards, both public and private. Supporters of the project had to forcefully impose
consent over the demolition of the Century and deal with the opposition of not just
preservationists but also several important downtown developers. Disagreement over the
project cast a long shadow over downtown development efforts and led to accusations
and counter-accusations among downtown’s small community of stakeholders.
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The level of commitment to the project makes it also somewhat idiosyncratic in
terms of the general tenure of downtown development. The extensive predevelopment
period to organize and implement the OPO project led to the frequent charge by some
downtown observers that the project, as well as broader efforts by Downtown Now!,
were not really critical to downtown’s resurgence. A very public appraisal of Downtown
Now! efforts published in 2003 credited Downtown Now! for its marketing efforts and
the work of Reeves as a “power broker” in downtown deals, but noted that some major
projects—like new housing on Laclede’s Landing and the proposed lid over I-70—were
not past the conceptual stage. The article also suggested that total investments in the area
were only a third of the proposed amount called for in the plan and that some elements of
downtown development were not mentioned in the plan at all (Nicklaus, 2003c: g1).
Other downtown developers, including Richard Baron, observed that the number of lofts
created to date was far fewer than the 10,000 units set by Downtown Now! planners in
2004 (Prost, 2004: B1).
Whether by design or as a function of institutional limitations, there was a
symbolic distance between loft developers and OPO efforts, where Downtown Now!
participants spent most of their energy. For better or worse, Downtown Now!’s
implementation efforts were intended to create the structure of downtown development
and not supplant the activities of individual entrepreneurs. While the parameters of the
OPO project have been criticized, what is less disputable is the perception on the part of
downtown stakeholders that, like the convention center hotel, the OPO district was an
element of downtown development upon which other investments rested. Solving the
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problem of the OPO was a part of the general task of creating the right set of incentives
needed for loft projects to proceed.
This aspect of downtown’s market-driven development approach is what accounts
for the general freedom provided to loft developers. The work of Downtown Now! staff
and political actors like Geisman have been confined to strategic interventions to improve
the ability of developers to initiate and complete projects—for example, encouraging
access between developers and lenders and simplifying the process of applying for city
funds. Indeed, one criticism of this approach mentioned by a downtown loft developer
was that Downtown Now! has generally been hesitant to intervene in a strong manner on
issues of speculative ownership and property maintenance, instead expecting that most of
these issues would work out as the incentives to invest in properties improved. At the
same time, however, this approach generally meets the needs of developers as the
capacities of individual developers increase. In this sense, the general tenor of public
input in downtown loft development has specifically eschewed the sort of “command and
control” approach that has been more typical of past public-private redevelopment
efforts.
With a primary reliance on private developers and entrepreneurs, loft
development emerged slowly in the late 1990s. Progress occurred in starts and stops,
with some developments failing under initial proposals and resumed under new
ownership (Prost, 1999a: C1; Prost, 2000b: C9). Increasingly, the success of initial
investments strengthened the institutional incentives, encouraging additional work and
diminishing the risk. State historic tax credits have played a role in every rehabilitation
project; banks such as Bank of America and US Bank have followed this emerging
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market and have established units that help syndicate credits and finance loft deals
(Manning, 1998: 1; Tucci, 2003a: D5). Increasingly, TIF funds have also become an
important part of the financing tool.
The initial loft developers in the area were smaller residential and commercial
developers known for their work in other parts of the city, mostly in South St. Louis.
These included Craig Heller, whose LoftWorks company is credited by many for their
steady progress in rehabilitating property adjacent to the OPO District. Heller’s
Merchandise Mart Annex project predated work on the neighboring Merchandise Mart
and comprised one of the first conventionally financed deals using historic tax credits
(Prost, 1998g: C6). By 2000, only a score of buildings had opened as residential loft
developments, although more were in planning stages. This planning paid off in 2003,
with about 350 units opening that year, 350 in 2004 and 200 in 2005 (Downtown St.
Louis Partnership, Inc, 2004). By the end of 2005, estimates from local developers and
downtown observers were that over 500 units were in planning or under construction,
including a number of larger properties along Washington Avenue that had stymied past
development efforts.
Continued progress in loft developments not only boosted downtown’s population
but changed the consistency of downtown’s market, residential and retail. Surveys of
downtown residents after 2000 demonstrated that the new residents included not just
single, young professionals—the target audience that enjoyed Washington Avenue as a
nightclub district—but also older couples and baby-boomers seeking to downsize their
housing requirements (Prost, 2000e: B1; Parish, 2001c: A1; Prost, 2001f: B4; Prost,
2002e: 8; Riley, 2004b: A1; Evans, 2005b: B1). New Washington Avenue residents
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sometimes clashed with and transformed elements of the existing streetscape. Rising
rents forced out a number of the existing businesses (Berger, 2001a: A2; Shinkle, 2001:
E1). As the loft population increased, city officials worked with both Downtown Now!
and the Downtown St. Louis Partnership to design a retail strategy that emphasized home
furnishings, personal services and destination restaurants (Lee, 2002: C1). The rise of
new businesses and new needs among the district’s residential population largely shut
down the club scene that had brought Washington Avenue publicity and nightlife in the
1990s (Johnson, 2005: F1).
Continued success in loft developments has created a new story about downtown,
its residents and its assets, that is manifested in promotional materials, street signage and
a broader feeling about downtown’s resurgence (Crouch, 2005: B4). At the same time,
the emergence of this image of downtown development has also raised tensions,
particularly between some loft residents and downtown’s homeless population.
Homeless advocates objected to plans to transform a local public park to a semi-privately
maintained dog park (Moore, 2003c: B3; Ammann, 2003: B7). However, these
complaints—the only public and sustained criticism of the Washington Avenue district—
have not significantly altered private plans for investment in the area. Sales of loft
buildings have continued to demonstrate the sustainability of higher sales prices (Evans,
2005d: B2) and at a number of price points, including fairly affordable units. With the
increased pace of development in the traditional core of the loft district, loft
developments have spread to the westward edge of downtown at a pace that has surprised
even the most optimistic loft promoters (Evans, 2005a: C4). These westward edges of
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the loft district have included luxury lofts with prices ranging up to $450,000 and upscale
restaurants and other retail establishments (Evans, 2005f: D2).
Summary
Downtown development demonstrated the conditions under which development
occurs and the roles participants play in initiating and completing projects. Economic
considerations as well as the retrenchment in federal aid to cities necessitate a strong
reliance upon non-public actors in developing and financing projects. The role of public
officials is to coordinate the work of professionals in the development agencies in
supporting projects, including sponsorship of planning activities and the use of publicsector incentives. Public sector officials, like the city’s deputy mayor for development,
also work with developers and their supporters on site-specific planning for projects such
as the new convention center hotel and the Old Post Office development.
The mix of development activities downtown is both consensual and competitive;
planning activities emphasize a public-oriented, collaborative approach in defining a
broad image and goal for initiatives. However, implementation of projects relies upon
the central role of private developers and entrepreneurs and the relationships that they set
up with private-sector financial sources and investors. While private developers provide
the bulk of energy in developments, civic actors are important in developing local
institutional capacities to support development efforts. In this sense, the development of
human capacity is as important as the economic incentives. For downtown, a reenergized
regional visioning campaign reoriented interest in urban redevelopment and downtown
development specifically. In the downtown development that followed, civic actors were
found in multiple places, including downtown oriented not-for-profit organizations, local

234

William, Winter, 2006, UMSL, p. 235

foundations, and other quasi-public agencies like Downtown Now!. Typically, they
brought to their positions considerable experience in other sectors, including local, state
and federal political experience and experiences in the private sector related to banking
and redevelopment.
In downtown development efforts, civic sector entrepreneurialism often matched
and preceded private sector entrepreneurialism. In part, the activities and funding of
civic sector actors represents “patient capital,” in the words of one local developer, which
can stand in for private capital in the interim, untested period of project development.
Additionally, the presence of particular actors played a critical role in connecting
philanthropic and corporate investments to development projects and attracting other
professionals, raising project profile and assuring stability to the development process at
a time when the perception of risk is high. On projects where the incentives don’t exist to
facilitate private sector leadership, civic entrepreneurs serve as champions of projects,
providing a focus for activity.
The creation and implementation of the Downtown Now! plan created a new
institutional setting in which redevelopment of downtown occurred. The plan
emphasized a novel, but widely accepted, vision for downtown at odds with previous
strategies, one that called for the creation of downtown residential neighborhood. The
planning process led to the initiation of new organization, Downtown Now!, that
supported developer’s efforts, particularly around such high profile projects as the OPO
district. At the same time, Downtown Now! and its supporters in the public sector
provided appropriate support to the individual entrepreneurs that did the bulk of the loft
redevelopments. In this sense, the institutional setting supporting reinvestment in the
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city’s loft district, the Downtown Now! plan and a reinvigorated public sector system for
permitting and use of incentives are matched by the economic incentives for
redevelopment of loft spaces. Over time, the success of loft developments routinized
development activity, increasing stability in development decision-making and further
minimizing economic risk of investment in the sector. Successful completion of loft
projects from 1998 onward created a new round of economic and institutional incentives
that extended development activity and has sustained ancillary developments in
downtown’s retail and commercial sectors.
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Chapter 7: Decentralization and Neighborhood Development
Downtown development demonstrated the conditions under which development
occurs and the roles participants play in initiating and completing projects. This chapter
applies this framework of development decision-making to redevelopment activities in
the near north side of the City of St. Louis, a low-income, primarily African American
area adjacent to the city’s central corridor. The thesis of the chapter is development in
the near north side demonstrates how private market actors dominant planning and
initiating development projects. Similar to the story of downtown development,
contemporary neighborhood developed was a presaged by a renewed regional interest in
city redevelopment fostered through the St. Louis 2004 process and the development of
new models of neighborhood development, particularly in the context of the development
of HOPE VI projects. An important component of development strategies in these areas,
public housing reconversion provides a complementary example to the development of
loft living downtown; the creation of a new array of new federal incentives and the
recognition of the past failure of public housing strategies was followed by an
institutional shift in public housing management, creating the platform for the work of
private developers in a host of HOPE VI projects.
Unlike downtown, however, neighborhood development in St. Louis occurs
within the context of a decentralized political structure emphasizing the coordinating role
of local stakeholders, including aldermen. While the decentralization of local politics
adds a layer of institutional complexity that constrains the options available to developers
and complicates the development process, it also provides powerful incentives for
aldermen and developers to work together to foster investment. In this sense, while
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private developers have dominated the selection of projects, their planning and their
implementation, these projects required new patterns of cooperation between private
developers, civic representatives and local political leaders. Additionally, the city wardbased political system means that residents can be acutely involved in local decisionmaking, including playing a formal role in development projects through non-profit
organizations and housing associations, although their power is checked due to the
dominance of non-neighborhood institutions and actors.
Despite an increased attention to neighborhood development within important
civic institutions, neighborhood developers confront a broader political and economic
environment of increased economic competition and decreased public sector incentives
available to assist projects. Proponents of development acted strategically to take
advantage of new opportunities to shape the institutions and incentives that impacted in
investments in projects and routinize development decision-making that advanced their
interests. Nor were civic resources necessarily a hallmark of successful strategies. 5th
Ward and 19th Ward redevelopment occurred within a framework reoriented to support
neighborhood initiatives loosely organized under St. Louis 2004 and the Sustainable
Neighborhood Initiatives and a corollary initiative in JeffVanderLou sponsored by the
Danforth Foundation. While in some areas of the 5th Ward, a renewed interest in singlefamily residential family—prompted by the unanticipated work of new, small-scale
private developers—reenergized local housing markets, more ambitious proposals based
on the preservation of the existing housing largely failed. Their backers were unable to
connect them with the requisite political, economic and social incentives.
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A Framework for Neighborhood Development Decision-making
Even though a similar framework of enquiry will guide the analysis of
neighborhood development, there are significant political, economic and institutional
differences between urban downtowns and urban neighborhoods. With neighborhood
initiatives, the alderman plays a critical role in facilitating development. Additionally,
neighborhood development initiatives can activate the participation of residents,
including through formal neighborhood organizations and other non-profit organizations.
These influences can shape the overall character of development and raise the possibility
of a tension between development priorities on the one hand and the perspectives of
neighborhood residents on the other. Where the story of downtown development in St.
Louis emphasized the overall consensus around goals, in residential neighborhoods the
costs and benefits of local development decision-making can be much more acute,
because they resonate in a political environment where the investments of actors are tied
to their political behavior, particularly voting.
St. Louis’ ward-based system accentuates the role of a constituent-orientation that
adds additional pressure points in development decision-making. Coupled with the
relatively small size of wards (about 12,000 residents), this creates a strong bond between
aldermen and their neighbors. These patterns of political behavior mean that
development initiatives enter an environment where local elected officials, and
principally aldermen, have existing political relationships with residents and residential
organizations. Even where the role of residents is not formally recognized, the electoral
power of residents is one of the issues that aldermen must weigh as they pursue
development options.
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In many St. Louis neighborhoods, these relationships are formalized in
neighborhood associations and organizations. As discussed in Chapter 4, commentators
have generally regarded local CDCs as weaker than their counterparts in other cities,
pointing to their relatively limited role in development production. This position fails to
appreciate the other tasks that neighborhood organizations play vis-à-vis to development
decision-making. While these may vary across the city, aldermen generally support a
limited role for formal neighborhood organizations by funding them, attending their
meetings, and seeking their input in development decisions. Even when they are not
involved in the actual production of housing, neighborhood groups can be critical as a
source of initial support for development deals. In some neighborhoods, this role is
heightened by specific locally developed neighborhood codes and plans. Neighborhood
organizations have played formative roles in developing these plans and also provide
oversight to ensure that projects conform to them.
As in downtown development, neighborhood development initiatives can occur
within the context of a well-defined neighborhood identity, a view that details the
strengths and assets in a particular area. From the specific perspective internal to a
development deal, development professionals are acutely aware of the characteristics of
specific places and how they impact the viability of projects; these calculations are
reflected in the technical language in the pro-formas of specific deals. As important is
how the image of place impacts the project selection and viability and how neighborhood
identities inform these images. By aligning local identity to projects, development
professionals cue to a model of redevelopment that can be understandable to the broader
community, both in economic terms as a recognizable product but also in symbolic terms
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as a form of urban reinvestment. On the most simplistic level, developments capitalize
on image making in their selection of project names, in the marketing materials that they
distribute and in the ways that they describe the project and potential residents. More
fundamental is the interplay between developments and the local characteristics of the
neighborhoods that they are located in and how developers utilize neighborhood identity
in the selection, design and features of the project.
The creation of neighborhood and development identities is both a conscious
project on the part of development professionals as well as an organic process involving a
broader grouping of local stakeholders. In broader terms, the neighborhood
redevelopment remains a powerful symbol in a city, and a region, that tends to view
political identify in localized terms (East-West Gateway Coordinating Council, 2002:
61). While the institutions of neighborhood organizing have usually been weak in their
actual productivity, examples of successful neighborhood development—stories like the
renovation of neighborhoods like Soulard and Lafayette Square—are typically held up as
models for other neighborhoods to follow. Neighborhoods codify their image in specific
development codes, historic district statutes and neighborhood plans, but also in the less
tangible notions of neighborhood identity that can commonly accompany local
descriptions of neighborhoods.
Neighborhood and 2004: The Sustainable Neighborhoods Initiative
In addition to specific place-based development strategies, some neighborhood
development initiatives have benefited from the attention of local leaders stemming from
a conversation about regional priorities that began in the mid-1990s. These included the
Peirce Report in 1997 and 1998 and St. Louis 2004 activities beginning in 1998. These
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conversations, largely led by members of St. Louis philanthropic, nonprofit and corporate
community, clarified a general vision for neighborhood improvements and brought
direction attention and resources to key development projects and to institutions that
supported neighborhood redevelopment. At the same time, this extension of civic
activity met up with a renewed interest in revitalization occurring in the neighborhoods,
particularly those in the 19th and 5th Ward, led both by new ward leadership and
reinvigorated neighborhood associations.
Neighborhoods and neighborhood redevelopment became a focus of this regional
conversation early on, particularly the lack of redevelopment in some areas (Kemper,
1997: 7B). The Peirce Report mixed its calls for a “collaborative spirit” to overcome
regional disunity in solving critical issues (Peirce and Johnson, 1997a: 1B) with
promising examples of best practices in neighborhood redevelopment both locally and
regionally (Peirce and Johnson, 1997c: 14; Peirce and Johnson, 1997e: 5B). The report
decried St. Louis’ missed opportunity in attracting national housing support in the 1980s
and 1990s and called the city’s community development corporation network “anemic;”
at the same time, the report also commended redevelopment efforts taken by McCormick
Baron and “fledgling” efforts by St. Louis Equity Fund and Regional Housing Alliance
(Peirce and Johnson, 1997b: 14). The report also pointed an innovative universitycommunity partnership between the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana and the
city of East St. Louis as example of collaborative planning that involved citizens and
resulted in substantial economic development projects (Peirce and Johnson, 1997d: 5B).
Significantly, the Peirce Report advanced a process of “complex harmonization”
that emphasized collective action and decision-making as opposed to unrealistic
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expectations that regional governance would emerge or, even, that a reenergized city
development agency would be able to foster citywide revitalization (Peirce and Johnson,
1997c: 1B). The report emphasized the significant role of St. Louis 2004 in continuing a
process of regional decision-making, calling the new organization the vehicle that could
launch a new round of civic experimentation (Peirce and Johnson, 1997c: 1B). Initial
plans by the 2004 organization released in the spring of 1998 stressed the importance of
neighborhood redevelopment (Mihalopoulos, 1998a: A1) and proposed a “Sustainable
Neighborhoods” initiative that called for improved quality of life in regional
neighborhoods, with demonstrations in a targeted list of neighborhoods to commence in
the summer of 1998 (“St. Louis 2004 Action Plan – 11 Initiatives,” 1998: A10).
The Sustainable Neighborhoods Initiative became one of St. Louis 2004’s
signature projects. The announcement of the program in December of 1998 kicked off a
series of activities in designated areas, as well as in other neighborhoods that attracted the
attention of local developers and civic leaders. Intense political lobbying about the
designation of the target communities, as well as skepticism about the motivations of
2004 leaders also followed the formal announcement of the program. Indeed, distrust
prompted 2004 officials to forgo plans to initiate a St. Louis Land Trust. Some local
leaders feared that the trust would be used to land bank land in primarily AfricanAmerican neighborhoods for white, suburban developers.
The initiative would go on to have some successes but also what some
neighborhood observers point to as obvious failures. The program kickoff included
designation of 9 clusters in the St. Louis region to receive priority attention, including
neighborhoods in city, county and both sides of the river. Generally, the areas were low-
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income with higher levels of economic and community distress than the regional average.
The clusters included Lemay in South County, East St. Louis, Illinois, Jennings and
Wellston in North County, Walnut Park West/Walnut Park East/Mark Twain in North St.
Louis, Carr Square/St. Louis Place/Old North St. Louis/Columbus Square on the near
north side, Gravois Park/Benton Park West/Fox Park/McKinley-Fox in South St. Louis,
Forest Park Southeast neighborhood adjacent to the Washington University Medical
Center in the Central West End, and the Covenant Blu/Grand Center/Vandeventer
neighborhoods in the mid-town area.. Officials at 2004 tapped two local organizations to
implement the project, RHCDA for physical development strategies and Area Resources
for Community and Human Services (ARCHS) for social services. The intention of the
initiative was for neighborhoods to create cluster leadership teams to launch coordinated
planning activities, facilitated by staff from the two agencies and other organizations.
This would lead to a set of priority projects that could receive additional civic sector
funding. The announcement also included commitments in the amount of $751 million in
loans and grants from a cross-section of local organizations and corporations to support
both planning and redevelopment initiatives (Parish, 1998i: B1).
Announcement of the initiative focused regional activity on neighborhood
redevelopment, leading to additional civic and philanthropic commitments in
neighborhoods and a number of high profile grants for redevelopment activities.
However, the $751 million commitment announced at the outset would come back to
haunt the program’s implementers. Problems emerged in both the planning and
implementation of projects. This difficulty reflected the difficulty of achieving consensus
in clusters that crossed neighborhood boundaries and included diverse groups of residents
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and stakeholders. Some clusters quickly completed planning and moved into a project
phase (Sutin, 1999: 1; Carroll, 1999: C1), but planning in others was delayed for years.
Fifth Ward alderman April Ford Griffin initially asked for 5th Ward neighborhoods to be
taken out of the initiative, and then chose to forgo Sustainable Neighborhood-funded
planning work, instead completing a separate ward plan using a portion of her CDBG
allocation. Complicating the process was a lack of clarity, even among neighborhood
leaders, about how resources could be accesses. Completion of plans in some cases led
to few improvements. Indeed, a number of cluster plans have sat on shelves with no
implementation or follow-up past the plan’s publication.
The critical failure of the initiative was the inability to build capacity in each of
the cluster neighborhoods. In this sense, designation as a Sustainable Neighborhood
cluster offered opportunities that had to be matched by neighborhood conditions,
including attracting outside support for development. For several neighborhoods,
RHCDA was a critical link to external resources, akin to the role of Downtown Now! in
downtown activities. RHCDA benefited from St. Louis 2004 funding and a series of
grants from the Danforth Foundation totaling just over $600,000 from 1999 through 2004
(Danforth Foundation, 1999: 30; Danforth Foundation, 2003: 4; Danforth Foundation,
2004: 7). These funds, and other support, paid for outreach staff to work in each of the
clusters. Besides designation under the Sustainable Neighborhoods Initiative, RHCDA
also landed the central role in a new Enterprise Foundation-funded initiative to boost the
capacity of local CDC’s (Parish, 1998d: A5); the funds strengthened the connection
between RHCDA and potential partners in the neighborhood redevelopment schemes.
RHCDA also received funding from the Enterprise Foundation and other investors,
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including local banks, to capitalize a Predevelopment Loan Fund; the organization made
$4.7 million in loans from 2000 to 2004, leveraging $123 million in housing
reinvestments (Regional Housing and Community Development Alliance, 2004: 10).
The organization also managed a low-interest home repair loan fund funded by both
public and private sources (Kelly, 2001: 5).
This support greatly expanded the organization’s capacity to sponsor
redevelopment deals. From 2000 to 2004, through all of its activities, RHCDA
participated in the development of over 900 units of housing, 250 units as the developer
or co-developer; at the time, the organization had another 600 units in pre-production or
planning stages (RHCDA, 2004: 13-14). RHCDA’s target areas for projects included
three of Sustainable Neighborhood initiative clusters—Forest Park SE, Wellston, and the
Old North St. Louis neighborhood in the near north side cluster. In interviews, RHCDA
explained its role as. On the one hand, the experience of its staff meant that the projects
they entertained had to meet normal financing, marketing and construction schedules. In
planning and predevelopment activities, RHCDA staff did preliminary scans of potential
projects and the costs and benefits of them, including local market characteristics. On the
other hand, reflective of their role in some of the sustainable neighborhood clusters, staff
was expected to push the envelope in terms of market constraints and seek to identify
opportunities for redevelopment not currently served by private sector actors. In this
sense, RHCDA bridges a gap in neighborhood development capacity and generally works
with a local CDC in order to create neighborhood-level capacity for continuing
redevelopment activities.
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As in downtown development, the role of the Danforth Foundation and other civic
sector organizations became critical in a range of neighborhood initiatives. Beyond the
funding of RHCDA, the foundation made direct investments in specific projects,
including some outside of designated target neighborhoods. Among these included a
$1.5 million investment in the Garden District plan by the Missouri Botanical Garden
(Bryant, 1998: C4), a neighborhood redevelopment initiative sponsored by the Missouri
Botanical Garden (Tucci, 1998d: 1), and a multi-year, multi-millionaire dollar investment
in the JeffVanderLou area (Danforth Foundation, 2000: 8). The foundation also used its
resources, in the form of both grants and loans, to support affordable housing
development undertaken by McCormick Baron in both East St. Louis and St. Louis City
(Danforth Foundation, 2002: 31, 43). These investments and support were broader than
the Sustainable Neighborhood target areas, reflecting that specific opportunities, and not
just geography, would guide neighborhood redevelopment efforts.
Patterns of Decline in the 5th and 19th Wards
Like downtown, neighborhoods located in the 5th and the 19th Wards of the City
of St. Louis had legacies of past activities—as well as periods of long inactivity—that
shaped the most recent round of redevelopment. These neighborhoods are broadly
referred to as the near north side of St. Louis. Fifth Ward neighborhoods include Carr
Square/Columbus, St. Louis Place and Old North St. Louis, located just north of the
central business district; the 19th Ward area of interest here contains sections of mid-town
and the JeffVanderLou neighborhood to the north
[Insert Figure 3 here.]
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While these areas’ complex social and demographic history once included varied ethnic
populations and typically urban neighborhoods densely occupied by both residences and
commercial establishments, their fate has been dramatically shaped by their urban
renewal experiences and demographic and economic shifts that impacted them in the
post-urban renewal period.
An extensive historical examination is beyond the scope of this analysis, but the
highlights are important for how the neighborhoods faced new redevelopment
opportunities in the middle and late 1990. The 5th Ward area generally includes the
neighborhoods north of Cole Street—the northern boundary of the downtown central
business district—to Branch Street on the north, I-70 to the east and Jefferson to the west.
[Insert Figure 4 here.]
The physical layout of the 5th Ward area has been especially impacted by urban renewal
activities, including the construction of a series of housing projects on the northern edge
of the downtown. These included the city’s first public housing project, Carr Square,
completed in 1942, Cochran Garden in 1952, the infamous Pruitt Igoe project in 1954,
and Vaughn Apartments in 1957. Other public housing projects completed after PruittIgoe’s demolition in 1975 included the O’Fallon Apartments, completed in 1980, and the
Columbus Square Apartments, completed in 1986. The presence of public housing has
radically impacted the 5th Ward in both demographic and social terms. While the
Columbus Square Apartments included a small number of market rate units and owneroccupied condos, most of the projects in the area were affordable, rental apartments, and
this fact heightened the concentration of poor residents in the area. The inability of local
housing authority managers to cope with the needs of this population—and the
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maintenance needs of the complexes—has at various times increased the level of social
and physical distress in the community, decreasing the ability of the neighborhood to
sustain a needed level of other local services—parks, retail establishments and social
service support systems. The fact that the area is generally surrounding by industrial and
commercial establishments—increasingly moribund—heightened the physical isolation
of this part of the city even with its location just blocks from the city’s central business
district.
While the projects remain primarily racially and economically segregated, a series
of initiatives beginning with the Murphy Park neighborhood in 1996 started the process
of their replacement with newer, mixed income communities. The story of these
projects—how they were organized and who participated in them—is a significant part of
the area’s redevelopment. Outside of the public housing areas, the remaining landscape
of the 5th Ward in the 1990s has been populated with the remains of the area’s 19th
century neighborhoods. While a number of scattered site housing projects were built in
these areas—namely, three rental housing projects built in 1983 by Grace Hill Settlement
House—these neighborhoods generally missed the renovation boom that occurred in St.
Louis in the 1980s, even with the attempt of some entrepreneurs and organizations to
market the area as a historic district. A lack of investment in the area’s housing increased
the abandonment of property throughout the 1970s and 1980s; by the middle of the
1990s, when the 5th Ward generally was entering into a new round of redevelopment
activity, the area was populated with vacant and burned-out housing and vacant lots left
by housing demolition.
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Public housing construction across the area hastened white flight from the area,
and added to other demographic trends, exacerbated social and economic problems.
[Insert Table 6 here.]
The area lost 87% of its population from 1950 to 2000; by 1990, the area was 82%
African-American, with 52% of the residents below the poverty level. The area’s
population decline was particularly dramatic; from 1970 to 1980, the area lost 60% of its
population, with a further 10% drop by 1990 and 30% between 1990 and 2000. By 1990,
about a third of housing units in the area were vacant; from 1950 to 2000, the area lost
76% of its housing units (U.S. Census Bureau, various).
In some of the older parts of the area, resident organizations followed the
neighborhood association patterns typical of local neighborhoods. In Old North St. Louis
neighborhood, an older white community linked up with a group of urban renovators who
moved to the area in the 1980s. They formed the Old North St. Louis Restoration Group
in 1988 in order to advance the preservation and restoration of the existing housing stock.
The group contrasted its agenda with that of the Grace Hill Settlement House, who had
advocated demolition of older buildings and construction of affordable rental housing.
The Restoration Group combined volunteer neighborhood service projects with advocacy
for reinvestment in the area (“Group on North Side Plans Arson Watches,” 1981: 7A;
Vodicka, 1990: 3; “Cleanup Effort Underway on Several Fronts,” 1994: 2D); along with
other small organizations sprinkled across the ward, the group also worked nominally as
a community development group. More significant both in institutional and political
terms were tenant groups in the public housing complexes, particularly Carr Square and
Cochran Gardens. Created through rent strikes and tenant organizing drives in the 1970s
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and 1980s, these groups had gained a level of control over their neighborhoods and were
active forces in both ward politics and in city politics generally (Todd, 1989e: 12D;
“Give Tenant Ownership a Chance,” 1989: 2B).
The 19th Ward was similarly touched by patterns of investment and disinvestment
in the postwar period. The area includes midtown commercial and institutional districts
along Olive and Lindell, including the north-eastern edge of the Grand Center area, and
the residential neighborhood of JeffVanderLou to the north of midtown, bounded by
Olive/Lindell on the south, St. Louis Avenue on the north, Jefferson on east and Grand on
the west.
[Insert Figure 5 here.]
Like the 5th Ward, the area was once a bustling commercial and residential community,
with particular historic importance to the city’s African American community. Martin
Luther King Boulevard (formerly Easton Avenue) running through this middle of this
area was once the site of an active neighborhood business center, including black-owned
nightclubs and theaters; the residential areas just north of Easton was one of the first area
of the city where African Americans were permitted to own real estate (Vashon/JeffVander-Lou Initiative, 2001: 2). In the 1960s and 1970s, the area was designated a War
on Poverty community, and an active neighborhood redevelopment effort led by Maclar
Shepard sponsored a host of community improvement initiatives, including construction
and rehabilitation of a number of affordable housing projects and some community
improvement and economic development projects (“Maclar Shepard Founder and
Chairman of Jeff-Vander-Lou Inc,” 2005: B7). Also significant for the area was the
presence of a number of long-standing religious churches. Washington Metropolitan
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Church, in the southern portion of the area in Mid-Town, actively supported the
construction of the Lucas Heights village, a series of affordable and market-rate
apartments built in the 1970s and 1980s (Rice, 1997: C15).
St. Alphonsus Liguori Catholic Church, located on the western edge of JVL, also
has been actively involved in neighborhood events, sponsoring the construction of new
single-family, for sale homes just west of the JVL neighborhood (Parish, 1999i: C3).
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, church staff was also involved in organizing at the
Blumeyer public housing complex, located on a site adjacent to the church (Dine, 1989:
5A; Todd, 1992: 1E; Samuel, 1996: 2B). The public housing, first opened in 1968,
comprised two high-rise apartment buildings containing over 1,100 apartments and
another 288 townhouse apartments adjacent to the high-rise site.
Despite these efforts, the ward, and particularly the residential communities in
JeffVanderLou, has suffered from economic decline for most of the postwar period,
including a significant loss of population and abandonment and demolition of residential
property (see Table 6 above). Like the 5th Ward area, this decline shaped the dominant
perception of the area as dilapidated and dangerous. A majority African American area
since the pre-war period, the 19th Ward area has a similarly precipitous decline in its
population, 87% from 1950 to 2000, with a 50% population decline in the 1970s and a
20% population decline in the 1980s. By 1990, 55% of the population lived below the
poverty level. The area lost 71% of its housing units from 1950 to 2000. By 1990, one
quarter of the housing units were vacant; vacancy increased to 30% of total units even as
the area continued to lose housing units (U.S. Census Bureau, various).
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Demographic shifts in the area’s population overwhelmed the capacity of local
organizations to produce positive results and, by the middle 1990s, Shepard’s JVL
organization remained in a much shrunken form. Budget cuts, both local and national,
had reduced its activity; in 1995 its innovative job-training program—a partnership with
Brown Shoe—closed to due to economic competition (Stroud, 1995: 1C). The JVL
Housing remained in a precarious state, with most units vacant and in disrepair (Parish,
2000a: C1). Also in a perilous condition was the Blumeyer housing complex. Drug
sales, gang violence and crime in the area prompted police officials to back an anti-crime
effort beginning in 1990 (O’Neil, 1990a: 3A).
The Failure of Public Housing and the Rise of HOPE
A significant part of neighborhood rebuilding in this near north side area has been
public housing improvements, particularly a spate of HOPE VI conversions that started in
the mid 1990s. While the sites are located in local neighborhoods and the resident groups
are fully invested in neighborhood politics, the story of their conversion fits the pattern of
changes in development decision-making that occurred downtown. The failure of past
strategies led to an institutional shift in the management of public housing and the
creation of a new type of public housing, with mixed-income tenants. This strategy was
publicly supported by elected leaders at level of government and particularly Missouri
Republican Senator Kit Bond, who championed a new source of federal funds to support
the projects.
Ironically, HOPE VI conversions have made St. Louis a national example of how
to revitalize publicly funded affordable housing (Morath, 2003: B2) thirty years after the
city became a national example of public housing failure with the demolition of the Pruitt
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Igoe project (Hebers, 1970: 1; Huxtable, 1972: D23). A more careful analysis of public
housing could show how this view of public housing failure as much reflects the political
posturing around public housing; one study published in 2001 found that the majority of
public housing residents did not conform to negative stereotypes and that children who
had spent part of their life in public housing had better outcomes than equivalent cohorts
who lived elsewhere (Newman and Harkess, 2001: 22). However, by the 1980s and
1990s, there was a pervasive perception in the local press that local public housing
projects were failures. Tenant complaints included a long list of outstanding repairs,
including broken elevators, faulty heating systems and peeling paint and faulty
management (Dine, 1989: 5A; Todd, 1989b: 1A; Todd, 1991a: 1A). An inability to
provide security for the complexes, despite the various scenarios attempted by project
managers, meant that drug dealing and gang violence plagued them (Bryan, 1989: 1D;
Todd, 1991d: 13A; Sorkin, 1991:7A). One third of Blumeyer’s units were vacant in 1989
(Dine, 1989: 5A); ten years later, the vacancy rate was over 50% (Parish, 1998g: B4).
The vacancy rate at the Vaughn Towers reached 75% by 1989, leading the city to
propose demolishing the units rather than investing any additional funds to bring more
units on line (Rose and Mannies, 1989: 3A). However, competing political pressures
complicated this proposal, like other reform efforts. Mayor Vincent Schoemehl’s
attempts to restructure housing authority management faced opposition both locally and
nationally. In 1982, Schoemehl “took over” housing authority operations after the
heating systems failed for up to 2,000 public housing residents (Freeman, 1982a: 1A).
However, the lack of consensus among other local political officials prevented broader
restructuring of the agency. Opposing Schoemehl’s move was not only the authority’s
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current management structure and prominent African-American aldermen but also
Aldermanic President Thomas Zych and HUD officials (Joiner, 1982a: 1A; Singer and
Domjam, 1982: 3A; Joiner, 1982c: 3A; Joiner, 1982c: 1B). In 1988, Schoemehl took
advantage of local funding shortfalls to transfer all of the agency’s planning, personnel
and social service delivery functions to various City Hall departments (Todd, 1989c: 4B);
a year later, with another reorganization plan on hold, Schoemehl appointed two directors
at CDA to continue to oversee housing authority operations (Todd, 1989d: 3A).
While Schoemehl’s political skills did foster some local victories, in other areas a
lack of political consensus marred improvement projects. The inability of city officials to
agree upon other scattered site locations cost the city an additional $3 million in federal
funding (Schaeffer, 1982: 3A; Gillerman, 1982: 14AS) and also complicated later
revitalization efforts at Vaughn and Darst-Webbe under the federal Homeownership and
Opportunity for People Everywhere (HOPE) program (O’Neil, 1991b: 3A; O’Neil and
Todd, 1991: 3A). First initiated in 1990, the HOPE program came about in a period of
intense transformation in HUD funding priorities and the development of new
relationships between federal officials, particularly HUD Secretary Jack Kemp, and
public housing leaders (Linsalata, 1989: 1A; Todd, 1989c: 12D; Todd, 1989f: 18A).
Kemp frequently mentioned Cochran tenant management leader Berthea Gilkey in his
national addresses on public housing, and both President George H. Bush and Kemp
visited both Cochran and Carr Square on national tours to promote the new program
priorities (Linsalata, 1989: 1A; Todd and Hernon, 1989: 1B; Freivogel, 1990: 1B).
Joining Bush administration policymakers in support for both HOPE legislation and
tenant management organizations was Senator Christopher (Kit) Bond (R-MO). Bond
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was instrumental in a 1990 compromise that moved HOPE legislation out of Senate
committee (Koenig, 1990a: 14A); his position on the Senate Appropriations Committee
uniquely placed him for a variety of programs and projects specifically allocated for St.
Louis.
The HOPE initiative reenergized the role of tenant groups in local decisionmaking. Under a series of local reforms following a rent strike in 1969, agency officials
decentralized management of public housing to tenant groups (Peterman, 1993: 162);
however, only Carr Square and Cochran retained tenant management at their respective
complexes after tenant management was reined in the 1980s (Monti, 1989: 42; Parish,
1998e: B1). Tenant leaders were strong supporters of HOPE priorities, including
ownership of public housing by residents. HOPE I and II promoted homeownership
opportunities in multifamily rental properties, HOPE III encouraged non-profits to
rehabilitate single-family homes for low-income ownership, and HOPE IV was oriented
towards elderly homeownership (Abt Associates, 1996: 1-1).
In backing these initiatives, administration officials like Kemp and local tenant
leaders would face the opposition of powerful congressional representatives, including St.
Louis Congressman William Clay (D-MO), who regarded these policy changes as a
privatization plan for public housing (Mannies 1989: 1C). Clay opposed a plan under
HOPE authorization passed in 1990 that authorized St. Louis’ housing authority to sell
Carr Square and Cochran to tenant managers in a plan that would convert some of the
units to homeownership (“Give Tenant Ownership A Chance,” 1989: 2B; “Clay Doubts
Savings on Carr Complex Sale, 1989: 12A); Clay’s opposition—and a lack of state
funding for the initiative—put the sale on hold until 1993, when Mayor Freeman Bosley
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made it one of his major housing initiatives (Gross, 1993: 1C). Clay also intervened in
other housing authority matters, including siding with an embattled agency director
(“City Housing Chief Is Asked to Stay,” 1989: 5A) and involving himself in a dispute at
Carr Square (Koenig, 1990d: 4B).
From HOPE I to HOPE VI
The HOPE 1 measures approved in 1990 that allowed for tenant ownership of
complexes would locally as well as nationally become an “isolated experiment” (“The
Mayor Gambles on Carr Square,” 1993: 10B), with mixed results. Six years after the
conversion, no units were owner-occupied (Shinkle, 2002: C2) and the Carr Square
Tenant Management Association was dogged by allegations of financial mismanagement
(Parish, 1998b: B1). Nationally, while 231 housing agencies received grants for planning
tenant conversion, the program returned only 2,300 units to tenant ownership (Rohe,
1995: 441). Following the 1992 national elections bringing a new administration to
Washington, support for HOPE 1 initiatives declined (DeParle, 1993: A16) and funding
for the program was discontinued beginning in FY 1995 (Department of Housing and
Urban Development, 2000: np).
Much more prominent have been the HOPE VI provisions intended to provide
funding to improve severely distressed public housing. The measure was first authorized
in 1992, with appropriations beginning in 1993. The initiative funded plans for the
physical revitalization of public housing developments, including demolition or
reconfiguration of the existing project and redevelopment of the area with additional lowincome and market-rate housing (Abt Associates, 1996: ii). Rating criteria for selection
in the program have included a plan for addressing both the physical aspects of the
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development as well as the social and economic conditions of residents and the
involvement of a broad local community—including residents, public officials,
businesses and service agencies—in planning and implementing the project (Abt
Associates, 1996: 1-8).
By 2003, the program had funded 446 separate grants, with a total public
investment of just over $5.3 billion (Department of Housing and Urban Development,
2003: 1). While federal funding renewed an incentive for investment in these types of
projects, other changes in the institutional structure of decision-making regarding local
public housing would accompany them. Beginning in 1994, HUD widely promoted a
“HOPE VI Plus” approach that emphasized the need to leverage HUD funds with other
local and state sources (Abt Associates, 1996: 5-3). The need for this leverage—and the
structure of some incentives, like low income tax credits—has in practice accelerated the
use of a public/private partnership in planning and completing projects, and specifically
the substantial privatization of the projects in the hands of private-market developers.
Each of the three official HOPE VI projects initiated in St. Louis—Darst Webbe on the
south side, Blumeyer in Midtown and Cochran on the near north side—as well as the
related mixed income development Murphy Park that preceded them has been
accomplished by a private developer, with public agencies and officials playing a
supportive role.
Concurrent with the development of the public-private approach have been a
series of reforms at the St. Louis Housing Authority that has deemphasized the role of the
agency in planning and implementing the projects, as well as managing the units after
redevelopment. Additionally, the prominence of the private sector in redevelopment of
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these projects has accompanied a shift in perspective that had promoted tenant
organization involvement and ownership. While on the national level, this shift was
accompanied rather forcefully with an end date in support to HOPE I initiatives, locally
this shift has taken somewhat more time, and the political ramifications have been longer
lasting. Finally, this new model of public housing reconversion has reshuffled the
political players involved in redevelopment. On the one hand, it has required mayoral
leadership for the commitment of limited local and state funding to support the initiative,
particularly the city’s likely share of state-level low income tax credits. On the other,
HOPE VI projects have required a greater deal of coordination between HOPE VI
developers and the local politicians who support for the initiative has been critical.
Crisis at the St. Louis Housing Authority
Even after Schoemehl’s reforms at the agency in 1989, warning signs of
dysfunctions at the St. Louis Housing Authority abounded during the mayor’s final term.
In 1989, HUD threatened to freeze federal funding because the agency lacked a
procedures and policy manual for contracting (Uhlenbrock, 1989: 8A), and local HUD
officials publicly chastised the agency’s outgoing head for managerial inefficiency
(Todd, 1989a: 1A). HUD officials regarded the agency as one of the “most troubled” in
the Midwest region (Linsalata, 1990: 3A). Following a series of management crises,
HUD again put the agency on notice, demanding immediate improvement on 13
standards of management skill (Todd, 1991b: 1B). The threat of HUD takeover
prompted another resignation of an agency director amid allegations of “bungling” the
agency’s multi-millionaire budget (“Fresh Start at Housing Authority,” 1991: 2B).
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Some local politicians complained that Schoemehl’s reforms at the agency
hindered rather than helped the organization’s operations; Schoemehl was criticized for
holding high-level meetings with agency officials without representation from the agency
director’s office (Mannies, 1991: 1C) and for the appointment of agency consultants with
close political ties to the mayor (Todd, 1991c: 7A). Appointment of Schoemehl’s
candidate for the directorship stalled over objections by HUD staff; HUD officials also
threatened to withhold the city’s annual CDBG appropriation because of the continuing
inability of the city to reach a compromise on the location of scattered site units under the
Vaughn improvement program (O’Neil, 1991: 3A).
Political compromises reached in February of 1992 ended the impasse over the
location of the new scattered site units (O’Neil, 1992a: 1A). However, charges of
mismanagement would afflict the Housing Authority throughout the remainder of the
1990’s, leading to a series of attempts by other St. Louis mayors to recast the agency’s
management. Mayor Bosley made reform at the Housing Authority one of the hallmarks
of his neighborhood revitalization strategy. In January of 1994, he appointed a task force
to study the agency’s operations; at the same time he asked for the resignation of four of
appointed agency commissioner (Holleman, 1994a: 1E). The task force report, released
in August of 1994, charged the agency with incompetence by staff and interference in
agency management by the board (Todd, 1994a: 1D). The findings led to the resignation
of the agency director (Prost, 1994c: 1A) and a new round of political fighting over
mayoral control of the agency (Gross, 1994: 1C). The succeeding executive director
resigned after less than one year on the job (Sorkin and Gross, 1995: 1B). The next
director picked by Bosley and ratified by the agency board in November of 1995 (Sorkin,
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1995: 1B), initially received high praises but ultimately couldn’t steer the agency in
manner that satisfied either HUD or other local politicians. HUD’s 1995 rating of the
agency placed St. Louis’ agency at the bottom of Missouri agencies, finding the officials
had spent only ½ of the modernization dollars allocated and that it took agency staff over
200 days to prepare a vacated unit for a new tenant, almost 7 times the federal standard
(Mihalopoulos, 1996: 1A).
This pattern of management changes and political conflict intensified after
Bosley’s primary election defeat by Clarence Harmon in March of 1997. During the
mayoral campaign, board members had released agency documents critical of Harmon’s
stint as director of security for the agency and some officials at the agency had been
publicly critical of Harmon’s campaign (Berger, 1997: 2D). HUD audits during the year
faulted the agency for improper bidding, including unseemly political relationships
between agency subcontractors and Bosley’s political allies (Tuft, 1997a: 9A), and later
gave the agency its lowest rating, finding, among other items, that it now took over 400
days for the agency to prepare a vacated apartment for a new tenant (Parish, 1997d: 1A).
Further financial irregularities prompted HUD to strip local executives of their ability to
independently spend money (Tuft and Parish, 1997: A7); as a result, Harmon forced the
resignation of the director and a majority of its appointed board (Parish, 1997f: A1).
Development of the Murphy Park, Mixed Income Model
Poor agency performance not only exacerbated political conflict over the agency;
it also jeopardized St. Louis’ first HOPE VI project, slated for the Darst-Webbe project
south of downtown. The Darst-Webbe project first received approval from the federal
government in January of 1995, but had been delayed in both its planning and
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implementation. Early in the Bosley administration, mayoral staff and agency executive
staff clashed over control of the project (Berger, 1995b: 1E), and the initial plan had to be
shelved when the lead developer pulled out of the deal (Berger, 1996b: 1E). After a
March, 1997, date for demolition of the existing buildings passed, HUD warned that it
would pull the grant designation unless the agency came up with a plan for the project
within 90 days (Parish, 1997e: 11A). While local agency officials were right to complain
the delay was in part due to changing HUD requirements for the project—and
particularly the desire on the part of HUD officials to save the adjacent City Hospital No.
1 from demolition under the project plan. Successfully planning and implementing the
plan would require not only a creative approach but also a wholesale change in the
orientation of housing authority officials in how they planned projects and the sort of
collaborations they would undertake to successfully complete them.
While Darst-Webbe was the city’s first official HOPE VI project under the new
federal initiative, the Murphy Park project in the 5th ward area predated it and created the
model for redevelopment at Darst-Webbe, Blumeyer and Cochran Gardens. By the late
1980s, housing authority officials had admitted that they had “lost the battle at Vaughn”
(Todd, 1989b: 1A). Frustrated with the lack of repairs, tenants of the building sued the
housing authority in 1990. The plan that emerged included both demolition of the 5
Vaughn structures and their replacement by 220 townhouses and the conversion of the
adjacent Carr Square units to homeownership opportunities (Rose and Mannies, 1989:
3A).
While Congress, under the leadership of Senator Bond, ultimately approved the
demolition and appropriated $36 million in a pilot program to subsidize rental apartments
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both in a new project on the Vaughn site and elsewhere in the city (Koenig, 1990: 8A;
Koenig and Todd, 1991: 3A), the requirement for one-to-one replacement of the
demolished units stymied progress on the project. This stipulation had been one of the
criteria set by tenants in their lawsuit and was vigorously opposed by some on the Board
of Aldermen who had to approve the project and who deplored the effect that some
subsidized, Section 8 units where having in their neighborhoods (O’Neil and Todd, 1991:
3A; Billingsley, 1991: 9W). As noted above, the delay exacerbated tensions between
local and federal officials, and led to threats that the federal government would withhold
not just additional public housing funding but the city’s CDBG allocation as well. Local
opposition to the plan ended with a compromise solution, adopted locally in February of
1992. Federal policymakers dropped the one-to-one replacement requirement in 1995
(Abt Associates, 1996: 5-3), along with changes that allowed for greater flexibility in
public housing requirements, including allowing housing agencies to rent to higher
income tenants, to evict problem tenants and to include market rate units in public
housing projects (Poor, 1996: 1A).
While the rule changes provided greater impetus for HOPE VI projects locally,
planning for the Vaughn project would continue haphazardly during Schoemehl’s final
years into the first years of the Bosley administration. Like planning for the DarstWebbe project, planning for Vaughn got caught up in politics between the Bosley’s office
and officials at the housing authority (Berger, 1995a: 2F). Demolition of the existing
buildings would wait until the spring of 1995, three years after Congressional approval
(Todd, 1995: 1A). Financing for the project would not be in place until February of 1996
(Berger, 1996a: 2C).
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The designation of McCormick-Baron and Associates as lead developer helped
move the project forward; more broadly, the firm’s assumption of the project helped
reinforce its characteristic as a privately-managed, mixed-income project—a
characteristic that the resulting initiative would share with other St. Louis HOPE VI
projects and other HOPE VI projects across the nation. McCormack Baron, with Richard
Baron as its principal, started in St. Louis in 1977, and became known for a series of
quality, mixed-income housing projects, including the O’Fallon Apartments, completed
in 1980 adjacent to the Vaughn site. The ability of the firm to work in these communities
was enhanced by Baron’s close relationships with tenant organizers and the instrumental
role he played as a young lawyer in St. Louis’ 1969 tenant strike. Baron also
collaborated with the Carr Square Tenant Management Corporation in the 1996 upgrades
as a part of the tenant ownership drive. By the 1990s, the firm worked nationally and
was recognized as a national leader in development of affordable housing (Robins, 1986:
1; Hamilton, 1988: 17; Gallagher, 1990: 1; Edelstein, 1996: 5), and particularly in the
development of relationships with Wall Street financing in the syndication of low income
tax credits and other housing related investment credits.
Baron’s model capitalized upon the widespread distrust of high rise public
housing towers, replacing them with two and three story townhouses oriented towards a
traditional urban street grid, with brick and other architectural details to tie them to an
existing urban landscape. Demolition of the Vaughn buildings included a cast of federal
and local political leaders, including Senator Bond, who lauded a new “model” for
affordable housing and community revitalization (Uhlenbrock, 1995: 1B). Even with the
capacity of the firm, completing planning for the project and moving into implementation
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of the plan meant overcoming a number of additional challenges. Federal commitments
represented only $20 million of the $36 million price tag, and some locally remained
skeptical about the project’s eventual success. Accessing low income tax credits would
require an extraordinary commitment of the state’s annual appropriation and virtually
assure that few other St. Louis projects would receive an equivalent share. Additionally,
the project would require private investment outside of public financing—not just equity
investment in the form of tax credit syndication, but also corporate and other charitable
contributions.
Those sort of private investments were possible because of Baron’s significant
contacts in the local corporate community, and would be a significant feature of Baron’s
community building efforts. Baron’s efforts were widely reported locally and nationally,
including specific mention and endorsement in the 1997 Peirce Report (Peirce and
Johnson, 1997c: 14) and praise from national political leaders on both sides of the
political spectrum (Parish, 1997a: 2B; Weiss, 1999: B1). For the first phase of Murphy
Blair, Mayor Bosley joined Baron in personal appeals to Civic Progress and other
corporate leaders for investment in the project (Todd, 1995: 1A). Murphy Park received
an early investment from NationsBank after its purchase of Boatman’s Bank (Gallagher,
1996: 8B); by 1997, local corporations—including Anheuser Busch, Southwest Bank,
Schnuck Markets, Mercantile Bank and other—had committed $2.5 million, much of it as
equity investment for tax credits (Parish, 1997b: 1A). McCormack Baron also utilized
corporate support in an improvement project at Jefferson School, a public elementary
school adjacent to the Murphy Park site. The firm received designation from the St.
Louis School Board of Education to redevelop the school, receiving the authority to not
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only complete physical improvements there but also the authority to restructure the
school’s educational curriculum and have some authority over the principal and teaching
staff (Autman, 1997: 2B). Support for work at the school came through substantial
investments by Southwestern Bell Telephone and the Danforth Foundation, among others
(Autman, 1998: B1).
Institutional Changes at the Housing Authority
Much of the work at Murphy-Blair succeeded despite political battles over the
management of housing agency and the impact of public housing on local neighborhoods.
However, subsequent changes at the agency and in the development environment in
which it operated would make future projects easier to complete. The use of low-income
tax credits created a precedent, later formalized by Mayor Slay’s development staff, that
HOPE VI projects would have priority over other local requests; the determination
largely quelled local criticism that HOPE VI projects were drawing too large of a share of
tax credits and fully committed the city behind the requests. More fundamentally,
management changes during the Harmon administration placed a series of leaders at the
agency fully committed to the HOPE VI model. According to one source who worked on
the Darst-Webbe project, Michael Jones, Harmon’s deputy mayor for development,
broached a series of compromises between agency staff and city staff at SLDC that
placed the latter fully in charge of HOPE VI planning; Harmon designated Otis Williams,
a senior official at SLDC, as lead person on the project, eliminating some of the
duplicative activity that had been occurring at the two agencies and stymieing progress
on the Darst-Webbe project specifically.
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Harmon also used the management crisis at the housing authority in the winter of
1997 as an opportunity to ask for the resignation of the entire board of the agency and
also the agency’s executive director, paving the way for a new management team at the
agency. Harmon’s choice for the director, Tom Costello, broke tradition from previous
choices; while Costello was a former director of the agency from the 1970s, he had
returned to private development practice as a senior associate at McCormack-Baron
(Tuft, 1997a: C9). More importantly, he fully embraced a new model of public housing
management. Costello backed out-sourcing of some of the agency’s work, including
planning around the Darst-Webbe (Parish, 1998a: E1); he advanced a privatization plan
that called for contracting out of all housing management services (Parish, 1999a: B4).
Costello also was strongly in favor of the sort of public private partnership that was being
used to redevelopment Murphy Park and Darst-Webbe (Parish, 1998f: C1).
While Harmon’s board choices were not long lasting, Costello’s interim
appointment—originally planned for just six months—lasted until the summer of 1999.
His replacement, Cheryl Lovell, followed closely along the privatization path Costello
advocated (Parish, 1999d: B1). Lovell’s previous post as director of redevelopment
projects put her directly in charge of HOPE VI redevelopment, and she was a strong
supporter of mixed income developments. Like Costello, Lovell saw the strengths of the
agency in overall asset management, as opposed to development or housing management,
a position also taken by HUD officials (Parish, 1999e: B1). Soon after her appointment,
agency officials agreed to privatize management at Clinton-Peabody and LaSalle Park
and to outsource all inspection operations to a private agency (Parish, 1999f: B1; Parish,
1999g: A8). Complementing Lovell’s management of the agency was renewed stability
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on the board. Harmon’s picks for the board in July of 1999 included Sal Martinez, a
housing development professional who had worked with a number of north side
development efforts (Schlinkmann, 1999f: A6); a year later, he was appointed chair of
the agency board. Like Lovell, Martinez was a strong supporter of HOPE VI
developments, and, as a part of his board work, he improved the political connections of
the agency to a variety of local stakeholders, including the aldermen where HOPE VI
projects were located.
HOPE VI and the Aldermen
HOPE VI at Blumeyer, and to a lesser extent Cochran, benefited from these
institutional changes and the renewed vision of public housing in the mixed income
model. The announcement in 1999 that housing authority officials were considering
Blumeyer for HOPE VI intensified the fear among residents about the future of their
complexes (Parish, 1999: A1) and led to a series of protests at the Blumeyer site (Parish,
2001a: C2). However, protests were quickly muted, partly because of the consensus
among housing authority officials and city politicians and the relationships between the
local aldermen and tenant organizations (Pierce, 2001b: N1). Friendship between the
authority’s board chair Sal Martinez and 19th Ward alderman Mike McMillan calmed
resident fears and presented an united front after the selection of McCormack Baron as
the site developer; McCormack Baron also agreed to maintain two elderly buildings and
to include residents in the project planning (Parish, 2001b: D2). Like other HOPE VI
projects, the Blumeyer project received strong support from Senator Bond, including an
earmark for social service planning at the site (Parish, 2001d: 15).
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Like Blumeyer, the HOPE VI at Cochran emerged with significant aldermanic
oversight and input. The developer chosen for the project included a local architectural
firm, Kennedy Associates, that had worked on both the Darst-Webbe and Blumeyer
project, and that had close relationships with 5th ward alderman April Ford Griffin and to
housing authority executives. While Griffin did not have veto power over the selection
of the developer, she had significant representation on the selection panel and, according
to one housing authority official, was notified about the selection process. After the
selection, Griffin strongly backed the proposal and the development team in
neighborhood meetings, including meetings where tenant representatives protested the
HOPE VI. According to an official involved in the project, Griffin successfully had one
of her allies to get a key position on the team that was implementing social services as a
part of the project.
Aldermanic oversight of HOPE VI projects represented their interest in promoting
redevelopment activities, an important message in their re-election campaigns (Munz,
2002: B1; Moore. 2004: C1). Additionally, aldermanic oversight reflected a concern that
redevelopment not disrupt their electoral coalition by alienating an important
constituency group—public housing tenants and tenant management groups. In the 19th
Ward, relationships between Alderman McMillan and tenant organizations blunted
opposition to the project; however, in the 5th Ward, the HOPE VI project exacerbated
existing tensions, particularly tensions between Alderman April Ford-Griffin and a
political faction centered at Carr Square and Cochran. In neighborhood meetings at this
time, Griffin allies attempted to blunt the opposition by promoting the project, minority
participation in it and attempting to negotiate between the two factions. However, the
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fact that this opposition was so prevalent and that the project ultimately went through
despite the organization of tenant management indicates the strong incentives for
pursuing the project among the housing authority, project developers and local elected
officials. The tension emerged in neighborhood planning processes conducted in the 5th
Ward, extended to problems between the tenant management groups and the housing
authority—including allegations of financial mismanagement on the part of both the Carr
Square tenant management group and the Cochran tenant management group (Bryant,
2002: 21; Shinkle, 2002: C2)—and erupted full-scale when the Cochran HOPE VI was
announced in September of 2002. The conflict led to a series of electoral challenges to
Griffin for her aldermanic seat and Griffin’s allies in local state representative elections
(Fernandes, 2001: N1; Schlinkmann, 2002: B2). Some Cochran tenants remained
opposed to the project to the very end, protesting at the ribbon cutting that initiated the
project (Parish, 2005: B4).
Politic, Planning and Development in JVL
HOPE VI projects on the near north side represent the ability of a renewed
redevelopment system to sustain successful relationships between private developers and
local development officials, including elected officials. A new system for planning and
implementing projects provided strong incentives for the developments, even when
public housing residents opposed them. These patterns of relationships were replicated in
other large commercial and institutional projects, particularly those located adjacent to
the area in Mid Town and downtown. 19th Ward Alderman Mike McMillan particularly
proved adept at negotiating these relationships and encouraging the completion of a
number of high-profile projects backed by important interests in Grand Center (Munz,
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2001: B1). McMillan’s campaign pitch included the fact that since his election in 1997
more than $1 billion worth of investments had been spent or committed in the 19th Ward
(Moore, 2004: C1).
At the same time, the HOPE VI experiences on the near north side reinforce the
relatively privatized nature of development decision-making, a characteristic that carries
over in examinations of other development initiatives in the area. Two large-scale,
publicly oriented planning processes—the JVL Initiative in the 19th Ward and the
Sustainable Neighborhoods Initiative in the 5th—failed to gain traction and ultimately
bogged down. In the later case, physical development planning processes largely blessed
existing redevelopment activities already occurring in the area, particularly the emphasis
on building new housing subdivisions utilizing the area’s large amount of vacant land.
These activities had a cumulative effect, drawing additional investment in the area and
creating a more or less sustainable platform for additional market-rate development. The
involvement of neighborhood organizations and neighborhood residents came only in
very specific and very traditional forms; where neighborhood organizations remained
involved in development priorities, they did so recognizing the primary place of private
market forces in locating, planning, and implementing development initiatives.
Both the Sustainable Neighborhoods planning initiative and the JVL Initiative
came out of the new engagement of civic leadership that emerged following the Peirce
Report and St. Louis 2004 Initiative. In the latter case, planning activities linked
revitalization efforts in JeffVanderLou with the powerful political and economic
resources of the local Danforth Foundation. The foundation’s change of mission in 1996
focused foundation resources directly on St. Louis area issues, including neighborhood
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development. Foundation staff regarded the JVL project as their version of a
“comprehensive community development initiative”—one that would assess both the
physical and social resources of JVL and target public and private resources to the
community into meeting these needs.
The JVL Initiative also fit with school reform strategies already occurring on the
near north side, specifically the McCormack Baron partnership with Jefferson School.
Baron had intended the work at Jefferson School to be a first stage of additional work
with other schools located in the area (Pierce, 1999b: A6); these efforts accelerated after
the St. Louis Public School Board announced that it would be building a replacement
school for Vashon High School, a prominent north St. Louis school with a long history in
the local black community. Throughout most of the 1990s, a decision over the fate of
Vashon High School was delayed as a part of court supervision of city schools from the
region’s desegregation agreement, with local school officials and high school alumni
supporting retention of the school (Little, 1995: 1B). Discussions on ending the court
supervision and local passage of a public schools modernization bond issue in 1998 broke
stalemate on the issue, providing $30 million for construction of a new Vashon facility
(Carroll, 1998: C4).
According to one participant, announcement of the site of the new school—a
prominent site in the JeffVanderLou neighborhood—capped a process of meetings
between city officials, school officials and corporate leaders and representatives from the
Danforth Foundation. The plan that eventually emerged combined a neighborhood
development initiative in the form of the JeffVanderLou Initiative and a wide-ranging
school improvement program, the Vashon Education Compact, focused on Vashon High
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School and the nine elementary and middle schools that feed into it (Pierce, 2001a: B1).
Creating the plan utilized a unique coalition of local political, business and civic leaders.
The Danforth foundation committed at the outset $5 million for the plan and its
implementation, and the public planning process utilized the leadership of Richard Baron,
former Mayor Freeman Bosley Jr., and community activist Norman Seay, among others
(Parish, 1999i: A1). Planning activities included about 12 neighborhood meetings in
1999 and 2000, with about 500 residents and stakeholders participating, including four
main committees with over 100 members covering such topic as education, housing and
infrastructure, health and human services and economic development
(Vashon/JeffVanderLou Initiative, 2001: 2-4). Danforth foundation staff also worked
with Richard Baron in a series of meetings with local corporate officials to line up
financial support for the Vashon Education Compact and to solicit tax credit support from
the State of Missouri for funding (“Rebuilding JeffVanderLou, 2001: 43); the list of
supporters largely replicated the list of corporate funders who backed Baron’s Jefferson
School initiative.
These two efforts placed JeffVanderLou and the 19th Ward more broadly in a
central place within a wide-ranging revitalization agenda touching every aspect of the
local community. The JVL Initiative plan, released about the same time as the Compact
plan, included ambitious strategies on physical redevelopment of the area’s housing
stock, improvement to social services and youth services, creation of retail districts, and
an educational improvement strategy for both the area’s public schools under the
Compact and adult and other vocational services (Vashon/JeffVanderLou Initiative,
2001). Vashon Compact plans included funds for physical retooling of schools,
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particularly the elementary and middle schools selected, teacher and principal
recruitment, professional development, and after school and educational enrichment
activities for neighborhood children (Vashon Education Compact, 2002; Vashon
Education Compact, 2003). The effort established two primary organizations for
oversight of the plan and its implementation, the Vashon Compact and the
JeffVanderLou Initiative.
JVL Initiative activities did lead to some redevelopment work. During the JVL
process, Pyramid Development and Bank of America began construction of a series of
market rate, for sale homes in an area to the east of JVL (Parish, 1999j: C3). The plan
was cosponsored by St. Alphonsus’ Grand Rock Community Development Corporation,
which was funded by 19th Ward Alderman Mike McMillan and led by McMillan’s ally,
Sal Martinez. Additionally, prior to the beginning of the JVL planning process, Danforth
Foundation officials participated in meetings to determine how to revitalize the JVL
rental housing developed by Shepard’s JVL Housing Corporation in the 1960s and 1970s.
In March of 2000, the St. Louis Equity Fund announced a $7.5 million dollar renovation
of the apartments, with financing that included HUD funds, local CDBG money and state
low income funds (Parish, 2000a: C1). After completion of the JVL plan, initiative staff
worked with the local Habitat for Humanity office to build 20 new single-family homes
in the 5th Ward portion of JVL as a part of the Hope Square project. The project received
funding from the city’s Affordable Housing Commission to cover about 1/3 of the
project’s $1.8 million cost (Riley, 2003: B4). In 2006, Habitat announced a second phase
of the project with another 20 affordable homes, with funding from the State of Missouri
low-income tax credit program and the Affordable Housing Commission (“Plans for Our
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2006 Build Project,” 2006: 5). However, broader residential development efforts within
JVL failed to get off the ground (Tucci, 2002: C1). As one local political official
acknowledged five years after the initiative’s launching, private developers remained
unconvinced as to the viability of doing housing in the neighborhood. The lack of
momentum frustrated some local residents, and, according to one observer, led to the
resignation of one prominent board member in 2004.
Compounding the difficulty of encouraging development were weaknesses in the
coalition supporting the JVL Initiative. From the outset, the two organizations—the
Initiative on the one hand and the Compact on the other—operated independently of each
other, with little consultation or coordination between the two organizations. While the
two organizations shared some of the same board members—principally, the Danforth
Foundation staffer who promoted the JVL project—staff members and the organizations
operated in two very different institutional settings. The challenges to the Compact’s
work were the challenges implicit in the Jefferson School model: distrust among teachers,
principals and some school officials as to the ultimate goals of the mostly white,
corporate and civic leaders supporting the reform package. Union opposition to the
Jefferson School project scuttled plans to replace most of the school’s teachers when the
improved school opened in 1998 (Weiss, 2000: A1), and union officials expressed doubts
about the effectiveness of the Compact when it was announced (Pierce, 2001a: C1).
While the Compact’s resources provided very useful in bringing needed repairs to the
Compact school group, in some areas, including principal recruitment and professional
development, the Compact made no progress, partly due to the resistance of school
officials (Wagman, 2004: B1).
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The work of the Compact grew more difficult when a new school board
majority—in part elected through support of St. Louis corporate and civic leadership and
Mayor Francis Slay (Hacker, 2002: A1; Wagman, 2003b: C1)—hired an interim
superintendent and leadership in the spring and summer of 2003. Including executives of
a corporate turn-around firm, the new leadership was hired because of a crisis in the
school system’s finances and the abysmal bureaucratic performance of the school
administration. New school officials quickly reduced school spending because of a $73
million deficit, privatized a number of services and closed schools in parts of north St.
Louis that had seen significant population loss. Perceived as a “takeover” of the school
system by some local African American leaders, these moves prompted a shake-up in all
aspects of the school system, including Compact activities. Several of the schools closed
included Compact Schools; the shakeup also included transfers of some of the Compact
principals, setting back the ability of Compact leaders to influence school operations.
At Vashon High School, the activities of the system’s new managers exacerbated
troubled relationships between Compact officials and school staff, particularly the
school’s assistant principal and basketball couch, Floyd Irons. Irons was strongly
supported by the school’s alumni and he shared the view of some that were strongly
distrustful of the Compact’s motivations. Relations between the two sides soured, with
accusations against Irons circulated in the local press, and Iron’s supporters charging that
the Compact intended to convert the new school into a charter school that would not be
available to neighborhood residents (Berger, 2003: C2; Wagman, 2003a: C1).
Similar to the experiences of the Vashon Compact, the JVL Initiative had
difficulty sustaining the relationships between diverse groups of supporters, ultimately
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limiting the organization’s effectiveness in bringing resources into the neighborhood.
Danforth Foundation officials first erred by offering the executive directorship of the
organization to an individual without first getting the support of McMillan or other
members of the nascent group’s executive board. Mistrust over the hire marred the
director’s tenure and ultimately resulted in the director’s abrupt removal, a move that led
to public charges of cronyism against McMillan (“Competence not Cronyism,” 2002: B2)
and a cooling of relations between McMillan and foundation officials. While many
considered Sal Martinez, the replacement at the agency and a McMillan ally, a competent
development professional, his departure from the organization in 2004 was also regarded
as another political move on the part of McMillan, increasing questions about the
agency’s long term viability.
Politics, Planning and Development in the 5th Ward
Like the JVL Initiative, planning in the 5th Ward initially received a boost from
St. Louis 2004 and civic leaders associated with it. The 5th Ward had been selected as a
cluster for Sustainable Neighborhood Planning activities and some activists from the area
had been a part of the 2004’s planning process. Unlike the 19th Ward, however, 5th Ward
Alderman April Ford Griffin remained wary of connections to the city’s emerging civic
leadership. According to one participant in the Vashon planning activities, Griffin
declined to pursue the new Vashon High School, acceding to McMillan’s wish to keep
the school in the 19th Ward and thus closing off the opportunity of a partnership with the
Danforth Foundation. More fundamentally, she was opposed to her ward’s participation
in the Sustainable Neighborhoods program, initially resisting inclusion of the area until
the day before the program announcement in December of 1998. Even though she
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relented, Griffin instead funded her own physical development plan and put off the social
service planning process until 2003, after the initial energy had waned. Ultimately, these
decisions made Sustainable Neighborhoods irrelevant to the 5th Ward’s revitalization
activities, although some relationships between community activities and St. Louis 2004
funded agencies did emerge.
According to one local planning official, city development officials began urging
Griffin to undertake a ward planning process soon after her election in 1997. Part of the
impetus for the planning process was the acknowledgement by city officials that multiple
developers were interested in building new single family housing on the vacant land in
the ward (Parish, 1999h: 8). Some of this activity, with varying degrees of success,
preceded the planning process. Outside of the public housing areas, most large-scale
redevelopment projects failed to get off the planning board. Two plans announced in
1988 to convert most of the southern part of the St. Louis Place neighborhood into a new
middle-income community failed after residents protested blighting of their property
(O’Neil, 1988: 1N). Equally unsuccessful was a major plan by the Bosley administration
to blight most of the southern portion of the St. Louis Place neighborhood and replace it
with a new golf course and market-rate, single family housing. Like the early plan,
residents were strongly opposed to the project (Mihalopoulos, 1996b: 3B; Mihalopoulos,
1996d: 1B); Mayor Harmon put a “dead stop” to the project after HUD denied an $8
million grant (Mihalopoulos, 1997b: 1A). Another Bosley administration project, Betty’s
Walk, a plan to build up to 23 new homes in the St. Louis Place neighborhood, stalled
after one of the co-developers, an ally of Bosley, was found to have defrauded HUD
(Tuft, 1996a: 1B). Ultimately, the project only completed 4 homes and the board of
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aldermen rescinded development rights to the project in 1996 and 1997 (Berger, 1996c:
1E; “Board of Aldermen,” 1997: 11A). More successful was the Mullanphy Square
project, developed by a small, women-owned development company that had done no
prior work in the city. The project completed and sold 41 homes in 1996 and 1997
(Parish, 2000c: B1); successive phases of the project have expanded the subdivision to
100 new single-family homes across the southern portion of the St. Louis Place
neighborhood.
Fifth Ward planning activities included 18 public meetings with residents in fall
of 1999 and winter of 2000; the planning activities looked at specific sub-districts in each
of the 5th Ward neighborhoods, as well as the location of new industrial, commercial,
retail and other institutional districts in the ward. An original draft of the plan included
renewed calls for a golf course (Parish, 2000b: B1). However, it was dropped in the final
plan due to resident concerns (Britt, 2000: B2) and, according to one planning officials,
after city officials convinced planners and Alderman Griffin that its funding was not
feasible. Resident reaction to the plan also modified the plan’s call for the immediate
demolition of dangerously dilapidated buildings, instead creating a list of structures
whose fate would be determined by future discussions. Elements of the plan included
strong support for continued development of new single-family housing, projecting a
need for about 400 new, market-rate single-family homes over the next five years
(Schwetye Architects Consultant Team, 2001: 5-1). The plan also supported the
development of retail along North Florissant and North Tucker, two major north-south
thoroughfares in the area, in concert with a proposed MetroLink line running through the
ward (Schwetye Architects Consultant Team, 2001: 6-4) and other commercial and

279

William, Winter, 2006, UMSL, p. 280

industrial sites elsewhere. The team largely punted immediate decisions over the
proposed golf course site, calling for future planning and public input over the mostly
vacant area (Schwetye Architects Consultant Team, 2001: 6-5).
Private Developers and Development-Decision-Making
While the final draft of the plan was submitted to city planning officials for their
approval in the fall of 2000, requested changes to the plan delayed final submission to the
City Planning Commission until December of 2001, with approval of the plan in March
of 2002. The delay reduced the effectiveness of the plan and continued the impression
that the plan mostly ratified existing development priorities. Bolstering this notion was
the fact that the final plan included no significant studies of the Cochran public housing
site, leaving planning for the area to ongoing HOPE VI planning. After approval of the
plan, other implementation largely passed by without significant action. A series of notfor-profit organization planned to oversee residential redevelopment of the neighborhood
(Schwetye Architects Consultant Team, 2001: 20-1) were never created; nor did the
phasing recommended by the plan prove to be authoritative in dictating the location of
new projects.
The point is that not that the work of the JVL Initiative and 5th Ward plan were
wastes of energy; more importantly, the plans were irrelevant to the main tasks at hand.
The reasons why these two initiatives did not directly result in development activities are
complex. They include political differences between planning participants, the
institutional weaknesses both of existing organizations, public and private sector, and the
area’s economic deficiencies in terms of development potential. Market studies
conducted in the area indicate that housing developers in both the 5th and 19th Wards
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faced significant economic constraints, despite the success of housing developers
elsewhere on the north side. An estimate completed as part of the JVL Initiative
concluded that the JVL area could absorb no more than 10 for sale, single family houses
per year with maximum sales prices of about $140,000, with a significantly stronger
market for rental units and elderly housing (Applied Real Estate Analysis, 2000: 4-5). A
5th Ward analysis completed two years later found more or less the same conditions,
recommending a total absorption of about 40 units over a four year period, with the
largest model priced at $186,000 (Development Strategies, 2002: 1).
According to one local developer, the key success of the 5th Ward plan was that it
reemphasized the facts on the ground—that the area was becoming a main site for new
housing development—and thereby accentuating the area’s image as a leader in new
housing development. In that sense, it did not attempt to interfere with the existing
relationships and incentives already operative for a small set of developers working in the
area. These developers gradually extended the market for new single-family housing,
working within existing economic constraints and gradually expanding them as projects
succeeded.
[Insert Figure 6 here.]
This development work started with the Mullanphy Square project in 1996;
homes in the first phase of the project sold for $90,000, with no direct city subsidy, and
the second phase, begun in 2003, started at $145,000 (Development Strategies, 2002: 14).
A second team renewed work on the Betty’s Walk project in 2003, with houses selling
for $161,000 (Office of the Assessor, 2005). A St. Louis Place Estate project began a
few blocks away in 2004; also had single-family houses starting at $161,000, with some
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sales prices over $200,000 (Riley, 2004a: B1). A North Market Place project also began
in 2004, with base models priced between $145,000 and $180,000 (Riley, 2004: B1). A
second phase of the project, begun in 2005, included the rehabilitation of a number of
historic buildings as rental housing. Additional development in the ward included
Sullivan Place, a new $5 million senior building, built by Pyramid Development in the
northern part of the St. Louis Place neighborhood in 2004; the project also included plans
for a series of single family homes adjacent to the project site. These developments
relied not only the economic incentives for investment but also strong political
relationships with Alderman Griffin for support for developments in the form of
favorable recommendations in the purchase of LRA land, blighting ordinances and
redevelopment legislation.
While very little development after the JVL plan occurred inside the
neighborhood, development occurred elsewhere in the 19th Ward, as private developers
saw new opportunities. Most unanticipated was the expansion of downtown’s loft district
and commercial redevelopment towards the Midtown Grand Center Art District. Projects
included a series of planned loft projects and other commercial renovations of buildings
as a part of a “microburst” of activity along Olive and Locust Avenue (Evans, 2005e: 35;
Evans, 2006: C1). As in the 5th Ward, this development relied upon the minimal assent
of 19th Ward Alderman McMillan in terms of redevelopment legislation, blighting
ordinances, and TIF district support.
Civic Involvement and Neighborhood Groups
Like residents of the area’s public housing, residents elsewhere in the area played
important roles in public planning processes. Residents and neighborhood organizations
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participated in planning meetings; in the 5th Ward effort, professional planners working
with both efforts directly solicited the input of neighborhood groups and broke the
planning process into neighborhood task forces that make specific recommendations for
their neighborhoods. The input of residents was particularly instructive in defeating
renewed plans for a golf course in the St. Louis Place neighborhood and for
recommendations of immediate demolition for some of the area’s historic properties.
However, this input did not translate into a substantial role for neighborhood residents in
the implementation of projects, or for neighborhood non-profits to take the leadership
role in projects. Private developers, in alliance with local aldermen, created a system of
incentives for continuing investment in the area. The projects that resulted defined the
area as a significant one for the construction of new housing subdivisions.
In a significant respect, the input of residents in the 5th Ward development
functioned in a form traditional to local neighborhood groups and organizations. The
decentralized nature of city’s politics emphasizes a closeness of elected officials and their
constituents; additionally, city officials recognize the legitimate role of neighborhood
residents to comment on proposed developments. Surpassing this traditional reactionary
role is a standard few neighborhood organizations reach. In development work, more
traditionally neighborhood groups help market their communities, build publicity around
their area’s assets and help hinder development seen as inimical to their neighborhood’s
identity or best interests.
Going beyond this traditional role requires an investment in resources that is not
typical of most local groups and, in the case of the near north side, creating relationship
between neighborhood leaders and external organizations and civic leaders. In the case
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of the JVL Initiative discussed above, this meant a relationship with the Danforth
Foundation. While ultimately the relationship was difficult to sustain in political or
personal terms, the connection brought JVL officials into contact with a broader set of
resources to plan neighborhood improvements and implement key projects. In the 5th
Ward, one example of how these relationships were developed related to the work of the
Old North St. Louis Restoration Group.
During the 1990s and 2000s, the 5th Ward had a number of active neighborhood
organizations. For example, the Greater Pruitt Igoe Neighborhood Association and its
affiliated Pruitt Igoe Development Corporation advocated against the golf course plan
and advanced a series of development projects throughout the 1990s and 2000s.
However, by the time of the 5th Ward planning process the Old North St. Louis
Restoration Group (ONSLRG) was the most active organization operating in the area.
The group started in 1981 over residents’ concerns about the continuing demolition of the
area’s housing stock (“Group on North Side Plans Arson Watches,” 1981: 7A); like
restoration groups in other historic city neighborhoods, ONSLRG stressed preservation of
existing buildings and advocacy for historic district status. The group successfully
lobbied for nomination of the bulk of the neighborhood as a national historic district in
1984 (Landmarks Association, 1983); while adoption of the district as a local historic
district was held up by Alderman April Ford Griffin, the status did provide for heightened
scrutiny under local planning ordinances, particularly review of demolition and new
construction in the neighborhood.
Throughout most of the 1980s and the first part of the 1990s, the organization
operated as a volunteer-based organization, conducting house tours, neighborhood clean-
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ups and other informal activities to encourage preservation of the buildings. The group
also operated as a counterpoint to the activities of the much more prominent Grace Hill
settlement house, which some restoration group members viewed as contributing to
continuing demolition in the neighborhood. Members of the group, particularly its board
of directors, combined neighborhood self-help principles with lobby and advocacy for the
neighborhood in a manner traditional to many St. Louis neighborhood groups. Much of
this activism took a reactive and responsive form towards proposals seen by board
members’ as hostile to the area’s interests. According to board members and former staff
members, this activity included lobbying against a group home for young mothers,
working to shut down various illegal tow lots and outside storage facilities, and
participating in planning meetings to restrict the impact of new highway interchanges on
the neighborhood. Board members represented the neighborhood interests on a number
of official and semi-official planning efforts, including the St. Louis 2004 efforts. Most
prominently, the group monitored hearings before the city’s Heritage and Urban Design
Agency (later Cultural Resources Office) in order to prohibit further demolition of the
neighborhood’s 19th century housing stock, actively testifying against demolition,
sometimes opposed by other residents and local businesses and stakeholders. Because
most of the group’s activities were passive in terms of their interaction with the local
housing market, ultimately these strategies proved inadequate to stem demolition in the
area, even though they did attract a few new rehabbers to the area. By 1996, informal
neighborhood estimates were that the area had lost 2/3rds of its original housing stock
through arson, abandonment or demolition.
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A series of partnerships between the organization and external stakeholders
beginning in the mid 1990s and continuing in 2000s gradually transformed the
organization’s activities and transformed the organization into a more active real estate
promoter. The practical consequence of these partnerships is that they expanded the type
of development activity that occurred in the neighborhood and created an image of the
neighborhood’s future that mixed historic housing with new infill housing. First, the
group successfully lobbied for grant funding under the city’s CDBG program; funding
first started in 1994 and continued for the next 12 years, allowing the group to hire at
least one professional staff member and open a neighborhood office. The group
supplemented the funding with a number of other grants, including grant funding from
the State of Missouri in 1998 and 1999 to fund property acquisition, basic rehabilitation
activities and neighborhood planning (Mannies, 1999b: B3). The grant expanded the
group’s staff—with staff specifically oriented towards housing development—and
allowed the group to purchase key buildings on which to start rehabilitation. At the same
time, the group began informal planning in the neighborhood in order to build local
consensus around strategies. These included a charette held in the neighborhood in 1998
staffed by volunteers from local architectural firms (Jaffe, 1998: D1) and a series of
meetings with officials from Grace Hill in 1998 and 1999 (Freeman, 1998: C1);
according to neighborhood leaders, the latter meetings particularly sealed a long standing
rift between the two organizations, creating an united front for initial discussions about
redevelopment in the area.
Most significant for the neighborhood’s redevelopment initiatives was an alliance
formed between the neighborhood group and Regional Housing and Community
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Development Alliance (RHCDA), which brought more seasoned not-for-profit housing
developers to the neighborhood. According to neighborhood leaders, the relationship
started gradually—with the neighborhood selected as part of RHCDA’s technical
assistance program in 1998, to joint planning activities for new housing started in 2000,
to an official collaboration between the two organizations to redevelop a portion of the
neighborhood beginning in 2003. RHCDA’s support for the organization meant technical
assistance funding providing for continuous in house staffing at the ONSL office on
housing development and also leveraged additional dollars for redevelopment activities,
including pass through funding provided to RHCDA by the Enterprise Foundation.
Additionally, RHCDA staff operated as problem solving around complex financing
issues involved in the group’s joint project, North Market Place, initiated in 2004 and
2005. This assistance was essential, as the project incorporated aspects not included in
other new housing plans in the area, including an affordability set-aside, rehabilitation of
existing historic buildings in the project area and architectural details intending to blend
the new buildings with the existing streetscape. Each of the aspects required additional
funding outside of conventional bank financing; ultimately, RCHDA staff would help the
organization access not only construction financing from Bank of America, but also
historic tax credits, CDBG funding from both Alderman April Ford Griffin and the
mayor’s office, grant funding from the Danforth Foundation and the Greater St. Louis
Empowerment Zone and the Affordable Housing Commission, and bond financing from
the Missouri Housing Development Commission.
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Summary
As result of renewed regional interest in neighborhood development, stakeholders
and entrepreneurs in the 5th and 19th Ward competed for the attention of private and civic
actors and organizations. In order to attract outside attention and support, local leaders
attempted to redefine the image of their neighborhood, promote its assets, reorient the
incentives that had discouraged development and form partnerships with actors from the
private sector. At the same time, the overall system of development decision-making
privileged participants from the private sector. In this sense, in pursing redevelopment,
neighborhood leaders confronted a conflict largely absent in downtown redevelopment,
the fact that very real and present differences exist between existing stakeholders in
neighborhoods, complicating development decision-making and local governance at the
neighborhood level generally.
One of the signs of the success for boosters of these neighborhoods comes the fact
the even though the level of distress in this north side area was great, by the end of the
1990’s there were strong incentives to reinvest in the area. In doing so, developers,
aldermen, and neighborhood groups overcame the negative impact of disinvestment and
the widely held view that past projects, particularly in the field of affordable and public
housing, had been abject failures. Redevelopment occurred with the creation of new
images for these neighborhoods and new institutional settings for supporting
reinvestment. For HOPE VI projects, the new model of mixed-income communities
matched institutional changes at the housing authority that emphasized collaboration with
private developers to tear down and redevelop the city’s publicly owned housing stock
and new incentives from the federal government to fund the work. Neighborhood
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redevelopment activities benefited from a new view of the assets of these communities—
in the 5th Ward most specifically, the view that the area’s vacant land could be
transformed into a series of new residential subdivisions.
The case of the ONSL Restoration Group offers a case of a neighborhood
organization was relatively successful in playing an active role in development activities.
While the story of the ONSL Restoration Group is unique for the 5th Ward, it is not
unique for St. Louis and probably even less rare for redevelopment activities in other
American cities. For the neighborhood, the involvement of the group broadened the type
of projects pursued, and the participation of RHCDA brought additional resources into
the neighborhoods that were largely unavailable to other neighborhood groups in the
ward. However, the RHCDA relationship also quickened an evolution in the group’s
outlook and operating philosophy. Increased staffing transformed a volunteer
organization closely run and operated by a key group of families into an organization run
by professional staff, with key assistance from other experts, particularly in the more
arcane matters of development financing.
This transformation had implications both for the priorities of the organization as
well as its activities in representing neighborhood residents. While neighborhood
residents continued a pattern of informal advocacy and lobbying, this was often done
outside of the technical work of the neighborhood staff and sometimes without their
support. The necessary political relationships required to jumpstart development
initiatives naturally made professional staff less willing to take aggressive stands on
behalf of certain issues and more willing to seek compromises for a longer term goal.
Additionally, while the redevelopment activities that emerged in Old North St. Louis
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have been broader than some of the surrounding areas—the inclusion of rehabilitation of
existing housing in the North Market Project is relatively rare—the general requirement
that the development fit a specific conception of market-driven development meant a
somewhat different approach to redevelopment than that advocated by the passionate
preservationists who made up the group’s initial membership through the 1990’s. At the
same time, the allegiance to development as the organization’s primary mission meant
that other types of strategies that did not easily fit into the market-driven development
approach, like the need for grant-based assistance for the area’s low-income
homeowners, would be difficult to fund and implement.
The group’s participation in redevelopment and the implication of these choices
on its strategies and priorities underscores the limitations of development decisionmaking. Even if development in ONSL expanded the sort of strategies being
implemented, ultimately the strategy transformed the organization and its most active
members from neighborhood activists to neighborhood developers. In doing so, the
characteristics of the organization became more aligned with the priorities of
development decision-making—and the impetus towards the development of new
subdivisions—than the other way around. In this sense, the development activities of the
organization demonstrate that it is relatively rare for the preferences of neighborhood
organizations to differ much from typical housing-preservation strategies that emphasize
middle-class owner-occupancy. While the emergence of regional housing intermediaries
has facilitated the productivity of nonprofit CDC’s—and expanded the type of projects
being completed—in general civic sector resources have tended to enforce the
prominence of private sector developers. Thus, the case of the near north side
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demonstrates that, despite the renewed interest in neighborhood revitalization by a new
round of civic leaders, their activities did not significantly alter the prioritization or
purpose of development activities.
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Chapter 8: Institutional Settings and Development Decision-making
With an investigation of the activities of development participants and the impact
of local settings on their behavior, this case study of St. Louis has found patterns of
development decision-making that are consistent across a variety of development subsystems. Both downtown projects as well as redevelopment initiatives within specific
neighborhoods can be represented by their location within an identified development
market as well as a specific institutional setting relating to development decision-making.
While across the city these institutional settings share a number of same inputs in terms
of participants, incentives and public processes, they are independent and specific to the
context. The ability of developers to successful replicate projects, sustain investment and
create successful markets depends in part of the clarity of these settings and the
incentives that they provide for developers to pursue projects. In the case of downtown
development, renewed redevelopment around loft development became institutionalized
in the Downtown Now! organization. The organization created a supportive publicprivate framework for supporting loft developers, including accessing economic
incentives such as TIF funds. Additionally, Downtown Now! mobilized broad range of
support for such lynchpin projects such as the Old Post Office.
A part of creating new institutional settings for development decision-making are
promoting a new view on development that can replaced older, often failed models of
development. Indeed, the process of developing a new identity is an important task of
actors who are seeking to ignite investment around physical development. For
downtown, the perception of the failure of more conventional strategies of redevelopment
within the central business district—downtown retailing and the office sector—led to the

292

William, Winter, 2006, UMSL, p. 293

development of a view of downtown as an upscale residential neighborhood. For HOPE
VI projects, the model of new, mixed income communities spurred the redevelopment of
failed public housing. Residential redevelopment in the 5th Ward built upon the success
of new subdivisions that presented themselves as distinctly different from the
surrounding urban fabric.
Private and Public Participation in Development Decision-making
The analysis of downtown projects and neighborhood projects suggests that
private-sector development officials play a privileged role in planning and implementing
projects and that their role is encouraged and recognized by city officials and city plans.
Over time, development professionals within the mayor’s office and the development
agencies have sought to transform the development agencies to adequately respond to the
requests of developers at specific points in the development process. At the same time,
members of the civic sector also play an important role, particularly at the early point in
the redevelopment process. Both downtown development and neighborhood
development benefited enormously from a renewed regional interest in redevelopment
initiated by the St. Louis 2004 process. Key stakeholders also played a significant role in
marshalling support for specific projects and signaling to other civic and corporate
funders of the viability of the initiative. Civic sector resources from such organizations
as the Danforth Foundation represented a form of “patient capital” in the predevelopment
process, providing initial support for planning and implementation efforts prior to more
traditional private sector financing.
Development professionals also work to change the characteristics of the
institutional setting shaping decision-making, including altering the mandate activities of
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public authorities over development projects, creating new incentives or shifting existing
incentives towards specific types of projects, and building support for new initiatives in
the broader civic or corporate sector. Over time, the institutional framework for
development in St. Louis has reflected the sort of broad political and economic trends
that have heightened the importance of the private market in urban development. Thus,
in St. Louis, the model of development is a modified form of public-private partnership;
there clearly is a role for the public sector in development decision-making; however, that
role is subservient to private market forces.
Decentralization and Development
As significant for development decision-making in St. Louis is the link between
specific initiatives and local elected politicians. The structure of local politics informs
development decision-making in a manner unanticipated by the scholarly literature. The
planning and initiation of development projects requires strong and capable mayors, and
their staffs, who are able to enforce prompt response of the public sector to development
initiatives and oversee the more or less rational use of limited public resources. At the
same time, there are mutually beneficial relationships between developers and wardbased political leadership. A system that requires active ward representation in the
development process benefits both the mayor and the aldermen. On the one hand, it
limits liability of the mayor’s office for all development decisions and takes seriously the
desire of some aldermen to be active partners. When done right redevelopment can be
good politics and help strengthen the incumbent’s appeal for re-election.
These sort of local relationships between development professionals and aldermen
were seen in the neighborhood projects in the 5th and 19th Ward. Despite the importance
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of other types of actors in the process of redevelopment—participation in planning
processes, working on neighborhood management issues and marketing the
neighborhoods for attention and investment—the overall system of development
decision-making privileged participants from the private sector. In this sense, even with
the fact that development decisions are often made at the ward level, neighborhood
residents and their organizations play important but limited roles in development
decision-making. The norms of the community are most likely to be institutionalized in
the specific images relating to neighborhood identity, and most neighborhood groups and
residents work in traditional manners in order to protect the perceived interests of their
communities. However, this places residents and their organizations in a relatively
reactive role. Even where neighborhood organizations remained opposed to projects—
for example, in the case of some downtown residents who opposed the Old Post Office
project and public housing residents concerned about the impact of HOPE VI projects—
these concerns will generally not be adequate to stem the activities of a renewed privatepublic interest in completing the project.
The case of the ONSLRG demonstrates that the role of neighborhood
organizations in redevelopment is relatively small and dependent upon strong
relationships with other civic organizations that link them with other resources. While
the organization has succeeded in initiating physical development projects, this has only
been possible with the outside assistance of a very capable partner and the projects have
generally only marginally broadened the over-all emphasis of new construction in the
area. The relatively limited role of neighborhood residents and organizations like
ONSLRG in the development process raises the possibility of political tensions between
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the priorities of neighborhood residents and private developers and that private
development may not be able to adequately meet the needs of neighborhood residents,
particularly the poorest residents in the area.
Neo-Institutionalism and Urban Development
While the reliance on local characteristics limits the application of some of the
key findings, the study does have some degree of replication to other cities and
metropolitan areas. By focusing on the local institutional setting for urban development,
the study identifies that even relatively “weak regime” cities like St. Louis can develop
the incentives for stable and repeated decision-making; this is a conclusion that is
unanticipated by either the political-economic framework, where local behavior is
unappreciated, or regime studies, which sees local collaboration as a function of a
relatively small set of participants. In this sense, St. Louis’ experiences suggest that
urban regime theory, which has dominated urban theory since its introduction, is not
adequate to understanding development decision-making and in application to urban
development may miss some of the factors critical for initiating and sustaining
development decision-making. Regime theory presents a relatively static view of
decision-making processes that have a relatively small set of participants, with welldefined roles; in the view of most regimes theorists, regimes are conceptualized as more
or less equivalent across the urban space. In the case of St. Louis, this framework
underestimates the importance of other types of actors—particularly civic actors who
often are the most important stakeholder at the front end of the development process—as
well as the factor of local political institutions in structuring development decisionmaking.

296

William, Winter, 2006, UMSL, p. 297

By contrast, neo-institutionalism provides a more flexible framework for
understanding development decision-making and urban development generally. In this
study, neo-institutionalist theory has been employed to conceptualize development
decision-making within the context of institutional settings comprising planning and
implementation activities in specific local markets. In the case of St. Louis, public
officials play specific, supportive role in encouraging the emergence of development
initiatives; however, development planning and implementation largely takes place in
decentralized decision-making structures where the activities of place-based
entrepreneurs—particularly from the private sector—are key. While these institutional
settings share general characteristics citywide—for example, in the allocation of CDBG
and other public resources—in other aspects they are specific to local, neighborhoodlevel characteristics. In this sense, the framework of institutional settings accounts for
the emergence of development initiatives in weak markets—where local entrepreneurs
engage in activities to define, promote and institutionalize incentives for
redevelopment—as well as markets where the incentive structure for local developments
are stable.
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Table 1: Population of City of St. Louis, St. Louis County and St. Charles County
1900-200
City of St. Louis
% Change
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000

575,000
687,000
773,000
821,000
816,000
856,000
750,000
622,000
453,000
397,000
348,000

Source: U.S. Census, 1900 - 2000

19%
13%
6%
-1%
5%
-12%
-17%
-27%
-12%
-12%

St. Louis County
% Change
50,000
82,000
101,000
212,000
274,000
406,000
703,000
951,000
974,000
993,000
1,016,000

64%
23%
110%
29%
48%
73%
35%
2%
2%
2%

St. Charles County
% Change
24,000
24,000
22,000
24,000
25,000
30,000
53,000
93,000
144,000
213,000
284,000

0%
-8%
9%
4%
20%
77%
75%
55%
48%
33%

Table 2: Racial Make-up of the City of St. Louis
1950 - 2000
Total
Population
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000

856,000
750,000
622,000
453,000
397,000
348,000

Source: U.S. Census, 1950 - 2000

White
Population
702348
534004
365620
242576
202085
152666

%
White
82%
71%
59%
54%
51%
44%

Black
Population
153,766
214,377
254,268
206,386
188,408
178,266

%
Black
18%
29%
41%
46%
47%
51%

Table 3: County Employment Patterns, 1930 - 1990
City of St. Louis, St. Louis County and St. Charles County
1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

City of St. Louis
Agricultural
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale
Retail
Services
Communications
Transportation
Financial/Real Estate
Public Administration
Total
St. Louis County
Agricultural
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale
Retail
Services
Communications
Transportation
Financial/Real Estate
Public Administration
Total
St. Charles County
Agricultural
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale
Retail
Services
Communications
Transportation
Financial/Real Estate
Public Administration
Total
Source: US Census, 1930 - 1990

1,320
941
27,653
142,220
71,551
88,543
6,159
29,092
15,852
2,791
386,122
6,476
643
8,622
21,883
14,049
19,645
1,160
5,417
4,344
685
82,924
3,226
115
604
2,362
970
1,298
98
445
140
50
9,308

625
286
13,903
111,045
15,925
56,975
68,425
3,582
36,234
15,117
11,356
323,563

769
235
15,347
131,987
19,352
58,501
67,041
4,566
33,310
15,479
19,937
366,524

748
188
10,228
114,815
10,838
39,887
63,056
3,630
21,652
12,803
16,155
294,000

1,147
282
7,360
64,350
12,014
33,015
68,200
3,095
14,883
10,588
16,781
231,765

782
192
5,853
37,460
7,466
25,066
60,483
2,547
11,473
9,349
12,395
173,066

1,067
140
6,343
24,393
6,735
27,723
62,354
2,774
10,152
10,186
9,557
161,434

5,250
283
6,854
26,824
5,948
15,659
24,084
1,596
6,939
5,633
3,049
102,119

3,615
255
11,307
49,616
8,511
25,690
28,092
2,774
11,506
8,267
6,893
156,526

2,243
391
15,402
96,051
13,057
39,214
49,305
4,287
16,781
15,532
10,937
263,200

2,392
560
19,554
106,072
26,852
64,391
94,640
5,956
21,251
22,979
19,222
384,409

2,608
704
22,071
106,870
26,830
81,965
137,994
9,406
28,829
32,253
20,218
469,768

3,598
631
23,096
95,164
28,621
84,193
170,024
11,620
29,094
43,044
18,436
507,521

3,057
102
549
1,978
148
1,091
1,482
44
336
138
185
9,110

2,357
96
918
3,692
222
1,426
1,692
94
526
225
381
11,629

1,346
165
1,818
7,220
404
2,467
2,871
191
821
516
540
18,359

889
175
2,885
12,083
1,382
5,456
6,637
677
1,910
1,341
1,376
34,811

1,188
189
4,334
19,931
3,116
11,294
15,600
1,633
4,226
3,193
2,171
66,875

1,367
188
7,506
26,336
5,419
20,034
30,779
2,752
7,909
6,873
3,200
112,393

Table 4: CDBG Appropriations, City of St. Louis, 1975 - 2006
Program Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

Amount
$15 million
$15 million
$16 million
$33 million
$34 million
$34 million
$38 million
$30 million
$29 million
$28 million
$24 million
$20 million
$21 million
$20 million
$21 million
$20 million
$20 million
$22 million
$22 million
$26 million
$30 million
$30 million
$31 million
$30 million
$29 million
$29 million
$29 million
$29 million
$27 million
$27 million
$27 million
$24 million

Source: Office of the Comptroller

Table 5: Public Development Agencies in the City of St. Louis
Year Established

Name

Authority

Description

1912

City Plan Commission

Local

City planning agency. Merged into CDA in 1974.

1939

St. Louis Housing Authority

State

1951

Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority State

Constructs, manages and repairs housing projects, to assist in determination
of local blight and how to ameliorate blight.
Prepares and recommend redevelopment and urban renewal plans and to
contract to carry out such plans. Part of SLDC.

1967

Planned Industrial Expansion Authority

State

1967

Industrial Development Authority

State

1971

Land Reutilization Agency (LRA)

State

1974

Community Development Agency

Local

1976

St. Louis Local Development Corporation

State

Provides grants and loans to local businesses for expansion and startup.
Overseen by a commission and staffed by SLDC employees.

1980

Heritage and Urban Design Commission

Local

Reviews development activities within historic districts, approves plans and
permits. Cultural Resources Office of Planning and Urban Design.

1982

Tax Increment Financing Commission

State

1983

Operation Impact

Local

1988

Economic Development Corporation (EDC)

Local

Approves all tax increment financing projects. Part of SLDC, overseen by
commission.
Receives and uses CDBG and other funding to complete housing
development activities. Now part of CDA.
Formed to consolidate activities of 6 independently chartered economic
development organizations-LCRA, LRA, PIEA, SLLDC, Port Authority, IDA.
Changed to St. Louis Development Corporation in 1990.

1990

St. Louis Development Corporation (SLDC)

Local

1998

St. Louis Regional Empowerment Zone

Federal

1999

Planning and Urban Design Agency (PDA)

Local

1999

Community Development Administration

Local

2000

Affordable Housing Commission

Local

Source: Various

Assists in Chapter 100 development projects, including certifying tax
exemptions and assisting in property acquisition. Part of SLDC
Issues tax exempt revenue bonds to finance large-scale industrial, multifamily housing, and non-profit development projects. Part of SLDC.
Receives title to tax delinquent property, markets and sells property for
redevelopment. Managed by SLDC staff as part of umbrella organization
since 1990, overseen by three member commission.
Established to receive federal funds under CDBG program. Coordinates
expenditure of funds and work of additional agencies. Currently exists as
Community Development Administration.

Renamed from EDC with strengthened oversight of CDA and federal funding
for development, residential and commercial.
Oversees use of federal grant and tax incentives for variety of community
development projects.
Consolidated planning, urban design and research activities at CDA and
Heritage into one agency with cabinet status. Overseen by a Planning
Commission. Undertakes all responsibilities done by predecessor units.
Predecessor agency to Community Development Agency.
Oversees providing grants and loans for low income and transition housing
using funds collected through a special city use tax.

Figure 1: City of St. Louis Organizational Chart

Source: City of St. Louis Community Information Network

Table 6: Neighborhood Change, 1950 - 2005
5th Ward and 19th Ward Census Tracts
1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2005

65782 58667 35664 13092 11788
40398 28763 11504 3235 1670
25870 29833 24053 10572 9993
-1%
-4%
-6%
-1%
39% 51% 67% 81% 85%
76% 35% 45% 38% 49%
52%
19451 18666 14970 6394 6426
2% 11% 30% 26% 32%
85% 88% 86% 81% 84%

8465
842
7409
-3%
88%
47%
43%
4831
36%
83%

8287
829
7263
0%
88%

32239 26064 17242
9444 2492
423
22775 23536 16765
-2%
-3%
71% 90% 97%
85% 40% 48%

4693
18
4630
-3%
99%
55%
49%
2672
31%
77%

4322
64
4189
-1%
97%

5th Ward Tracts
Population
White
Black
% Annual Change Population From Last Population Count
% Black
% Same House 5 Years
% Poor Residents
Total Units
% Vacant
% Renter

4652
36%
82%

19th Ward
Population
White
Black
% Annual Change Population From Last Population Count
% Black
% Same House 5 Years
% Poor Residents
Total Units
% Vacant
% Renter

Source: Bureau of the Census, 1950-2000; Claritas, Inc. 2005

8579
2%
81%

8126
7%
80%

7008
18%
82%

8938
57
8842
-5%
99%
54%
4241
19%
76%

7156
73
7046
-2%
98%
62%
55%
3694
26%
76%

2475
31%
78%

